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Below is an extract from a commentary originally posted at www.speculative-investor.com on
18th May, 2008.
Inflation Risk and Credit Risk
Paul van Eeden recently published a very
negative article about bonds (he expects bond prices to tank and interest
rates to soar). We don't disagree with Mr. van Eeden's view that interest
rates will eventually have to move much higher. We are, after all, long-term
bearish on bonds. However, his ultra-bearish view on bonds is partly based
on the false premise that the inflation (money-supply growth) rate is currently
at the very elevated level of around 17%.
Over the past few months we've given a lot of thought to how the money supply
should be measured and have discussed some of our thoughts/conclusions in previous
commentaries. For example, refer to the "Measuring the money supply" piece
in the 21st April Weekly Update. We are still not sure that we have identified
the ideal measure of money supply or even if such an ideal exists within today's
monetary system, but we are sure that time deposits and institutional money-market
funds do not constitute money and should therefore not be counted when determining
the total supply of money. This means that M3, the monetary aggregate upon
which Mr. van Eeden relies, does not provide a reliable estimation of the money
supply.
A far more accurate representation of the money supply picture is provided
by the "True Money Supply" (TMS) aggregate defined HERE.
The following chart shows that the year-over-year (YOY) growth rate of TMS
is presently about 3.5%. To put it another way, TMS tells us that the inflation
(money-supply growth) rate is presently in the bottom quartile of its 10-year
range.

Our statement that the US inflation rate is presently in the bottom quartile
of its 10-year range may appear to be absurd given that the prices for various
commodities and everyday goods/services are rocketing upward, but today's rising
prices are largely due to the massive inflation that occurred years ago; specifically,
the massive inflation in the US during 1998-2004 and outside the US during
2003-2006. There is often a multi-year lag between the cause (money-supply
growth) and the effect (rising prices), which is one reason why so few people
are able to see the link between money-supply changes and purchasing power
changes.
During any long-term inflation cycle the major beneficiaries of the inflation
will be the sectors of the economy where the supply/demand fundamentals are
the most bullish; that is, those sectors where there is relative scarcity.
Commodities should continue to be the major beneficiaries during the current
inflation cycle -- a cycle that's probably nowhere near an end -- because that's
where the relative scarcity now lies, but the downward correction in the money-supply
growth rate over the past few years creates an intermediate-term hazard for
commodity investors.
We expect that wider recognition of the inflation problem will eventually
bring about a major decline in Treasury bond prices (a major rise in bond yields),
but the temporarily SLOW rate of US money-supply growth over the past 2-3 years
could support US T-Bond prices over the coming 6 months by putting irresistible
downward pressure on the prices of industrial commodities.
In addition to inflation risk, Mr. van Eeden points to credit risk as a reason
why interest rates must rise. Here we are in almost total agreement. A type
of financial alchemy took place over the past several years whereby 'dodgy'
debts were packaged up and, with the help of bond insurers and rating agencies,
'magically' transformed into investment-grade bonds with interest rates that
reflected minimal default risk. The upshot is that the interest rate on non-Treasury
debt is now generally way too low in absolute terms and relative to the interest
rate on Treasury debt of comparable duration.
We therefore think that a bet against high-risk/high-yield corporate debt
and/or a bet on widening credit spreads would make sense. Interest rates will
simply have to rise to compensate lenders for the very real risk of default.
Keep in mind, though, that there is no direct default risk (credit risk) associated
with Treasury debt, only indirect default risk via inflation (the central bank
will always be ready, willing and able to purchase all new government debt
if other buyers cannot be found). As a result, US Treasuries should not be
hurt as the market prices-in greater credit risk.
In other words, the increasing awareness of credit risk is a reason to be
bearish on NON-government debt.
Gold and Bonds
The absolute level of the T-Bond yield doesn't play a significant part in
our gold market analysis. When inflation fears finally begin to get out of
hand the gold price and the T-Bond yield will move sharply higher together,
but to perform well gold doesn't need rampant inflation fears and the surge
in bond yields that always accompanies such fears. Interest rate differentials,
as opposed to any particular interest rate, are what matter as far as gold's
prospects are concerned.
Regular TSI readers would realise that the interest rate differentials we
are referring to are yield spreads (differences between long-term and short-term
interest rates) and credit spreads (differences between the interest rates
on high risk and relatively low risk debt securities of comparable durations).
Our view is that the widening of yield and credit spreads creates a bullish
interest-rate backdrop for gold, regardless of whether T-Bond yields happen
to be rising or falling. This is because widening yield and credit spreads
are symptoms of contracting financial market liquidity and declining confidence.
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