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Regular
readers of Outside the Box will be familiar with Michael Lewitt's thoughtful
commentary. Today, he reminds us that much of the turmoil we are in could have
been avoided with proper regulatory structures and then does a very poignant
analysis of various sectors of the economy. I agree with him that we have not
seen the worst and that we will continue to see this mild recession/slow recovery
for longer than we should without true structural reform.
On a side note, I will be on CNBC Tuesday morning at around 10:00 or 10:30
with Mark Haines and Erin Burnett, talking about commodity prices and regulation.
So without further ado, let's jump into today's Outside the Box.
John Mauldin, Editor
Outside the Box
The HCM Market Letter
by Michael E. Lewitt
The Hollow Men
We are the hollow men
We are the stuffed men
Leaning together
Headpiece filled with straw. Alas!
Our dried voices, when
We whisper together
Are quiet and meaningless
As wind in dry grass
Or rats' feet over broken glass
In our dry cellar
Shape without form, shade without colour,
Paralysed force, gesture without motion;
Those who have crossed
With direct eyes, to death's other Kingdom
Remember us - if at all - not as lost
Violent souls, but only
As the hollow men
The stuffed men.
T.S. Eliot (1925)
Introduction - The Mean Season
While many economic pundits are trying to predict the end of the American
recession that began last summer, HCM regrets to inform everybody that
the United States' economy is entering hurricane season. And we don't call
it The Mean Season down here in Florida for nothing. The economic headwinds
that have been buffeting the United States for the past several months are
only increasing in velocity despite the Herculean efforts of the powers-that-be
to bolster the system against collapse. At this point, the domestic economic
picture can only be described as ominous. Energy prices have risen from dangerously
high to prohibitively high. Housing prices are continuing to drop at alarming
rates in many sections of the country. Banks remain reluctant to lend either
to individuals or corporations for virtually any type of transaction. And our
political and business elites remain a prosper of Hollow Men who continue to
whistle past the graveyard as their limousines chauffeur them home each night
to their gated mansions.
HCM harps on this leadership void because policy failures led us into
our current difficulties. Inadequate financial regulation allowed unfettered
securitization and leverage to push the system to the brink of collapse. A
complete failure to fashion a responsible energy policy has led to skyrocketing
gasoline prices. The damage inflicted on investors, consumers and businesses
by these failures were avoidable. Instead, the political and financial elite
placed their own short-term interests ahead of the long-term interests of everybody
else, and the results are plain to see: burgeoning inflation, choked credit
markets, and a deteriorating physical, moral and cultural climate. The only
way to improve things is to identify what ails us and then initiate systemic
reform. But systems cannot change unless the individuals who manage and participate
in them are willing to change. HCM's past two newsletters ("How to Fix
It," April 1, 2008 and "Why We Must Fix It," May 1, 2008) were attempts to
engage our readers in the type of debate that must occur as we enter a Presidential
election at this crucial and uncertain time in history. In this issue, HCM focuses
to a greater extent than in our last two issues on the economic headwinds that
are frankly alarming us.
The U.S. Economy
An array of American industries is beginning to experience deep distress.
Three in particular are about to experience a wave of restructurings or defaults
that will drive a stake through the heart of the American economy: airlines,
automobiles and retailers.
The Airline Industry - Unfriendly Skies
Having tried to merge in virtually every permutation available and failed,
the airlines are now left with no choice but to cut capacity and pray for oil
prices to fall. American Airlines, generally considered the best managed and
healthiest U.S. airline, announced on May 21, 2008 that it will cut its capacity
by 12 percent and reduce its workforce by a commensurate amount due to high
oil prices (which account for 40 percent of its cost structure).[1] Delta
and Northwest, which had the dubious distinction of filing for bankruptcy on
the same day, have announced that they will merge (although in the airline
industry there is a huge distance between the cup and the lip, so whether this
deal is ultimately consummated remains to be seen). United and USAir have been
flirting with each other but seem unlikely to mate despite titters that they
may try to hook up again. The bottom line is that airlines, which are marginal
businesses in the best of times, are unsustainable businesses with oil at current
levels. The industry was partially nationalized after 9-11. The current oil
spike should finish the job.
The Automobile Industry - One Big Pothole
The automobile industry continues to be weighed down by the albatrosses of
outmoded products, unionized workforces, crippling legacy costs, higher raw
material costs and the unavoidable conclusion that the world has passed them
by. It is both startling and depressing to hear American automakers just now
coming to the conclusion that they are still manufacturing too many gas-guzzling
trucks and SUVs and too few hybrid and diesel passenger vehicles. Few industries
have seen such profound failures of vision and leadership. Ford announced in
late May that it no longer expects to be profitable in 2009 and expects to
produce 120,000 to 150,000 fewer trucks and SUVs in the third quarter of 2008
than a year earlier, and 60,000 to 100,000 fewer in the fourth quarter of this
year than last year. Job losses and plant closings are sure to follow unless
current facilities can be converted to manufacture more fuel efficient vehicles.
Ford is generally considered the healthiest of the Big Three.
Now General Motors, whose stock (see Graph 1 below) has hit a multi-decade
low, is preparing a new restructuring plan in order to reduce costs and preserve
cash. The reference to "preserving cash" should raise alarm-bells in the minds
of investors in General Motor's debt and equity securities. HCM has
long maintained in this publication and elsewhere that General Motors will
ultimately have to restructure its balance sheet (probably through a bankruptcy
filing). We take no pleasure in noting that the evidence is mounting that General
Motor's woes appear to be accelerating. The ongoing soap opera at General Motor's
largest parts supplier, Delphi Corp.,[2] is
also placing additional financial stress on the company since General Motors
has continuing financial obligations to the parts maker, which it spun off
several years ago. Investors should not for one minute try to convince themselves
that General Motors is too big to fail. It is not a financial institution like
Bear Stearns whose bankruptcy would call into doubt the viability of the financial
system. General Motors is just a stumbling industrial giant that has outlived
its usefulness and failed to adapt to the times. Investors should avoid
General Motors' securities even if it means taking losses at current prices.

Some private equity players thought they could outsmart the trends that were
pushing America's auto industry onto the junk heap. In what is turning out
to be the irony of ironies, General Motors was thought by some (including HCM)
to be selling its crown jewel when it parted with a majority stake in its finance
arm, GMAC, to private equity Cerberus Capital Management, L.P. ("Cerberus")
in a 2007 transaction. Instead, Cerberus is scrambling to keep GMAC afloat
under the weight of its mortgage business, Residential Capital, LLC ("ResCap"),
which has suffered enormously from the collapse of the housing market. Not
sufficiently sated with swallowing half of GMAC, Cerberus went on to gobble
up Chrysler Corp. and Chrysler Finance. Now Cerberus is desperately trying
to figure out how to keep that failed automobile company and its finance arm
from going under. Chrysler is a disaster unto itself, which is why Daimler
AG was so eager to dump it. Chrysler has three North American plants producing
full- size pickup trucks but last year sold only 358,000, or less than two
plants' worth. In the dictionary of private equity terms, the automobile industry
may soon come to be defined as "Waterloo."
The Retail Industry - Dropping Before They Shop
When you're about to lose your home and you can't afford to fill your car
with gas at $4.00/gallon, you're probably not thinking about driving to the
mall to spend more of the money you don't have. The U.S. consumer - the one-time
engine of global economic growth - is struggling mightily, and retailers are
feeling the pain. The year began with a string of smaller retailers throwing
in the towel and filing Chapter 11, including several furniture retailers (Bombay,
Levitz, Domain and Wickes), Sharper Image, Fortunoff, Harvey Electronics and
the catalogue retailer Lillian Vernon. Linen 'N Things became the largest casualty
in the sector in May after struggling from virtually the day that private equity
giant Apollo Management L.P. took it private to sell more of what nobody wanted.
Many other retailers that are still solvent are feeling the pain and making
anticipatory cutbacks, including Foot Locker, which has announced that it will
close 140 stores, Ann Taylor, which is shuttering 117 locations, and Zales
which will eliminate 100. Another Apollo-owned retailer, Claire's Stores, has
seen its bonds trade down to distressed levels (although HCM is less
convinced that this is a bankruptcy candidate, probably based on the many torturous
hours I spent with my daughter Alessia at the Claire's store in the Boca Raton
mall).
Sears - Sad and Sadder
Sears Holdings Corp., the largest U.S. department store chain, surprised the
market on May 29, 2008 with an unexpected first-quarter loss of $56 million,
or $0.43/share, compared with year earlier net income of $223 million, or $1.45/share.
Analysts were projecting a small profit, which is why they are analysts. Revenues
for the quarter declined by 5.7 percent, or roughly $680 million, to about
$11.1 billion from just under $11.75 billion a year earlier. Most of the sales
decline came in the high margin appliance area as well as in the lawn and garden
and clothing categories. Consumers are definitely cutting back. Same-store-sales
for stores open at least a year plunged 8.6 percent, with Sears's stores seeing
a 9.8 percent drop and Kmart locations showing a smaller but still severe 7.1
percent fall. Poor results did not dissuade Sears' management from purchasing
an additional $40 million of stock during the quarter (admittedly a mere bagatelle
in the scheme of things) or its board of directors from adding an additional
$500 million to the $143 million the company is already authorized to buy back. HCM continues
to question the wisdom of these stock repurchases while the company's business
continues to deteriorate. Sears' cash balance declined to $1.4 billion from
$3.5 billion in the year-earlier quarter, and was $200 million lower than the
$1.6 million it held at the end of its fiscal year on February 2, 2008. During
the quarter, the Company spent $70 million more on marketing and $10 million
more on its on-line unit, lifting selling, general and administrative expenses
to 25.4 percent of sales from 22.5 percent of sales a year ago (with little
to show for it, apparently). Sears is what we at HCM call a melting
ice cube. It continues to consume itself through share buybacks and misbegotten
marketing ploys. The unhappy truth is that Sears and Kmart are yesterday's
retailers. Graph 2 shows the inexorable decline in Sears' stock since it hit
a high of $193/share in April 2007. Investors are clinging to the hope that
the Company's real estate will bail them out. In HCM's view, such are
not the dreams of which fortunes will be made.

It boggles HCM's mind that so many financial institutions have been
willing lenders to the retail industry over the years in view of the high rate
of defaults that this industry has seen. Retailers are generally loathe to
amortize debt - they would rather open additional locations. Actually, they
are genetically compelled to do so. Accordingly, they make the worst of borrowers
because they always need more money and never repay the money they borrowed
in the first place. There are few barriers to entry since new malls are being
built on every street corner in America (or at least were being built before
the recent credit crunch). Retail ideas are easily copied (for example, Linens
'N Things is just another version of Bed Bath & Beyond, which is competing
with Wal-Mart, Kmart, Target and many catalogue retailers. Even more disturbing
are the high prices at which recent retail LBOs were done in an era of low
cost capital. These transactions were almost assured of running into trouble,
as they are now beginning to do. There will be more bankruptcies to come.
The Housing Industry - A Monument to Futility
Then there is the housing industry, where the news just keeps getting worse
and worse. The Office of Federal Housing Oversight reported that U.S. house
prices dropped by 3.1 percent in the first quarter of 2008 compared with the
first quarter of 2007. Prices for previously-owned single-family homes fell
in 43 states, with California and Nevada seeing 8 percent drops. The inventory
of unsold homes also continues to rise to unprecedented levels. Graph 3 shows
how this inventory has actually been spiking higher this year.

One of the reasons for this is that mortgages are extremely hard to come by
in today's market. HCM has heard anecdotal evidence of fully qualified
potential buyers of high-end homes in California being unable to obtain mortgages,
and we imagine this is illustrative of conditions throughout the country. Foreclosure
data is almost mind-numbing. In April, foreclosure filings were up 65 percent
year-over-year to a record 243,343 according to RealtyTrac. Not all
of these houses will actually enter foreclosure, but many of them will. Finally,
the S&P/Case-Shiller National Home Price Index shown in Graph 4 declined
by 14.1 percent year-over-year in the first quarter of 2008, compared with
a 8.9 percent year-over-year decline in the first quarter of 2007. Consecutive
declines of this magnitude reverse increases of similar magnitude earlier in
this decade, showing the dark side of the real estate bubble that loose monetary
policies engendered.

While the Federal Reserve has lowered interest rates and taken other steps
to place a safety net under the housing market, there are scant signs of success
thus far. In fact, mortgage rates have not dropped nearly as much as hoped
due to deeper problems in the credit markets. The mortgage market has not responded
in the traditional manner to the Federal Reserve's sharp interest rate reductions
because of structural problems arising from the collapse of securitization
markets and the vaporization of liquidity from the mortgage market. As a result,
lenders (with a push from the government) have been working with borrowers
to keep them in their houses. But the government has yet to come up with comprehensive
legislation to address this problem, and the American landscape is increasingly
littered with empty houses that are expensive for lenders to maintain and whose
physical condition is deteriorating. It is going to take years for the housing
economy to recover from its downturn, and it is clear that the sector has not
hit bottom yet.
Energy - Sapping the Energy Out of Everything Else
In 2007, it did not require a hurricane in the Gulf of Mexico to push oil
to $100/barrel. As the United States approaches another storm season, the picture
is far grimmer. Oil now exceeds $130/barrel and the best last hope for a meaningful
drop in price appears to be the sharp economic slowdown that high oil prices
pretty much guarantee at this point. The International Energy Agency is expected
to sharply reduce its forecast for future oil supplies when it completes work
on a study it is doing on the industry. For several years, the IEA has predicted
that supply would keep up with demand that was expected to reach 116 million
barrels a day by 2030, up from around $87 million barrels today. The agency
is reportedly now coming to the conclusion, which will warm the hearts of believers
of the Peak Oil thesis (like HCM), that it will be difficult to squeeze
more than 100 million barrels per day out of the ground over the next two decades.
It appears that higher oil prices are here to stay.
What To Do?
What is an investor to do in such an environment? Bridgewater Associates'
Ray Dalio, widely regarded as one of the savviest guys around, writes the following: "From
an investment perspective... portfolios should be structured with the assumptions
of sustained slow growth and/or a very weak dollar (especially relative to
emerging market currencies.)"[3] HCM would
fine-tune this suggestion by pointing out that the industries discussed above
- airlines, autos and retailers - and those closely related to them are likely
to experience not slow but negative growth in the months ahead. HCM also
concurs with the weak U.S. dollar thesis, and believes that the best U.S. dollar
play remains against the South Asian currencies, the Chinese remnimbi and the
Indian rupee (even though the rupee does poorly with high oil prices, it remains
a good long-term play). These currencies have now appreciated more than 40
percent against the U.S. dollar since 2002, compared with 100 percent appreciation
of the Euro, which represents an economic bloc that suffers from even worse
structural flaws than the U.S. Over time, holding currencies such as the Singapore
dollar, Taiwanese dollar, Hong Kong dollar, as well as those of growing giants
India and China, will handsomely reward investors. HCM would also recommend
that investors invest in gold, which will remain a store of value as long as
U.S. economic policies continue to debauch the dollar. The U.S. dollar represents
political stability, but as Fareed Zakaria points out in his newly published
book, The Post-American World, political stability is no longer is short
supply in today's world:
"It seems that we are living in crazily violent times. But don't believe
everything you see on television. Our anecdotal impression turns out to be
wrong. War and organized violence have declined dramatically over the last
two decades. Ted Robert Gurr and a team of scholars at the University of
Maryland's Center for International Development and Conflict Management tracked
the data carefully and came to the following conclusion: 'the general magnitude
of global warfare has decreased by over sixty percent [since the mid-1980s],
falling by the end of 2004 to its lowest level since the 1950s.[4]'
Violence increased steadily throughout the Cold War - increasing sixfold
between the 1950s and early 1990s - but the trend peaked just before the
collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and 'the extent of warfare among and
within states lessened by nearly half in the first decade after the Cold
War.' Harvard's polymath professor Steven Pinker argues that 'today we are
probably living in the most peaceful time in our species' existence.'"[5]
Whatever one thinks about the Iraq War, it has coincided with two broad economic
trends that are indisputably negative for the so-called victor, the United
States: higher oil prices and a lower dollar. The world is undoubtedly a better
place without Saddam Hussein running around starting or threatening wars, but
the ironic byproduct of his elimination (and long-overdue appointment with
the gibbet) could be considered an improvement in global stability and a coincident
lowering of the need for the U.S. dollar as a haven of political safety. The
result has been a move among many sovereign investment funds - not least of
all those in the Middle East - to diversify their holdings into the Euro and
other currencies. The world has not yet crossed the Rubicon whereby oil will
no longer be priced in dollars, but that is no longer an inconceivable concept,
although its consequences for the U.S. currency are well nigh inconceivable.
Moreover, it would be difficult to argue with the proposition that dollar
confidence has been damaged because the current credit crisis emanated from
the heart of American finance. The fact that American investment banks spawned
the financial technology of securitization, CDOs, CDS and other structured
products that pushed the system to the brink earlier this year raises profound
questions about the philosophical, intellectual and moral foundations underlying
Western free market capitalism and its base currency, the U.S. dollar. The
growing distrust of this capitalist model is further enhanced by the very legitimate
questions raised by the asymmetric compensation schemes that rewarded many
of the promulgators of these financial disasters while leaving institutions
representing retirees and municipalities and other "mom and pop" investors
nursing enormous losses. This loss of confidence in what remains the best system
of economic organization known to man, flawed as it may be, is the type of
long-term systemic damage that HCM has in mind when it speaks of the
failure of business and political leaders to think in terms beyond themselves
about the consequences of their actions and the policies they promote.
Opportunities Out of the Muck
Years ago, a friend of ours used to ask for a hemlock martini upon returning
to the clubhouse after a particularly bad round of golf. Some of our readers
might feel like such a cocktail after imbibing the unremittingly negative tone
of this report. But investors should remember that opportunities are created
during the periods of deepest dislocation. And while things could certainly
be worse - and HCM strongly believes will get worse before they get
better over the course of the second half of 2008 - this is certainly one of
those periods in which great investment opportunities are being created. Before
suggesting a couple of areas that might be ripe for exploration today, HCM needs
to emphasize that investors seeking opportunities out of the current muck must
have long-term time horizons.
In the near-term, market volatility will remain elevated by a number of factors.
Not least among these factors is the dominant presence in the markets of the
quantitative investors. HCM finds these strategies flawed for several
reasons. First, they generally tend to use high levels of leverage, which tells
us that the underlying investments are not very attractive without leverage.
Second, quantitative investing strikes us as the epitome of speculation; it
adds nothing to the productive capacity or capital account of this nation or
any nation. Quants build nothing. Third, quantitative strategies contribute
disproportionately to the volatility of the markets, which in turn damages
confidence in markets. Markets cannot prosper if investors are not willing
to trust them and risk their capital in them. When investors see the prices
of stocks or bonds or bank loans blow around like palm trees in a hurricane,
and then look outside and see that the sun is shining and the air is calm,
it makes them question the very foundations of the market. This leads to the
withdrawal of capital from the market for the risk-taking purposes that it
is needed. Fourth, it is nothing less than a national tragedy that so many
bright and talented minds are being swept into the arms of Wall Street to build
quantitative investment models rather than devoting themselves to the sciences
and medicine and other life-affirming activities. The latter complaint is one
that all of our readers can and should address through their philanthropic
and community work.
So where are the opportunities? In the credit markets, the best long-term
opportunity is to take advantage of the dislocation in the market for leveraged
bank loans. Despite some recovery in this market, loans of many attractive
credits continue to trade at healthy discounts. The enormous disparity between
technical conditions in this market and credit fundamentals that opened up
last summer with the demise of the Structured Investment Vehicles (SIVs) remains
extant and offers an opportunity to earn attractive risk-adjusted returns in
the hands of a seasoned manager. In the equity markets, HCM would advise
being more cautious due to the outsized presence of quant funds and other short-term
oriented investors who have raised volatility to unhealthy levels. The energy
sector remains attractive for those who believe, like HCM, that we are
seeing the early stages of the Peak Oil thesis come to life. Companies contributing
to the enormous buildup of infrastructure in the Middle East and Asia are also
attractive. Financials should be avoided at all costs. Asian and other emerging
markets are more attractive than the U.S., though in all cases we would consider
stocks on a case-by-case basis.
Footnotes:
[1] Of
course, the media paid most attention to American's decision to charge $15
for checking bags, a move that will not raise any meaningful revenue for the
airline, aggravate the flying public, and may be best understood as a cry for
help aimed at politicians in Washington.
[2] Delphi
Corp. is suing an Appaloosa Management-led group for backing out of a financing
pact that would enable the parts maker to emerge from bankruptcy. The problem,
as Appaloosa and its partners have figured out, is that industry conditions
are likely to land Delphi Corp. right back in bankruptcy before long.
[3] Bridgewater
Daily Observations, May 21, 2008.
[4] See
Ted Robert Gurr and Monty G. Marshall, Peace and Conflcit 2005: A Global
Survey of Armed Conflicts, Self-Determination Movements and Democracy,
Center for International Development and Conflict Management, University of
Maryland, College Park (June 2005).
[5] Fareed
Zakaria, The Post-American World (W.W. Norton & Company: New York, 2008),
pp. 8-9.
Your concerned about the regulatory response analyst,
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