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Since 9/11 the US money supply has rocketed by about 70 per cent*. (The Clinton
presidency was just as bad). The problem is one of bad economics, not bad investment
decisions, wild speculation, the housing boom, the falling dollar, the current
account deficit, the domestic deficit, etc. The vast majority of economic pundits
have only a dim understanding of the link between the money supply and America's
current economic difficulties.
As for politicians, the range from the hopelessly confused to the dangerous
irresponsibility of Democrats like Mr Obama whose ignorance of economics and
economic history is easily on par with Pelosi's ignorance and stupidity. And
that is truly frightening.
At one point the Fed's reckless monetary policy had driven down short-term
interest rates to the point where became negative. This was bound to trigger
a housing boom, fuel stock market speculation, drive down up the current account
deficit, etc, etc, etc. All the easily recognized symptoms of a boom once again
appeared. And once again the economic commentariat missed the real story.
In a closed economy forcing the interest rated down sets of an investment
boom that leads malinvestments that have to be abandoned once the boom comes
to an end. However, in an open economy things are not quite so straightforward.
An exploding money supply rapidly expands the demand for foreign goods. This
would not matter very much if the world was on a gold standard. But a world
that is on a paper standard that is subject to political manipulation is a
different beast altogether.
(Despite the views of some lunatics, it is not a Jewish cabal that manipulates
the world's money supply but central banks, sometimes under pressure from cynical
and ignorant politicians).
When a country's currency is over-valued economic commentators focus on the
current account deficit. What they fail to see is that if the central bank
does not take action to reign in the money supply the over-valued currency
will result in a reverse J-curve. Every first-year economics undergraduate
knows -- or should know -- that a depreciating currency will reduce imports
and encourage exports.
However, an over-valued currency will have a reverse effect that could lead
to factories closing down and moving their operations abroad. This in turn
will encourage politicians to court discontent over the situation by demanding
curbs on imports. In effect the over-valuation is akin to a tax that can destroy
a country's comparative advantage. David Ricardo was certainly alert to this
situation, pointing out that:
A new tax too may destroy the comparative advantage which a country before
possessed in the manufacture of a particular commodity. (David Ricardo, Principles
of Political Economy and Taxation, Penguin Books, 1971, p. 269).
Nevertheless economic commentators still insist on talking about the pattern
of trade being determined by comparative advantage, completely oblivious to
the fact that the free trade argument was originally couched in terms of a
gold standard. Anyone who is acquainted with the "bullion controversy" would
understand this. In other words, trade theory was formulated within the framework
of a stable monetary policy, a fact that Joseph Schumpeter made clear when
he wrote that
the 'classic' writers without neglecting other cases, reasoned primarily
in terms of an unfettered international gold standard". (The History of
Economic Analysis, Oxford University Press, 1994, p. 732).
The above is not an argument against free trade but a warning that a bad monetary
policy will also distort the pattern of foreign trade in the same way that
it distorts the domestic capital and price structures.
It is always observed that in times of a boom financial intermediaries eventually
begin to start taking risks that in normal times would be considered utterly
reckless, sometimes turning into a speculative frenzy, much like tech stock
during the Clinton administration. But this always happens when a boom is allowed
to go unchecked for sometime. Benjamin M. Anderson referred to a speech that
was made in 1929 before the New York State Chamber of Commerce
which discussed, among other things, the phenomena of a mob mind which had
been so manifest in the year and a half that had preceded the crash. The
speaker made the generalization, familiar to social psychologists, that the
more intense the craze, the higher the type of intellect that succumbs to
it. (Benjamin M. Anderson, Economics and the Public Welfare: A Financial
and Economic History of the United States 1914-1946, LibertyPress, 1979,
p. 203).
Two fallacies lie at the root of the boom-bust-cycle. The first one maintains
that the money supply needs to be manipulated to maintain a stable price level.
According to this view the great depression should never have happened: that's
why it took Irving Fisher by surprise, severely denting his reputation as an
economist. The second one asserts that money supply needs to expand to maintain
purchasing power. Anyone truly acquainted with Say's law will immediately realize
what is wrong with this theory. (William H. Hutt, A Rehabilitation of Say's
Law, Ohio University Press: Athens, 1974).
The Brookings Institution predicted that the tax rebate for consumers would
raise GDP through increased spending on consumer goods to the extent that it
would more than compensate the government for any loss in tax revenue. It was
a complete failure. Just about any classical economist would have predicted
this. Using Say's law he would have pointed out that
What a country wants to make it richer, is never consumption, but production.
Where there is the latter, we may be "sure that" there is no want of the
former. (John Stuart Mill, Essays on Economics and Society 1824--1845,
Liberty Fund, 2006, p. 263).
*The Austrian definition of the money consists of the following:
Currency Component of M1, Total Checkable Deposits, Savings Deposits,
U.S. Government Demand Deposits and Note Balances, Demand Deposits Due to Foreign
Commercial Banks, and Demand Deposits Due to Foreign Official Institutions.
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