|
"...Overcapacity - first of credit, then of real estate - drove the price
of renting sharply lower, bankrupting cautious investors along with big borrowers..."
A TEXAN CUSTOMER who came to see me a few months ago told me a story
which illustrates the fine mess we're in.
In the 1980s boom his neighborhood boasted not one but two commercial real-estate
developers, both of whom were building shopping malls.
The one developer was cautious. He'd already built two malls successfully,
and by re-investing some of his profits as equity in his new project he'd reduced
his leverage and his risk.
Further along the avenue, however, was a more aggressive developer. He'd borrowed
98% of his construction costs on artificially cheap credit; money which had
been pumped into the banking system by the Fed to keep the economy steaming
along.
Anyway, the experienced developer was earlier into his construction project
and completed it ahead of schedule - and he got his mall nearly fully occupied.
His competitor, as well as being more highly geared, was slower to build and
later to complete, so you can guess what happened next.
As the early '80s boom in Texan oil projects and real estate turned into bust,
the new mall couldn't get any tenants, which meant there was no revenue to
pay down the debt. The aggressive developer went bust, and with the local economy
sagging, the near worthless debts on his empty mall were sold by the bank at
just 18 cents on the dollar.
That allowed the new owners to slash the asking rents. They charged 4 cents
on the original construction dollar, making a yield of 4/18 - a healthy 22%
yield on their outlay. But that rent deeply undercut the other, more cautiously
built shopping mall. It was charging 12 cents on its construction-cost dollar,
fully three times as much.
Naturally, as the recession wore on, the cautious developer watched his tenants
quit his mall for those cheaper rents down the freeway. So now the cautious
developer failed too.
Why? Because overcapacity - first of credit, then of malls - had driven the
local price of rented retail space down to third of its reasonable rate of
return. The total rent that could be earned on two malls was significantly
less than what could have been earned on one.
I have always found it difficult to make the logical step from cheap credit
- which sounds so helpful - to financial collapse, which seems so regularly
to follow it. This story shows how the route passes through overcapacity. Yet
even overcapacity was not bad news for those investors who bought the distressed
mall at 18% of its construction cost.
How were they able to get such a bargain? Simple. They could raise cash when
almost no-one else could. That probably meant they were debt free at the end
of the expansion, and had found a reliable store of ready value as the credit
liquidation played itself out.
I like to think that lots of BullionVault users
will one day be the opportunists in stories like this, though I also believe
the credit crunch has a long way to go, which means it will not be for some
considerable time. Gold certainly
doesn't offer a 22% yield, but when other asset classes do, perhaps sellers
of BullionVault gold will contribute
the capital which kick-starts our economies from the bottom of the coming slump.
Until then debtors, politicians, and central bankers will call us hoarders,
and accuse us of destroying the economy. It's not a label which makes me feel
particularly proud, but I think I can live with it.
|