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"...Monetize labor, monetize stocks, monetize the farmers, monetize real
estate..."
DAMNED IF THEY DO, damned if they don't, politicians the world over
are looking pretty sheepish right now.
Nationalizing failed banks, mortgage lenders and insurance firms hardly makes
for a strong election pitch. It won't do much to coax fresh risk capital into
shoring up financial balance-sheets, either.
But letting them fail would only look worse.
"The Fed and Treasury have not yet provided a panacea, but merely avoided
another imminent disaster," reported BCA Research on Wednesday. That was before
the Treasury recapitalized the Fed's balance-sheet with an extra $100 billion...just
in time for the Fed to lead the world's big central banks in pumping $242bn
into the US and European money markets.
Sure, that quarter of a trillion dollars helped talk inter-bank lending rates
down off the window ledge. But for the third time this week, government action
failed to stem losses in financial stocks. Because "they have not yet found
a fiscal solution targeted at ending the underlying rot," as BCA goes on - "i.e.
putting a floor under the housing market and economy.
"Congress is now starting to consider a system-wide solution (similar to the
Resolution Trust Corporation) but any initiative may have to wait for the next
administration."
And the next administration won't be short of policy prescriptions to choose
from. No one is, in fact.
"Don't pay too much attention to the financial sector's self-interested bleating.
Protect public interests first," urges Martin Wolf in the Financial Times.
Dishing out four do's and four don'ts for the UK government on Thursday, he
must be a different Martin Wolf from the economist writing in the Wednesday FT -
even though they've both got a plan.
"Governments cannot credibly promise to wash their hands of a financial breakdown," wrote
the doppelganger. "This is the lesson of at least a century of financial history."
So what to do? "An enormous Resolution Trust Corporation-style approach for
the banking and securities system may be required," says Bill Clinton's former
deputy Treasury secretary, Roger Altman - also in the FT - even though "the
cost to taxpayers would be huge."
How huge? "American will need a $1,000bn bail-out," says Kenneth Rogoff, ex-head
of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), yet again in the Financial Times. "Regardless
of the Fed and Treasury's most determined efforts, the political pressures
for a much larger bail-out [up to $2,000bn] are going to be irresistible."
And the details exactly? "Instead of investors relying on the guarantees provided
by insurance companies and taking comfort from the work of the ratings agencies," reckons
Tim Congdon - a former "wise man" on the UK Treasury's panel writing in (you
guessed it!) the FT - "the credit assurance should come from the banking
industry itself. At least two strongly capitalized and well-regulated banks
should provide a guarantee that, in the event that the issuer of a bond defaults,
they would cover the deficiency."
But wouldn't that simply swap relying on, say, AIG or Ambac for ultimate guarantees
to relying on...well...relying on whom exactly? Congdon and his co-prescriber
Brandon Davies, a former treasurer of Barclays bank, don't say which banks
can clear this "well capitalized, well regulated" hurdle just now. But never
mind; they'd actually rely on the Fed or Bank of England standing behind the
entire system anyway.
"The task of assessing banks' capital strength and balance-sheet qualities
could lie with the central bank and an appropriate regulatory agency, as at
present," Congdon and Davies explain. "Once the guaranteed securities could
be transacted freely and readily with central banks, liquidity would quickly
return to the wholesale markets."
This assessment role would differ from today's model how exactly? The Fed
and the FDIC...the Bank of England and the FSA - these dynamic duos judged
banking balance-sheets and capitalization amid the greatest mis-reading of
risk in history.
And that "free and ready" trading of rated securities; it would mark a change
from current practice in what way precisely? The developed world's six largest
central banks swapped $242 billion-worth of liquidity (i.e. government bonds)
for system-approved securities on Thursday morning alone.
Yet the FTSE100 in London still ended the day 0.7% lower. The S&P slipped
into the red to stand almost one-tenth below the start of September.
Oh, for the old days of certainty and clear thinking! "Liquidate labor, liquidate
stocks, liquidate the farmers, liquidate real estate..." Those were the days!
Policy wonks like Andrew Mellon - US Treasury secretary between 1930-33 - knew
how to deal with a debt-led depression. None of these namby-pamby rescues,
bail-outs or weasel-worded "conservatorships". Let the whole thing go bust!
Teach 'em a lesson they'll never forget!
"Purge the rottenness out of the system [so that] values will be adjusted,
and enterprising people will pick up the wrecks from less competent people."
Trouble was, of course, Mellon's shock-and-awe plan was too shocking by half
for the half-democratic United States of the early '30s. Britain had already
tried the same tack of abject collapse...putting three million people out of
their jobs by 1926 and risking a true revolution before finally admitting defeat
- and abandoning the Gold Standard - ready to start reflating for growth even
as Mellon spoke out.
Seven decades later, the long shadow of dole queues and soup-lines still darkens
the way for today's politicians. The mere mention of 1929 or Austria's Credit
Anstalt also shines a torch to the exit, however.
"Debt retirement which is financed by money creation is an appropriate anti-deflation
measure," as Nobel-prize winning economist James M.Buchanan explains in his Public
Principles of Public Debt. "This may be called debt monetization."
Sounds intriguing, professor! Tell us more before we call Ben Bernanke...
"Debt instruments are replaced by money," he explains - which is already happening
today. Three-month US Treasury bonds are now yielding precisely nothing, making
these "near-cash" items so near cash you could roll them up to light your cigar.
And you can see how the loans of T-bonds now being made by the Federal Reserve
against mortgage-backed bonds, stock-market equities and all investment-grade
debt does just what "debt monetization" requires:
Central banks are swapping weak debt for cash. Bingo! The bad debt has vanished.
Or maybe not. Maybe it's just been dumped onto everyone else - consumers, savers,
investors and business. But hey! A problem shared if a problem halved. And
with $1,000bn-worth of trouble still due on Ken Rogoff's best guess, would
$900,000 of debt monetization per household really prove something to fear?
"Liquidity is increased, and spending will be encouraged," Buchanan goes on.
Or at least, that's what theory would claim. It certainly looks like a way
to fend off debt deflation...and make good on Ben Bernanke's promise of avoiding
a repeat of the Great Depression. Albeit at the cost of rampant inflation in
your cost of living. But fact is - or so everyone says - the money supply needs
to leap to redeem the banks' losses.
"Monetize labor, monetize stocks, monetize the farmers, monetize real estate..."
Got a certain ring to it, don't you think?
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