September 25, 2008
Reggie Middleton asks, "Do you guys know who youre messin' with?"
by Reggie Middleton
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This is a follow up to the post that I made early this morning, "Shock
and Awe, 2.0!" (I consider it a must read)1. I was one of
those hedgie-type guys who were shorting the Goldman stock. Why was I doing
it? Was it because I was unpatriotic? Was I a shark out for blood? Out to
destroy the very financial fabric of America? I'll tell you why I did it
(and quite profitably, may I add, see the notes and links at the bottom of
this article). I did it becaue Goldman takes a lot of excessive risk in relation
to their profits (see Risk
vs. Reward vs. Reputations on the Street)2, in an environment that is
fraught with peril, while carrying a lot of immovable trash on their balance
sheet, as they sport the highest price and valuation on all of Wall Street,
despite hiring the same people as their competitors (what's left of 'em)
who went to the same schools to learn the same trading methods to move the
same products. If you click the link above, they are so correlated to their
fallen brethren that their stock even moves in the same patterns. In a nutshell,
I saw disequilibrium in the market, and I saw an opportunity to capitalize
on the markets fixing this problem. Alas, I digress...
Henry Paulson just asked for a revolving $700 billion credit line to fix the
mess that he literally, and I do mean literally, created. Take a look at this
graph or inflation adjusted real estate prices (courtesy of Professor Shiller's
irrational exuberance data), and take note that Paulson ran the biggest investment
bank during the years between 1998 and 2006 (the exact years of the real estate
boom).

Let's take a close look at the stuff that Paulson's company hid off balance
sheet while he was CEP (these are recent numbers, but the categories are the
same).
| Unconsolidated VIE's ($ mn) |
31-May-08 |
| |
VIE
Assets |
Maximum Exposure to Loss in Nonconsolidated VIEs |
| |
|
Purchased
and
retained
interests |
Commitments
and
Guarantees |
Derivatives |
Loans
and
investments |
Total |
| Mortgage CDOs |
18,569 |
516 |
0 |
8,144 |
0 |
8,660 |
| Corporate CDOs and CLOs |
10,891 |
402 |
0 |
1,398 |
0 |
1,800 |
| Real estate, credit-related
and other investing |
28,216 |
0 |
8 |
0 |
3,977 |
3,985 |
| Municipal bond securitizations |
254 |
0 |
254 |
0 |
0 |
254 |
| Other mortgage-backed |
|
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| Other asset-backed |
4,200 |
0 |
0 |
1,793 |
0 |
1,793 |
| Power-related |
438 |
2 |
37 |
0 |
16 |
55 |
| Principal-protected notes |
5,948 |
0 |
0 |
5,683 |
0 |
5,683 |
| Total |
68,516 |
920 |
299 |
17,018 |
3,993 |
22,230 |
Three guesses as to the type of assets he and Bernanke will want to pay "above
firesale prices" for if they get the $700 billion they desire. Color rhymes
with Fed???
Why is it that I'm the only one who finds it rather silly that the man who
created much of the problem will ask me and my family to pay taxes to dig his
old firm and the "crew" out of the whole. Care to hazard what he made during
thehot bubble era generating these assets that we now are being asked to bailout?
From Forbes via Wikipedia:
His compensation package, according to reports, was US$373 million
in 2005, and US$16.4 million projected for 2006.[9]4 (and
this is just for two years out of the 8). His net worth has been estimated
at over US$700 million.[9]4 Do
you think this bailout play will incude his giving some of that money back?
And you wonder whey exec comp limitations are being bandied about as part
of the package????
Let's take a look at the risk that his alma mata is taking to make those monies...

We have looked at company's recent quarterly filings and 10K to have a closer
view of Goldman Sachs' (GS) exposure. Following are some of our observations:
Value at Risk (VAR) and Risk Adjusted Return on Risk Adjusted Capital (RARORAC)
Goldman has the highest VAR among its peer group of $184 mn, followed
by Lehman at distant $123 mn (we all know how well LEH is currently faring).
Notably, GS also the highest range (difference of highest and lowest
daily VAR during a quarter) of daily trading VAR of $92 million, reflecting significant
(read risky) volatility in its trading portfolio. This is higher than $61
mn and $67 mn (for 1Q2008) for Lehman and JPM, respectively. This is also being
reflected in the lowest risk adjusted return on risk adjusted capital (RARORAC
- a much more grounded measure of risk adjusted return) of 14.8% for GS among
its peer group. Just so this doesn't escape anybody, GS has the lowest risk
adjusted return on the Street. Simply analyzing earnings (or looking at
CNBC) would lead one to believe that Goldman has the highest return on investment,
but unfortunately, the world is a bit more complex than an earnings statement
or a cable news channel.
Average Daily Trading VAR
(in million dollars) |
Q208 |
Q108 |
Q407 |
Q307 |
| Goldman Sachs |
184 |
157 |
138 |
139 |
| Morgan Stanley |
99 |
97 |
89 |
87 |
| Merrill Lynch |
NA |
65 |
65 |
76 |
| Lehman Brothers |
123 |
130 |
124 |
96 |
| JPM |
NA |
122 |
107 |
112 |
Range of Daily Trading VAR
(Difference between highs and
lows) (in million dollars) |
Q208 |
Q108 |
Q407 |
Q307 |
| Goldman Sachs |
NA |
92 |
77 |
68 |
| Morgan Stanley |
NA |
34 |
46 |
36 |
| Merrill Lynch |
NA |
39 |
51 |
32 |
| Lehman Brothers |
37 |
61 |
107 |
66 |
| JPM |
NA |
67 |
138 |
64 |

Risk Adjusted return
on risk adjusted
capital (RARORAC) |
Q208 |
Q108 |
Q407 |
Q307 |
| Goldman Sachs |
12.9% |
14.8% |
16.1% |
15.3% |
| Morgan Stanley |
19.7% |
19.1% |
21.5% |
23.3% |
| Merrill Lynch |
NA |
31.6% |
32.5% |
30.5% |
| Lehman Brothers |
14.0% |
12.3% |
12.0% |
15.3% |
| JPM |
NA |
54.1% |
60.2% |
56.8% |
Goldman also has the highest adjusted leverage ratio (adjusted asset
divided by adjusted equity) of 18.6x (for 1Q2008) among its peer group, reflecting
lower equity cushion against any valuation write-down or loss. This highest
leverage portends much greater volatility in economic earnigns. In other words,
when the win chooses not to blow in their direction, the sh1t will hit the
fan that much harder than the rest of the Street.
| Adjusted leverage ratio |
Q208 |
Q108 |
Q407 |
Q307 |
| Goldman Sachs |
NA |
18.6x |
17.5x |
18.0x |
| Morgan Stanley |
14.1x |
16.0x |
17.6x |
18.8x |
| Merrill Lynch |
NA |
18.2x |
20.3x |
17.9x |
| Lehman Brothers |
12.0x |
15.4x |
16.1x |
16.1x |
| JPM |
NA |
13.1x |
12.7x |
12.3x |
Click here for a worksheet that illustrates the VaR exposure for all ofthe
big US brokers in detail: Broker
VaR Worksheet (634.49 kB 2008-07-05 09:25:24)5.
Goldman Sachs' exposure
- GS' level 3 assets as percentage of its equity at 258% is close to highest
figure of 274% among its peer group. Its level 3 assets proportion to total
asset has increased consistently from 5.7% in 2Q2007 to 8.1% in 1Q2008.

- It is also worth noting that approximately 25% of its OTC derivative credit
exposure (comprised in level 3 assets) is rated BBB and lower.
| OTC Derivative Credit Exposure ($ mn) |
| |
Feb-08 |
% of total |
Nov-07 |
% of total |
| AAA/Aaa |
$15,387 |
15.6% |
$14,596 |
20.7% |
| AA/Aa2 |
$33,820 |
34.2% |
$24,419 |
34.7% |
| A/A2 |
$25,291 |
25.6% |
$16,189 |
23.0% |
| BBB/Baa2 |
$9,724 |
9.8% |
$6,558 |
9.3% |
| BB/Ba2 or lower |
$13,354 |
13.5% |
$7,478 |
10.6% |
| Unrated |
$1,236 |
1.3% |
$1,169 |
1.7% |
| Total |
$98,812 |
100.0% |
$70,409 |
100.0% |
- In March 2008, Standard & Poor's affirmed Group Inc.'s credit ratings
but revised its outlook from "stable" to "negative.
Paulson to the rescue!
1. Reggie Middleton on Risk, Reward and Reputations on the Street: the Goldman
Sachs Forensic Analysis6
(Archived/Reggie Middleton's Boom Bust Blog/MyBlog)
Here is my detailed opinion on Goldman Sachs. Be sure to review my precursor
to this report: Goldman Sachs Snapshot: Risk vs. Reward vs. Reputations on
the Street. Anybody who is interested in how I ...
Thursday, 24 July 2008
2. Reggie Middleton on Goldman Sachs Q3 20087
(Reggie Middleton's Boom Bust Blog/MyBlog)
...rish view on Bear Stearns in a bear market and Is this the Breaking of the
Bear's Back?), I am bearish on Goldman as well (Goldman Sachs Snapshot: Risk
vs. Reward vs. Reputations on the Street and Re...
Wednesday, 17 September 2008
3. Goldman Sachs Snapshot: Risk vs. Reward vs. Reputations on the Street2
(Archived/Reggie Middleton's Boom Bust Blog/MyBlog)
...t shared by most of the analyst community and those that follow them. This
brings me to the issue of Goldman Sachs. I have been bearish on commercial,
mortgage and investment banks for over a y...
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Reggie
Middleton
Reggie Middleton, LLC
Perpetual Interests, LLCTM
http://boombustblog.com/
Who am I?
Well, I fancy myself the personification of the free thinking
maverick, the ultimate non-conformist as it applies to investment and analysis.
I am definitively outside the box - not your typical or stereotypical Wall
Street investor. I work out of my home, not a Manhattan office. I build my
own technology and perform my own research - in lieu of buying it or following
the crowd. I create and follow my own macro strategies and am by definition,
a contrarian to the nth degree.
Since I use my research as a tool for my own investing
to actually put food on my table, I can stand behind it as doing what it is
supposed too - educate, illustrate and elucidate. I do not sell advice, I am
not a reporter hence do not sell stories, and I do not sell research. I am
an entrepreneur who exists just outside of mainstream corporate America and
Wall Street. This allows me freedom to do things that many can not. For instance,
I pride myself on developing some of the highest quality research available,
regardless of price. No conflicts of interest, no corporate politics, no special
favors. Just the hard truth as I have found it - and believe me, my team and
I do find it! I welcome any and all to peruse my blog, use my custom hacked
collaborative social tools, read the articles, download the files, and make
a critical comparison of the opinion referencing the situation at hand and
the time stamp on the blog post to the reality both at the time of the post
and the present. Hopefully, you will be as impressed with the Boom Bust as
I am and our constituency.
I pay for significant information and data, and am well
aware of the value of quality research. I find most currently available research
lacking, in both quality and quantity. The reason why I had to create my own
research staff was due to my dissatisfaction with what was currently available
- to both individuals and institutions.
So here I am, creating my own research for my own investment
activity. What really sets my actions apart is that I offer much of what I
produce to the public without charge - free to distribute and redistribute,
as long as it is left unaltered and full attribution is given to the author
and owner. Why would I do such a thing when others easily charge 5 and 6 digits
annually for what some may consider a lesser product? It is akin to open
source analysis! My ideas and implementations are actually improved and
fine tuned when bounced off of the collective intellect of the many, in lieu
of that of the few - no matter how smart those few may believe themselves to
be.
Very recently, I have started charging for the forensics
portion of my work, which has freed up the resources to develop the site to
deliver even more research for free, particularly on the global macro and opinion
front. This move has allowed me to serve an more diverse constituency, which
now includes the institutional consumer (ie., investment turned consumer banks,
hedge funds, pensions, etc,) as well as the newbie individual investor who
is just getting started - basically the two polar opposites of the investing
spectrum. I am proud to announce major banks as paying clients, and brand new
investors who take my book recommendations and opinions on true wealth and
success to heart.
So, this is how I use my background and knowledge in new
media, distributed computing, risk management, insurance, financial engineering,
real estate, corporate valuation and financial analysis to pursue, analyze
and capitalize on global macroeconomic opportunities. I have included a more
in depth bio at the bottom of the page for those who really, really need to
know more about me.
Visit his blog Boom
Bust Blog.
Copyright © 2007-2009 Reggie Middleton
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