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I've addressed this subject before at
greater length, but I want to put it in one post that people can easily link
to and pass around.
Briefly: the fundamental cause of the bank crisis is not evil Republicans,
lying Democrats, "deregulation," "affirmative-action lending," or even "ludicrous
levels of leverage." A banking system is like a nuclear reactor: a complicated
piece of engineering. If it's engineered right, it works 100% of the time.
If it's engineered wrong, it works 99.99% of the time, and the other 0.01%
it coats the entire tri-state area in radioactive strontium.
The bank crisis is an engineering failure. Its fundamental cause is a humble
bug. Once we find the bug, we can start to ask: who is responsible for this
bug? Who wrote the code? Who rolled back the fix? That discussion, though fascinating,
is out of scope here.
Another analogy is the Space Shuttle disasters. Challenger had
a bad booster O-ring; Columbia's
wing was hit by falling foam. The level of discourse we're hearing now on the
crisis tends to be "the Space Shuttle was Nixon's idea" or, at best, "Columbia's
wing melted through and fell off." This is not an engineering analysis. It
is point-scoring at best, anti-information at worst.
I believe I know what the bug is. It was first identified by the 20th-century
economist Ludwig von
Mises, capo of the Austrian
School. Mises was an excellent writer, as eloquent as Marx and far more
sensible, and it's unsurprising that there is a large Internet
cult devoted to his work.
I am going to assume you are not a member of this cult. If there was a video
of Mises walking on water, I might be tempted to take his pronouncements for
granted. Since no such tape exists, they have to be explained and justified.
But we do need to start with Mises, because he was the first to solve the
problem. Almost a hundred years ago, in his Theory
of Money and Credit, he wrote:
For the activity of the banks as negotiators of credit the golden rule holds,
that an organic connection must be created between the credit transactions
and the debit transactions. The credit that the bank grants must correspond
quantitatively and qualitatively to the credit that it takes up. More exactly
expressed, "The date on which the bank's obligations fall due must not precede
the date on which its corresponding claims can be realized." Only thus can
the danger of insolvency be avoided.
Let's call the sentence in quotes Mises' rule. A banking system which obeys
it is Misesian. We do not have a Misesian banking system - and that's the bug
Basically, imagine that there were two kinds of nuclear reactors - fission
and fusion, perhaps. Fission reactors work 99.99% of the time. Fusion reactors
work 100% of the time. The reason our society gets its power from fission reactors
is that our reactor experts are fission experts. Therefore, we have resigned
ourselves to having fission reactors, plus a large fleet of mobile power-washers
to clean up the radioactive strontium every ten or twenty years. If you ask
either the reactor engineers or the cleanup crews about the possibility of
switching to fusion, the best answer you'll get will be something like "waah?" There
are many worse.
Let's consider the sentence again. "The date on which the bank's obligations
fall due must not precede the date on which its corresponding claims can be
realized." Mises' rule of banking. Let's explain these terms and the reasoning
behind them.
A "bank" is a financial middleman. It borrows from you and lends to someone
else. When you "deposit" money "in" a bank, you are actually lending money
to the bank. The bank does not keep this money in a big cardboard box. (I really
hope this is not news to you.) It lends it to someone else - call him Dwight.
The bank's "obligation" is its agreement to repay you your loan. Its "claim" is
Dwight's agreement to pay back his loan. (And your claim is the bank's obligation.)
So what Mises is saying is that the bank must not agree to return your money
(plus interest) before Dwight returns his money (plus interest).
Because, duh, it doesn't have it yet. Sounds obvious, right?
Of course, banks do not match individual claims and obligations in this way.
If this is the way it worked, you and Dwight could save time and money by cutting
the bank out of the loop. In reality, a bank borrows from and lends to thousands
if not millions of people, which allows it to meet its obligation to you even
if a few Dwights turn out to be deadbeats. Nonetheless, we can make the same
obvious statement: by the time the bank needs to pay you, it needs to have
collected from enough Dwights in order to have the money to pay you. Duh.
A more general way to describe Misesian banking is that the bank's plan to
fulfill its obligations must not involve any implicit transactions. For example,
if the bank promises to give you your money back in a week, and Dwight promises
to give the bank its money back in two weeks, the bank has an implicit transaction.
At the end of the first week, it needs to borrow money from someone else in
order to repay you. That someone else might just be you, in which case you
are rolling over - that is, renewing - the loan. But this is your decision,
and the bank cannot know that you will roll over. After all, presumably there
is a reason you selected a one-week loan.
We observe that in Misesian banking, the duration of a loan is as important
as its amount. To balance a one-week obligation with a two-week claim is to
balance an apple with an orange. It is just, not, done. Recall Mises' statement:
the credit that the bank grants must correspond quantitatively and qualitatively
to the credit that it takes up. That means it can't have an apple on the right
and an orange on the left. (And what happens if it breaks this rule? Ha. We'll
find out.)
A more naive approach to banking might just add up the claims on the left
side of the page, add up the obligations on the right side, note that the sum
on the left exceeds the sum on the right, and be satisfied. This would be "corresponding
quantitatively" - but not "qualitatively." In Misesian banking, the bank makes
sure its structure of claims allows it to satisfy its structure of obligations,
as is, without implicit transactions. (Another kind of implicit transaction
might be a currency conversion.)
Let's look slightly more closely at the loan market. We'll start with the
obvious and segue into the not so obvious.
When you lend, you are exchanging present money for a claim to future money.
Even if you know that this claim is perfectly good, you have no reason to make
the trade unless you are getting more money in future than you give up in present
- otherwise, you would just keep the money in your big cardboard box. So, for
example, you might trade $100 in 2008 dollars for $110 in 2009 dollars.
The $10, obviously, is your interest rate, or yield - 10%. If you thought
the loan had a 10% chance of not being paid back - the default risk - you might
add another $10 or so, to get the same expected return. And the year (from
2008 to 2009) is the maturity of the loan.
We are now in a position to ask a very interesting question: in a healthy
lending market, assuming Misesian banking, and forgetting about default risk
for a moment, how should yield vary by maturity? Should a longer-term loan
carry (a) a higher interest rate, (b) a lower interest rate, or (c) the same
interest rate?
I suspect that, just intuitively, you said (a). This is indeed the right answer.
Let's see why.
The market for loans is set, like everything else, by supply and demand. Every
loan has a lender and a borrower. The lender always prefers a higher rate.
The borrower always prefers a lower rate. At any maturity, the market rate
is that rate at which the number of dollars which lenders are willing to lend
is exactly equal to the number of dollars borrowers are willing to borrow.
We can make a little graph of this market, putting maturity on the x-axis
and yield on the y. The result is called the yield curve. At least in a free
market, the yield curve will always slope upward - higher maturities will command
higher interest rates. This is true for any set of lenders and borrowers, anywhere
in the known universe. If they have Misesian banks in the Lesser Magellanic
Cloud, their yield curves slope upward.
How can we possibly know any such thing? We know only one thing: interest
rates are set by supply and demand. But we can make some elementary observations
about lenders and borrowers, which are true by definition.
The first is that at the same rate, any lender will prefer a shorter maturity.
Consider the choice between one-week and two-week lending. If both transactions
had the same rate, you could just lend for one week, get the money back and
lend it again. This gives you the option to use the cash at the end of the
first week, an option that the two-week maturity does not provide. An option
can never have negative value, so why not: you'll pick the one-week maturity.
The second is that at the same rate, any borrower will prefer a longer maturity.
For a borrowing transaction to be profitable, some productive process must
use the money and generate a return. The set of productive processes that can
produce round-trip return at a maturity of one second is empty. Therefore,
in Misesian banking, no one should want to borrow at a one-second maturity,
because there is no lending at a zero rate and no way to finance a productive
enterprise at any nonzero rate - however small.
As the maturity of the loan increases, so does the set of productive processes,
and so does the demand to borrow. Without violating Mises' rule, you cannot
finance a nine-month pregnancy with a one-month loan. You need a nine-month
loan. Nine one-month loans in a row will not suffice, because the last eight
are implicit transactions.
Thus, for a higher maturity there is less supply of lending, and more demand
for borrowing. Less supply and more demand means higher price, which means
a higher yield. Which means the yield curve slopes upward.
This concludes our explanation of Misesian banking. Now let's explain the
crisis.
Again, we don't have a Misesian banking system. We have what might be called
a Bagehotian banking system - after Walter
Bagehot (pronounced "badget"), who wrote Lombard
Street, the first description of how this system works.
Here is a nice, concise explanation of the Bagehotian system:
The essence of what banks do in normal times is to borrow short and to lend
long. In doing so, they transform short-term assets into long ones, thereby
creating credit and liquidity. Put differently, by borrowing short and lending
long, banks become less liquid, thereby making it possible for the non-banking
sector to become more liquid; that is, have assets that are shorter than
their liabilities. This is essential for the non-bank sector to run smoothly
This appeared in the Financial Times on October
9, 2008. The author is one Professor
Paul de Grauwe, who like Professor Mises, and unlike me, got paid to
understand this matter.
Note the perfect inversion between the Misesian and Bagehotian theories. Mises,
writing almost a hundred years ago, describing a banking system that did not
exist in his time any more than it exists in ours, says: "Only thus can the
danger of insolvency be avoided." De Grauwe, writing now, says: "This is essential
for the non-bank sector to run smoothly."
Hm. We may not be sure whom to trust here, but we do know that neither of
these gentlemen is stupid. So what gives?
First, let's decode what Professor de Grauwe is saying. He's saying that banks
routinely violate Mises' rule - they borrow "short" (ie, with short-term maturities),
and lend "long" (ie, with long-term maturities). In other words, they engage
in what we call maturity transformation.
Because we know the shape of the yield curve, we know why MT is profitable.
Short interest rates are lower than long interest rates. So if the rest of
the world is practicing Misesian banking and you're practicing Bagehotian banking,
you make a mint.
In fact, we can say even more than this: we can say that MT lowers long-term
interest rates. In our stodgy, Teutonic Misesian bank, if someone wanted to
borrow money for 30 years, we had to match him with a lender who wanted to
lend money for 30 years. In our fast-paced, Anglo-Saxon Bagehotian bank, we
don't care - we balance our balance sheet quantitatively, not qualitatively.
We can match the borrower with any lender, and get a better rate.
This is how a classic, Wonderful Life-style deposit bank works. A so-called "deposit" is
really a loan of instantaneous maturity, continuously rolled over - by not "withdrawing" the
cash, you are really renewing the loan. In the classical Bagehotian model,
this might be used to finance, say, a 30-year mortgage.
Bagehotian banking seems like a just plain better idea. Its profits can be
distributed to lender and borrower alike, producing higher rates for the former
and lower rates for the latter.
Unfortunately, there is a slight downside. As we said earlier: "duh, the bank
just doesn't have the money yet." When a bank borrows for a month and lends
for a year, how exactly does it complete the transaction? Is there a little
time machine inside the vault?
By violating Mises' rule, the Bagehotian bank makes itself dependent on an
implicit transaction: viz., finding someone to loan it money for eleven months.
Let's look at the ways in which it can implement that transaction.
The easiest way is just by inducing you to roll over your loan. It finds someone,
and that someone is you. The reason Bagehotian banks work 99.99% of the time
is that lenders, especially individual lenders, tend to roll over their loans
a lot. You make a bank deposit rather than buying a six-month CD, even though
the CD pays a higher rate, because you are not sure you won't need the money
before the six months is up. Often you find you didn't. In retrospect you should
have bought the CD, but you had no way of knowing this at the time.
The bank can also sell the 1-year loan. But selling a loan is equivalent to
finding a new lender. Again, it cannot be known on what terms this implicit
transaction can be executed.
What we've identified here is the wad of duct tape in the nuclear reactor.
A Bagehotian bank is not contractually sound, because it does not have a complete
plan to carry out its obligations. It relies on implicit transactions. And
when these transactions cannot be executed on the terms expected - poof. The
duct tape catches fire. The reactor melts down. The bank has a run.
In a bank run, the lenders start to doubt collectively that the bank will
not be able to execute on its obligations to all of them. The origin of the
doubt could be concern about the bank's quantitative solvency - eg, its 30-year
claims are subprime mortgages. Or it could just be a suspicion that the bank
will experience a run. If there is a run, you want to be the first out.
What happens as a Bagehotian bank experiences a run? Let's assume that, before
the run, the bank was still quantitatively solvent - the current market price
of its claims exceeds the sum of its obligations. The only problem is that
the claims mature far later than the obligations.
So the bank sells the claims on the open market. If it can sell them all at
the market price before the run, it is fine - it can raise enough cash to pay
off all its depositors.
But a market price is a market price. It is not magic. Introduce new supply
into the market, or withdraw demand - and the price drops like a stone. The
bank run changes the price of the claims that are being sold. It has to find
a lot of new lenders - but the market price of everyone's claims is dropping.
So all banks which hold claims in this market are becoming quantitatively insolvent.
The bank run spreads to the entire market. Lenders run in the other direction.
And so on.
The idea of the yield curve lets us visualize this in a particularly elegant
way. Recall that Bagehotian banking, by transforming maturities, lowers long-term
interest rates. It flattens the curve. At least as compared to the Misesian
yield curve.
Think of this curve flattening as putting pressure on a spring. A Bagehotian
banking system is, at all times, a bank run waiting to happen. And when the
run happens, the spring explodes in the other direction - well past where the
Misesian yield curve would have been. It will not stop at the Misesian level,
because a Misesian banking system would never have made so many long-term loans.
It will produce astronomical long-term rates.
(This is exactly what we see now in the mortgage-backed securities market.
It is impossible to get a read on exactly what the risk-free interest rate
is in this market, because by definition there are no risk-free securities
in it. Maturity-transformed demand is (at present) no longer buying mortgage
securities, but not all the holdings have been liquidated, and there is no
maturity-matched banking system to provide baseline demand. So neither interest
rate nor default risk can be computed from asset price - you are trying to
solve one equation for two variables.)
This metaphor of the spring lets us understand Professor de Grauwe's perspective.
He believes "[maturity transformation] is essential for the non-bank sector
to run smoothly" because he is thinking empirically, rather than deductively.
He simply notes that every time MT stops, the reactor fails and melts down,
and the tri-state area receives its coating of strontium. His thought is not
intended as a comment on a Misesian banking system which never initiates MT
to begin with, an idea that has probably never come to his attention. He is
a fission expert, after all.
The difficulty in transitioning from Bagehotian to Misesian finance is immense,
which is probably a big part of why it's never been tried. The Misesian sees
an enormous set of financial structures which violate Mises' rule. He sees
no way to unwind them. Other than massive liquidation - the bank run as a virtuous
purge of "malinvestments" (pretty much any investment is a loss if it has to
be financed at 80% interest) - there is no obvious way to get from here to
there. The reactor just has to blow, and the strontium has to be swept up.
Or so at least is the conventional wisdom, and no one is really working on
the problem.
Moreover, there is another way to save a Bagehotian banking system: find a
new lender who can print infinite amounts of money. (Or, in a metallic standard,
compel the acceptance of paper as equivalent to metal.) This friendly fellow
is generally known as "the government," or more formally as a "lender of last
resort."
The end result of Bagehotian banking is that, without any government protection,
it is incredibly unstable and will melt down at a drop of the hat. With full
government protection, it is stable, and it drives down long-term interest
rates - just as if the government itself had been making the loans itself.
The lender of last resort might as well be a lender of first resort. (There
are no modern schools of economics which believe, as far as I know, that governments
should print money and lend it.) And with wishy-washy, informal, wink-and-a-nod
protection - which is what we had until the other day - these toxic qualities
are combined.
And this is how we continually stumble forward with a broken, Victorian-era
banking system, suffering the slings and arrows of bad financial engineering.
The whole thing needs to be rebooted, if not reinstalled, and we simply don't
have a political system - or an intellectual system - which is capable of this.
But I digress.
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