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Can the credit crisis get any worse? In this week's Outside the Box my London
partner Niels Jensen shows that it indeed can. Banks, and mainly European banks,
have large exposure to emerging market debt of all types through both sovereign,
corporate and individual loans. Just as banks have had to write down large
losses from the subprime crisis and other related problems, next will come
a wave of potential losses from yet another source. Niels then goes on to give
us a look the size and problems with hedge fund deleveraging. Altogether, this
is a very interesting letter and one that is written from a non-US point of
view that I think you will find instructive.
Niels Jensen is Managing Partner of Absolute Return Partners based in London,
which is a boutique alternative investment firm (www.arpllp.com).
You can write Niels at info@arpllp.com if
you like with your comments and questions.
John Mauldin, Editor
Outside the Box
When the Chickens Come Home to Roost
by Niels Jensen
The helicopters are here
You may remember my prediction last month that Bernanke's helicopters were
on their way. I cannot resist the temptation to show you this chart, courtesy
of John Williams at Shadow Government Statistics (see chart 1). The US monetary
base has literally exploded in recent weeks and is up a staggering 38% year-on-year
- the highest increase since 1939 according to my good friend Simon Hunt at
Simon Hunt Strategic Services. Not entirely surprising, you might say. After
all, you would expect the Federal Reserve Bank to react swiftly in response
to the drama unfolding in front of our eyes.

I just wish we had central bankers here in Europe who would be prepared to
move as quickly and as decisively as their colleagues on the other side of
the pond. Our 'eurocrats' continue to worry unnecessarily about inflation and,
by not acting aggressively enough, it is more than likely that the recession
which is engulfing us as we speak will end up doing considerably more damage
here in Europe than in the US.
Bank lending is responding
Meanwhile, in the US, bank lending is already responding to Fed's tactics.
Total commercial and consumer bank lending has grown by an annualised rate
of almost 50% in the last month and a half. Quite impressive in an economy
which is supposedly in recession.
So far so good. The problem is, however, that the near meltdown has unleashed
an asteroid storm of problems. Take Iceland. As most investors know by now,
Iceland is in very serious trouble. According to at least one estimate, European
banks stand to lose about $75 billion on Iceland - not exactly pocket change.
And that is on a population the size of Coventry! Earlier this week, the Central
Bank of Iceland raised the policy rate from 12% to 18%. Inflation is now running
at about 16% and will undoubtedly peak at much higher levels. According to
Danske Bank, expect it to hit 75% before things get better. That is ugly.
The canary in the coalmine
I have an increasingly uneasy feeling that Iceland is the canary in the coalmine.
Hungary is struggling. So are Pakistan, Ukraine, Belarus, Romania and Argentina.
Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, the President of Argentina, took everyone
by surprise last week when she announced that the country's private pension
funds (about $26 billion) would be transferred into the state pension system.
The official line is that she is aiming to protect the country's pension funds
from the global turmoil. Who is she kidding?
Now, the Federal Reserve Bank has decided to provide emergency loans to Mexico,
Brazil, Singapore and South Korea. Not that long ago, it was Singapore (amongst
others) which provided emergency funding to the ailing US banking sector. If
countries such as South Korea and Singapore require help from the outside,
the state of affairs in other and less developed nations could be much worse
than generally perceived.
Looking at the evidence produced in a new Goldman Sachs research paper1,
it is primarily Eastern Europe one has to worry about. Credit growth in Eastern
Europe and Latin America has been much stronger than in emerging Asia (chart
2).

However, if you then look at the state of the current account (chart 3), it
is evident that Eastern Europe is facing a much bigger challenge than the other
two regions. Their current account deficit has grown dramatically since the
turn of the Millennium and now stands at close to 10% of GDP.
This puts Eastern Europe in a very vulnerable situation. When Asia was in
a similar situation back in the late 1990s, it ended in tears with currencies
blowing up and consumer spending collapsing. Ultimately, though, it resulted
in much improved current accounts as the weak currencies led to an export boom,
but there was considerable pain before they got to that point.

Stephen Jen and Spyros Andreopoulos at Morgan Stanley have further explored
the subject2. They suggest that an already weak banking sector in
the OECD could be further stifled by non-performing loans to emerging market
countries.
European banks at risk
Worldwide cross-border lending now stands at $37 trillion with about $4.7
trillion going towards Eastern Europe, Latin America and emerging Asia. Cross-border
lending by European and UK banks to emerging market countries accounts for
21% and 24% of respective GDPs compared to 4% for US banks and 5% for Japanese
banks (see chart 4). Europe has about $3.5 trillion of debt outstanding to
emerging market countries whereas the US has only about $500 billion on the
line.
The country most exposed to emerging markets is Austria with total emerging
market loans accounting for no less than 85% of the country's GDP - most of
it to Eastern Europe. Austrian banks have been aggressively pursuing opportunities
in Eastern Europe for years. They have in fact been so aggressive that their
total lending to the region (approximately $300 billion) exceeds the amount
lent by Germany to Eastern Europe. Even more worryingly, Austrian banks are
the largest holders of debt on Hungary and Ukraine - two of the most fragile
economies on the old Soviet bloc. As an aside, when the global banking system
collapsed in May 1931 in the midst of the Great Depression, it was a run on
the Austrian banks which acted as a catalyst.
Italy is possibly in an even more dire condition. According to a recent article
in The Daily Telegraph3, Italy's public debt is now the third largest
in the world, behind the US and Japan. And, at 107% of GDP, it is almost twice
the limit set by the Maastricht Treaty (so much for treaties!). Italy is also
a big lender to Eastern Europe. Unicredit alone has about $130 billion of debt
outstanding to Eastern European countries. Italy's predicament is well recognised
by fixed income investors. 10-year Italian government bonds now yield 1.08%
more than their German sister bonds. The market is telling us that something
rather unpleasant could happen to Italy. It is even possible that Italy could
be forced to pull out of the euro, unless they can turn the ship around fairly
quickly.
Meanwhile, UK banks are primarily exposed to emerging Asia and Latin America.
Only Poland stands out in Eastern Europe as a major recipient of loans from
UK banks and Poland is perhaps not up to its neck in problems the way Hungary
and Ukraine are right now, but the situation is deteriorating there as well.
Sweden is mostly exposed to the Baltic countries. The three Baltic countries
owe a total of $123 billion, $83 billion of which originate from Sweden. Knowing
that Latvian banks in particular have been rather innovative with the structure
of their mortgage products (such as Yen based loans), would you sleep well
if you were the credit officer of one of the major Swedish banks?

Spain is the Latin juggernaut
Spain is another worry. Contrary to popular belief, the US is not the largest
lender to Latin America - Spain is. Just under $1 trillion of cross-border
debt is outstanding across Latin America. Only 17% of that comes from US banks.
Spanish banks, on the other hand, have more than 30% of the debt on their books.
Let's hope for Spain's sake that Ms. Kirchner is telling the truth when she
claims that the nationalisation of the private pension funds was done to protect
them from the evils of this world. Somehow I doubt it.
The sharp rise in the value of the US dollar and the Yen is not helping emerging
market economies either. We do not know exactly what proportion of the $4.7
trillion of loans to emerging market countries are denominated in US dollars
and Yen respectively, but we suspect that it is a significant share. As long
as the world is deleveraging, you should expect both currencies to continue
to appreciate in value, as most carry trades have been based on either US dollars
or Yen. Meanwhile, some countries are putting up a brave fight (e.g. Hungary
and Romania). However, as we learned in 1992, a wounded currency is like a
bleeding torso in shark infested waters. You can rest assured that speculators
will finish off the job. No central bank can win that battle.
One might argue that a devaluation of the Hungarian currency or a collapse
of the Pakistani economy won't really affect your portfolio, but that misses
the point. It is the risk to an already wounded banking industry you have to
worry about. And, as I have pointed out above, European banks are much more
exposed to emerging market countries than their US competitors.
Annus Horribilis
Enough said about emerging market risk for now. My other big worry at the
moment is what is happening to (some) hedge funds. Clearly, 2008 has been to
hedge fund investors what 1992 was to Queen Elizabeth II - Annus Horribilis
(see chart 5).

Merrill Lynch did a study recently, showing that the 30 biggest US equity
holdings amongst US hedge funds were amongst the poorest performers in the
S&P5004. In other words, it is likely that much of the recent
sell-off in equity markets around the world can be traced back to hedge fund
liquidations.
There is no question that hedge funds are downsizing at present. The problem
is to obtain precise data on the phenomenon. If we estimate that the global
hedge fund industry controls about $2 trillion of capital, and we assume that
15-20% is going to be pulled out between now and year-end (which is not far
from the truth according to our sources), $3-400 billion must be returned to
investors between now and 31st December.
Deleveraging continues
That is not the whole story though. The average hedge fund uses leverage,
to the tune of about 1.4 times (see chart 6). This is down significantly from
a year ago, but it still means that hedge funds need to liquidate investments
of at least $500-550 billion in order to meet current redemption requests.
And the real number is probably higher because some of the worst performing
strategies this year are the ones using the most leverage. The real number
is therefore more likely $6-800 billion, and that is a big enough sum of money
to put downward pressure on the markets.
Add to this the fact that some hedge funds (mostly the bigger ones) have been
selling credit default swaps (CDSs). A CDS is an insurance against corporate
default. The buyer of a CDS supposedly makes money if the underlying credit
blows up. I say 'supposedly' because the payment is a function of the seller's
ability to pay up. That was why Morgan Stanley had to be saved at all cost.
MS has been, and continues to be, one of the largest players in the CDS market.

There is no way we can establish precisely how many CDSs hedge funds have
on their books, but please consider the following: The CDS market is a $50
trillion market (give or take). Before they blew up, AIG were one of the biggest
sellers of CDSs with approximately $500 billion on their books. They ran into
problems (partly) because they were heavily exposed to the financial services
industry which is already in recession.
Recession in the early stages
The rest of the economy, however, is not yet in recession - or rather, we
do not have the statistics to prove it. Corporate defaults are still low, both
here and in the US. But corporate defaults will go up as they always do in
recessions. If AIG, one of the largest and most sophisticated financial institutions
could get themselves into trouble with barely a 1% share of the global CDS
market, what will happen to the sellers of the remaining 99%?
Who 'owns' this risk? Is it hedged or not? Is it even possible to hedge the
risk, knowing that your counterparty might not be able to pay up? What we do
know is that only the larger hedge funds have participated in the practise
of selling CDSs. Right now it feels very good not to be invested in
those types of hedge funds (as you may be aware, our focus is on alternative
investment strategies away from mainstream hedge funds). I also suspect that
the extreme volatility in recent weeks is somehow related to this phenomenon.
Investor redemptions are not the whole story.
Conclusion
I pointed out several months ago that the world's stock markets would present
several 'false dawns' before we could finally declare victory against the bear
market. Last week's more upbeat tone was one such 'false dawn', in my opinion.
There are three reasons for that:
Firstly, investors have not yet fully capitulated, and that is a necessary
condition for markets to turn around. It is best illustrated by a survey conducted
by BCA Research at the end of their two-day investment conference held in New
York on 20-21st October. Only five or six of the more than 250 people in the
room expected the stock market to be lower a year from now5. Not
consistent with capitulation! Having said that, it is perfectly normal to experience
powerful rallies in the midst of a major bear market. The sharpest rallies
in history have actually been bear market rallies.
Secondly, de-leveraging has a long way to run yet, not so much in the hedge
fund community where I suspect that much of the damage will be behind us once
we pass the next major redemption hurdle on 31st December, but in society more
broadly. Governments, banks, (some but not all) companies and, most importantly,
the majority of households are more leveraged than good is. I have borrowed
Chart 7 below from BCA Research, and it shows total US bank loans as a percentage
of US GDP. Unfortunately, the picture would be much the same for many of the
European countries. We are now facing a major de-leveraging cycle and it will
suppress economic growth and put a lid on the stock market for years to come.

Thirdly, whereas I fully agree that the worst of the financial crisis
might now be behind us, bear in mind that we have not yet seen the full effect
of the economic crisis. We are only in the first or second innings of
this recession, and the emerging market story has the potential to wreak further
havoc. So do credit default swaps - or something else. Recessions are by nature
quite unpredictable. There is one thing I am sure about, though. Just as for
New Year's Eve, the more extravagant the party, the bigger the hangover. Prepare
for this one to linger for a while yet.
Niels C. Jensen
© 2002-2008 Absolute Return Partners LLP. All rights reserved.
- Global Economic Weekly, 29th October, 2008
- "Europe more exposed to EM bank debt than the US or Japan",
Morgan Stanley, 27th October, 2008
- "Traders warn of Italian iceberg", The Daily Telegraph, 31st
October, 2008
- Source: "Hedge Funds in Trouble", The Economist
- BCA Research Global Investment Strategy, 24th October,
2008
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