|
China has a unique opportunity and responsibility to shape not only its own
future, but also that of the global economy. While China is by no means responsible
for the plight the world faces, it has played an important role in allowing
global imbalances to be built. If China decides to help prop up the world economic
model that got us into trouble in the first place, we may face the same challenges
again a few years down the road. Except then, China may not have $2 trillion
in reserves to rescue its economy, and could face severe challenges. China
will ultimately act in its own best interest, but prudent she must be. The
time for China to act is now.
Because of the country's fiscal health, policy makers in China have far more
flexibility to turn the global financial crisis into an opportunity than do
their U.S. counterparts. Currently, U.S. policymakers mistakenly think they
have all the flexibility in the world because of what is perceived to be an
almighty Federal Reserve (Fed). In our assessment, the law of unintended consequences
is likely to hit the U.S hard: debt
monetization will cause inflation; economic growth will falter once the
Fed tries to mop up all the liquidity it is throwing at the economy; and the
wealth gap will increase further as the wealthy refinance their debt taking
advantage of artificially low interest rates, whereas the middle class slides
further into recession as they remain locked out from the credit markets. Policies
to prevent the middle class from de-leveraging will backfire, causing not just
economic misery, but the rise of populist politicians. While these policy mistakes
are tragic in the U.S., similar mistakes in China could be catastrophic.
The greatest challenge of a negative feedback loop in an economic downturn
is demand destruction. A depression is a state of mind - consumers and businesses
are reducing their risk appetite and switch to survival mode no matter how
low interest rates are. Banks are more interested in buying government bonds
with capital injections received than in lending to the private sector. Uncertainty
is a key contributor to demand destruction. U.S. policies are not as effective
as policy makers would like them to be because for too long, there has been
a lack of leadership to communicate how this crisis will be managed.
A U.S. Congress willing to give a $34 billion "bridge loan" to automakers
knowing very well that the money will be spent within months while not placing
car makers on a sound footing is a Congress building bridges to nowhere. Speaker
of the House Nancy Pelosi said the loan would get the industry ready for the
21 st century; we are almost a decade into the new century - this effort is
too little too late. Worse, even if there were a magic wand to heal the carmakers,
zero percent financing on six-year loans extended during the credit bubble
depresses demand for years to come. Similarly, the stimulus plans to be enacted
in January are unlikely to be as effective as intended; foremost, the plans
are expensive and should push up the cost of financing for government debt.
The U.S. Treasury has been at the forefront of the crisis, but any leadership
taken was not properly communicated. The result is, again, that policies have
mostly been expensive, but have failed to unlock credit markets. Too often
have the Treasury's rules changed; the policies in place continue to discourage
private sector participation in helping to recapitalize financial institutions.
Lou Jiwei, chairman of China Investment Corp., the country's sovereign wealth
fund, puts it bluntly: "Right now we don't have the courage to invest in financial
institutions because we don't know what problems we will put ourselves into." He
spoke ahead of U.S. Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson's visit to China and added, "My
confidence should come from government policies. But if they are changing every
week, how can you expect that to make me confident?"
The only leadership that seems to be emerging is from the Federal Reserve
determined to print not just billions, but trillions of dollars to provide
the backstop to all economic activity; at the same time the policies are an
insult to any potential buyer of securities the Fed has targeted, as the intervention
keeps yields artificially low. As China has been one of the premier buyers
of these securities, namely Treasury bonds and agency securities, this is a
clear message by the Fed that Chinese investments to finance U.S. deficits
is no longer welcome; why else would the Fed depress the return for potential
buyers during a time when unprecedented amounts of debt need to be raised?
While we are provocative in our allegation, it is at best an unintended consequence,
at worst highly deliberate. Intentional or not, it may coerce Asian buyers
of U.S. debt to reduce their holdings to allow the U.S. dollar to weaken. The
Fed may believe that it does not need the free market to set rates as it can
use its own balance sheet to set economic policy; this ill-perceived view is
also shared by economists that believe modern central banking is stronger than
market forces.
China can learn from these mistakes, but has no time to lose. Demand destruction
in China is working its way through the economy there as well. The window for
Chinese policy makers to lift the spirit of workers is closing fast: the Chinese
New Year is an opportunity for workers to reunite with their family and friends;
during those days, the mood of the country will be set for the year. Right
now, stagnating wages, job losses and the bleak U.S. economy will dominate
the dinner table discussions. Consumer spending in China has continued to hold
up year over year, but there is a seriously accelerating slowdown under way.
Far more effective than a spending program on infrastructure is a program to
lift the spirit of Chinese consumers.
| |
| |
Merk Insights provide the Merk Perspective on
currencies, global imbalances, the trade deficit, the socio-economic impact
of the U.S. administration's policies and more.
Don't miss an Insight:
Sign up for our Newsletter
The Archive:
Read past
Merk Insights |
| |
Lifting the spirit of Chinese consumers is not done by providing access to
credit, but by giving the country a vision. It is already abundantly clear
that the toy industry is faltering; but the high tech industry in China is
performing well under the circumstances. In its recent history, China has embraced
change and must do so now. This is the opportunity to get the country ready
for the next phase in its economic growth. To do so, rather than subsidizing
industries that have little chance to survive, the country should focus on
where its strengths are likely to be in the years to come. China has a tremendous
opportunity as the outsourcing partner for goods and services at the higher
end of the value chain. Toy production should be left to other Asian countries;
China has to focus on technology and innovation. Similarly, while building
roads and power plants may provide a buffer to an economic slowdown, policies
are required to encourage Chinese entrepreneurs to take risks and invest. An
infrastructure stimulus plan will favor state controlled enterprises; to turn
the mood in the country, government policies have to provide the general population
with a vision, not merely state owned enterprises.
Once a vision for the future is embraced, it will become apparent that it
is in China's interest to allow the renminbi to appreciate. Since early 2007,
the European Union surpassed the U.S. as China's primary export market. The
close link between the renminbi and the dollar reinforces the public's perception
that the fate of the Chinese economy is linked to that of the U.S.; China has
to become more self confident - removing the shackles of the current exchange
rate regime may provide an important catalyst to energize a spirit of change.
While a stronger currency would hurt industries that mostly compete on price,
such as the toy industry, it would substantially increase the domestic purchasing
power. The future of China is a more balanced economy with a stronger domestic
sector as well as an export sector that competes on value, not price. China
does not want to face the challenges of Vietnam, which only competes on price,
ending up with extraordinary inflation and, ultimately, unable to sell to the
U.S. anyway because American consumers cannot afford their mortgages.
China is not powerful enough to prop up U.S. consumer spending; as a result,
it is far more efficient for China to use its reserves to help transition the
economy for the future rather than use its reserves to buy U.S. government
securities to stimulate the U.S. economy. The Fed has decided to take China's
place in buying U.S. debt; let the Fed pursue its dangerous experiment. In
the meantime, China should position itself for the future as the road ahead
will, without a doubt, be rough.
We manage the Merk Hard and Asian Currency Funds, no-load mutual funds seeking
to protect against a decline in the dollar by investing in baskets of hard
and Asian currencies, respectively. To learn more about the Funds, or to subscribe
to our free newsletter, please visit www.merkfund.com.
|
Axel Merk
Axel Merk is Manager of the Merk Hard Currency
Fund
The
Merk Hard Currency Fund is a no-load mutual fund that invests in a basket of
hard currencies from countries with strong monetary policies assembled to protect
against the depreciation of the U.S. dollar relative to other currencies. The
Fund may serve as a valuable diversification component as it seeks to protect
against a decline in the dollar while potentially mitigating stock market,
credit and interest risks - with the ease of investing in a mutual fund.
The Fund may be appropriate for you if you are pursuing
a long-term goal with a hard currency component to your portfolio; are willing
to tolerate the risks associated with investments in foreign currencies; or
are looking for a way to potentially mitigate downside risk in or profit from
a secular bear market. For more information on the Fund and to download a prospectus,
please visit www.merkfund.com.
Investors should consider the investment objectives,
risks and charges and expenses of the Merk Hard Currency Fund carefully before
investing. This and other information is in the prospectus, a copy of which
may be obtained by visiting the Funds website at www.merkfund.com or calling
866-MERK FUND. Please read the prospectus carefully before you invest.
The Fund primarily invests in foreign currencies and
as such, changes in currency exchange rates will affect the value of what
the Fund owns and the price of the Funds shares. Investing in foreign instruments
bears a greater risk than investing in domestic instruments for reasons such
as volatility of currency exchange rates and, in some cases, limited geographic
focus, political and economic instability, and relatively illiquid markets.
The Fund is subject to interest rate risk which is the risk that debt securities
in the Fund's portfolio will decline in value because of increases in market
interest rates. As a non-diversified fund, the Fund will be subject to more
investment risk and potential for volatility than a diversified fund because
its portfolio may, at times, focus on a limited number of issuers. The Fund
may also invest in derivative securities which can be volatile and involve
various types and degrees of risk. For a more complete discussion of these
and other Fund risks please refer to the Fund's prospectus. Foreside
Fund Services, LLC, distributor.
Image rendition and html coding Copyright © 2000-2009
SafeHaven.com
ADVERTISEMENTS
« Opinions expressed at SafeHaven are those of the
individual authors and do not necessarily represent the opinion of SafeHaven
or its management. Articles are available via RSS/XML. Please
visit RSSHelp for instructions. »
|