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Below is an excerpt from a commentary originally posted at www.speculative-investor.com on
5th February 2009.
In our 3rd December 2008 commentary we explained that the probability of an
imminent great depression was uncomfortably high. Our reasoning, in a nutshell,
was that the recent credit bubble was much bigger than any previous credit
bubble of the past century and that the policymakers of today were blundering
much more rapidly and on a much grander scale than their counterparts of the
1930s.
We can't over-emphasise that the Great Depression did not become "great" due
to the economic problems signaled by the 1929 stock market crash, but, instead,
due to government policies undertaken to counteract the economic problems.
The policy errors we are referring to do NOT include the Fed's so-called failure
to prevent the money supply from shrinking, but do include government actions
designed to boost prices, expand credit, create employment, and re-distribute
wealth. These actions delayed necessary adjustments, and as a result it took
more than 15 years for the economy to do what it should have done in 2-3 years.
As Franklin Roosevelt's own Treasury secretary, Henry Morgenthau, lamented
in an address to Congressional Democrats in May of 1939: "We have tried
spending money. We are spending more than we have ever spent before and it
does not work. And I have just one interest, and if I am wrong ... somebody
else can have my job. I want to see this country prosperous. I want to see
people get a job. I want to see people get enough to eat. We have never made
good on our promises ... I say after eight years of this Administration we
have just as much unemployment as when we started ... And an enormous debt
to boot!"*
It is commonly believed that the Second World War finally ended the Great
Depression, but this is not true -- the Depression didn't finally end until
government controls were eventually relaxed after the War. Preparing for and
fighting WWII made sure that everyone had a job, but minimal unemployment does
not necessarily go hand-in-hand with economic strength. In the former Soviet
Union there was very little unemployment, but living standards were "third
world". Herein lies the problem with treating job creation as a primary goal
of economic policy.
As noted above and in our earlier commentary on this topic, government today
is unfortunately enacting the same policies that made the Great Depression "great".
Additionally, policymakers have stepped-up their efforts and appear to be more
committed than ever to the path of increased spending, monetary pump-priming
and economic intervention. As a result, we think the probability of a great
depression has risen to the point where such an outcome is almost inevitable.
At this point it is appropriate for us to address a couple of related issues.
The first is the perceived problem of falling confidence.
The famous economist J. M. Keynes didn't understand the link between the boom/bust
cycle, fractional reserve banking and the central bank's manipulation of interest
rates. He therefore relied on mysterious changes in something he called "animal
spirits" to explain how booms would evolve into busts. Many of today's economists
operate from within a similar faulty framework, and thus believe a key to turning
the economy around is boosting the confidence of consumers and businesses.
They don't seem to appreciate that the problems are REAL, as opposed to figments
of our collective imagination. A loss of confidence, leading to less spending
on current consumption and a consequential increase in saving, is a RATIONAL
response to the current economic REALITY. By putting a hallucinogen in the
water supply you could probably make people feel more confident and thus cause
them to go out and spend freely for a while, but how could this possibly help
given that the current predicament involves too much debt, too little savings,
and a mismatch between production and consumption? Obviously it wouldn't help;
it would just make a bad situation even worse.
Policies that encourage people to increase their borrowing and spending are,
in effect, encouraging people to dig themselves into deeper financial holes,
but such policies are now 'all the rage' in the world of economic policymaking.
For example, one of this
week's US Government schemes puts in place a financial incentive for people
to borrow money to buy new cars. This scheme will cause damage to the extent
that it actually does what it is supposed to do, but fortunately for the US
economy it probably won't work (it probably won't lead to many additional car
loans).
In sum, the problems are real. Confidence will naturally return after savings
and production have adjusted to the new reality, while policies that convince
people to ignore reality and behave less prudently in the short-term will only
exacerbate the problems.
The next issue we'll cover is the implication of increasing the money supply.
Many people, including the Fed Chairman, believe that the economy can be helped
through its 'rough patch' via monetary inflation.
Those who share the Fed Chairman's belief should explain in detail, using
good economic theory as opposed to Keynesian "animal spirits", how counterfeiting
money can possibly strengthen the economy. One of the main considerations is
that years of monetary inflation prompted massive investment in projects that
should never have seen the light of day, leading to the situation where the
economy's capital structure doesn't mesh with the needs of consumers. As far
as we can tell, creating more money out of nothing couldn't possibly alleviate
this problem.
Some will argue that monetary inflation 'works' (does good) by pushing up
asset prices and thus reducing the debt burden, but let's think this through.
If there's enough monetary inflation to push up asset prices then lenders will
start demanding higher interest rates due to anticipated currency depreciation.
Also, the cost of living will rise. At the same time, the aforementioned mismatch
between production and consumption -- the root of the high and climbing unemployment
rate -- will remain in place and probably become even more pronounced due to
additional mal-investment. So, rather than having their financial burdens lessened
by falling prices and low interest rates, those without jobs and those with
excessive debt loads will have to deal with higher living and debt-servicing
costs.
The bottom line is that the government can't improve the situation by creating
money out of nothing, but it can CHANGE the situation. Specifically, it can
make sure that the depression will be the inflationary kind rather than the
deflationary kind. The inflationary kind is potentially worse because under
this scenario the economy is less able to repair itself and you don't get the
benefits that would otherwise be conferred by a falling cost of living. Unfortunately,
the actions being taken by today's policymakers skew the odds in favour of
an inflationary depression.
Finally, forewarned is forearmed. Our economic outlook could prove to be too
pessimistic, but if you prepare for a depression -- by, for example, getting
out of debt and building up substantial reserves of cash and gold -- and things
turn out better than expected, you won't lose much. On the other hand, you
will probably lose a lot if you prepare for a rosy scenario and a depression
actually occurs.
*Quote taken from Burton Folsom's book "New Deal or Raw Deal?"
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