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It is the general view that the U.S. economy has outperformed the rest of
the world in the past several years. Judging by real GDP growth rates, this
is true. Yet the reason why is obvious, easily explained, and disastrous in
its consequences: the U.S. credit machine has no parallel in the world. It
is geared to accommodate absolutely unlimited credit for two purposes - consumption
and financial speculation.
There has developed a tremendous and growing imbalance between the huge amount
of credit that goes into these two uses and the minimal amount that goes into
productive investment. Instead of moving to rein in these excesses and imbalances,
the Greenspan Fed has clearly opted to sustain and foster them.
Today it is customary to measure economic strength by simply comparing recent
real GDP growth rates. It always becomes fashionable when U.S economic growth
is higher than in Europe.
From a long-term perspective, however, economic policy and economic growth
are about physical resource allocation, that is, available tangible capital
stock and labor. How much of the current production is devoted to consumption
and how much to capital investment? Looking for economic health and strength,
generations of economists have focused on two economic aggregates: savings
and investment, in particular net savings and net investment.
It used to be a truism among economists of all schools of thought that the
growth of an economy's tangible capital stock was the key determinant of increased
productivity and subsequently of good, high-paying jobs. And it also used to
be a truism for economists that from a macroeconomic perspective, tangible
capital investment into factories, production equipment, and commercial and
residential building represents the one and only genuine wealth creation.
But in America's new money culture, policymakers and economists make no difference
between wealth created through saving and investment in the real economy and
wealth created in the markets through asset bubbles, engendered by extremely
loose money and credit.
In 1996, an article in Foreign Policy entitled "Securities: The New
Wealth Machine," explained how securitization - the issuance of high-quality
bonds and stocks - has become the most powerful engine of wealth creation in
today's world economy. Whereas societies used to accumulate wealth only slowly,
they can now do so quickly and directly, and "the new approach requires
that a state find ways to increase the market value of its productive assets." In
such a strategy, "an economic policy that aims to achieve growth by wealth
creation therefore does not attempt to increase the production of goods and
services, except as a secondary objective."
This a perfect description of the corrupted economic thinking that is today
ruling in America not only in corporations and the financial markets, but even
among policymakers, elevating wealth-creation, that is, bubble-creation, to
the ultimate of wisdom in the policy of economic growth.
There can be no question that the rapid sequence of asset bubbles - stocks,
bonds, housing - that the United States has seen in the past few years were
crucial in stimulating economic growth. Considering, though, its tremendously
lopsided effect on consumer spending and the associated consumer-borrowing
orgy, we are unable to regard this as a reasonable and sustainable policy.
It works in the short run from the demand side, but it has come at heavy structural
costs.
With these remarks, we wanted to make one thing perfectly clear. It is not
profits, savings and investment that drive U.S. economic growth. It is America's
unparalleled credit machine, and that alone, which makes all the difference
in economic growth and wealth creation between America and the rest of the
world.
In the consensus view, the U.S. economy is breaking out of its anemic growth
pattern. A few signs of accelerating economic growth have led to this forecast,
in particular the 8.2% spurt of real GDP growth in the third quarter of 2003
and within it sharply higher investment technology spending, up 22%; surging
profits, and also surging early indicators, among them in particular the November
ISM survey for manufacturing. Various indicators are at their strongest in
20 years.
We strongly disagree with this assessment. The growth spurt in the third quarter
was exceptional, due to a one-off splurge in tax rebates and a burst in the
mortgage refinancing wave. As to investment spending, what essentially matters
is the change in total nonresidential investment, and that continues to show
virtual stagnation. The widely hailed surge in IT investment came overwhelmingly
from the hedonic pricing of computers, which has been abolished. Recent profits
reports have indeed been impressive, but their success is vastly different
between sectors and not as straightforward as the official numbers imply.
Yet our disbelief in the U.S. economy's breakout from its protracted sluggishness
has one main reason: All the economic growth of the past two years, anemic
as it was, is traceable to a seemingly endless array of asset and borrowing
bubbles. Quoting analyst Stephen Roach, "the Fed, in effect, has become
a serial bubble blower" - first the stock market bubble; then the bond
bubble; then the housing bubble and the associated mortgage refinancing bubble.
As a result, consumer spending has been surging well in excess of disposable
income for years.
The idea was that sustained and rising consumer spending would in due time
stimulate investment spending. It has grossly failed to do that. Our assumption
rather is that consumer spending will slow as the asset and consumer borrowing
bubble are sure to fade. Seeing no big investment recovery, we expect a surprisingly
weak U.S. economy in 2004.
Regards,
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