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"I know the Government are intent on decimating the country's gold reserves...to
replace them with a whole series of overseas currencies. [Yet] they are not
only selling gold but devaluing our remaining gold supplies by announcing
their intention to sell in advance, which leads to a lower price on sale..."
Nick Gibb MP, debating the UK Finance Bill, 13 May 1999
IT WAS TEN YEARS ago to the day this Thursday that Gordon Brown shocked
the gold market (not to mention the newspaper sub's) by pre-announcing a huge
400-tonne sale from the UK's reserves.
Gold Prices fell
on the news...losing 2% for the day and dropping one-eighth to fresh 20-year
lows by the time the Treasury's auctions actually started that autumn.
And this week, to mark the occasion - and mark it almost alone - the Financial
Times said that "Europe's central banks are $40bn poorer than they
might have been after they followed the British move."
No, not quite. Because the gold that they sold - a total of 3,811 tonnes by
all accounts - could only become money on sale. Until then, it was just gold
to them, and holding it didn't make Europe's central banks any richer. It would
simply mean they had 3,811 extra tonnes of gold in the vault.
Which is a very different thing from holding an extra $40 billion.
"What is the rationale for holding gold, a non-interest bearing asset, given
that there is no more official role for gold since the collapse of the gold
exchange standard?"
So asked Hervé Hannoun of the Banque de France during the FT's
Gold Conference in mid-2000. As you can guess, it was a rhetorical flourish.
Because nine months after signing the "Washington
Agreement" to cap central-bank gold sales at 400 tonnes per year - a
pact sparked by Gordon Brown's indiscreet selling and which in turn sparked
a sharp rise as the threat of indiscriminate selling fell back - the Frenchman
in fact had answers aplenty.

"First, security: the absence of any credit risk is an intrinsic quality
of gold. Gold offers full security as long as it is properly stowed in central
banks' vaults.
"Second, liquidity: in situations of political turmoil or high global
inflation, gold's liquidity is unchallenged...Its liquid quality becomes apparent
and increases as uncertainty grows. In this regard, the absence of a return
on gold can be viewed as the price of its 'option component': contrary to most
other assets, Gold Prices go
up when things go wrong."
So far, so yellow and shiny. And during that after-dinner speech - tellingly
arranged by investment-bank Goldman Sachs, a key advisor to Gordon
Brown's Gold Sales in 1999 - Hannoun would go on to deny the French central
bank had any plans whatsoever to sell gold from its vaults.
Why? Because "Gold is an asset of last resort par excellence and recent market
developments [i.e. the 'Brown Bottom' in prices and ensuing central-bank agreement
to limit sales in future] have in no way altered its intrinsic qualities. There
is still a rationale for central banks to hold gold."
Roll on 10 years, however, and those two wonderful attributes of central-bank
gold - first security, then liquidity amid crisis - have so far paled compared
to Hannoun's third rationale: diversification.
"Gold is also a very good diversification instrument. Indeed in the long run,
the price of gold has shown a very low and even a negative correlation with
the Dollar (the first-ranking reserve currency) and with US Treasuries. So
gold is very useful to build a diversified portfolio as it enables you to improve
your risk/return profile."
Odd, but with Gold Prices rising
- and rising three-fold and more against both the Dollar and Euro since the
start of 2000 - the Banque de France has since sold 520 tonnes of Gold
Bullion over the last half-decade, all announced within "Washington II",
the renewed (and expanded) central-bank gold agreement signed in Sept. 2004.
France still has another 60 tonnes slated for sale between now and September,
when CBGA II will expire. Whether or not the signatory banks all sign up again
remains unclear for now. (Renewal in 2004 was completed by March.) But private
investors trying to judge their own exposure to gold might want to consider
the three rationale laid out by M.Hannoun back in 2000.
Security, liquidity and diversification.
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