|
I decided to dedicate some resources into the reason stock prices have diverged
so far, and so fast from the underlying fundamentals. The preliminary results
of my findings will be released over the next day or two, hopefully. In the
meantime, enjoy this precursor.
Market volumes
Volumes in the markets are tapering down and are undermining the strength
and sustainability of the recent rally. The average volume of both Dow Jones
and S&P 500 in June were below the average volumes (since Jan 2008)


As a matter of fact, you can easily and visually discern from the charts above
that there is a clear inverse correlation between volume and index price. The
higher the volume, the lower the index goes, the lower the volume the higher
the index goes. I attribute this to the observation that most REAL investors
realize that there are too many headwinds in the market to truly commit significant
long capital. Well, if that is the case, what is causing the stock prices to
rise on light volume????
Growth in program trading
There has been a phenomenal surge in program
trading over the past one year with program trading accounting for 40.4%
of total trading volumes on NYSE for week ended June 19, 2009 against 35.1%
in January 2009 and 27.8% for the previous 52 weeks. The growth has been
exceptional particularly since the last week of May 2009. This smells quite
fishy, after all the last week in May also saw a significant jump in both
the S&P and DJIA on diminished volume.
| (Average Daily - in mn shares) |
|
Current week |
|
S&P
500
Index |
Buy
Programs |
Sell
Programs |
Total
Programs |
Total
NYSE
Volume |
Program Trading
as % of Total
NYSE volumes |
Total NYSE
Volume
(previous 52
Week Avg) |
| Dec 29-Jan 2, 09 |
932 |
414 |
366 |
779 |
2,221 |
35.1% |
23.7% |
| Jan 5-Jan 9, 09 |
890 |
433 |
438 |
871 |
2,660 |
32.7% |
23.7% |
| Jan 12-Jan 16, 09 |
850 |
508 |
506 |
1,014 |
3,034 |
33.4% |
23.7% |
| Jan 20-Jan 23, 09 |
832 |
520 |
530 |
1,050 |
3,305 |
31.8% |
23.7% |
| Jan 26-Jan 30, 09 |
826 |
435 |
432 |
868 |
2,849 |
30.4% |
23.8% |
| Feb 2-Feb 6, 09 |
869 |
471 |
454 |
924 |
3,000 |
30.8% |
23.8% |
| Feb 9-Feb 13, 09 |
827 |
428 |
456 |
885 |
2,916 |
30.3% |
23.9% |
| Feb 17-Feb 20, 09 |
770 |
547 |
573 |
1,119 |
3,434 |
32.6% |
24.3% |
| Feb 23-Feb 27, 09 |
735 |
606 |
614 |
1,220 |
3,728 |
32.7% |
24.0% |
| Mar 2-Mar 6, 09 |
683 |
633 |
637 |
1,270 |
3,853 |
33.0% |
24.1% |
| Mar 9-Mar 13, 09 |
757 |
589 |
537 |
1,126 |
3,659 |
30.8% |
24.3% |
| Mar 16-Mar 20, 09 |
769 |
704 |
637 |
1,341 |
4,112 |
32.6% |
27.0% |
| Mar 23-Mar 27, 09 |
816 |
535 |
503 |
1,037 |
3,549 |
29.2% |
24.5% |
| Mar 30-Apr 3, 09 |
843 |
566 |
523 |
1,089 |
3,344 |
32.6% |
24.6% |
| Apr 6-Apr 10, 09 |
857 |
482 |
439 |
920 |
2,978 |
30.9% |
24.8% |
| Apr 13-Apr 17, 09 |
870 |
528 |
489 |
1,017 |
3,418 |
29.8% |
25.0% |
| Apr 20-Apr 24, 09 |
866 |
505 |
460 |
965 |
3,511 |
27.5% |
24.9% |
| Apr 27-May 1, 09 |
878 |
437 |
441 |
878 |
2,979 |
29.5% |
25.1% |
| May 4-May 8, 09 |
929 |
507 |
456 |
963 |
3,742 |
25.7% |
25.2% |
| May 11-May 15, 09 |
883 |
465 |
462 |
927 |
3,265 |
28.4% |
25.6% |
| May 18-May 22, 09 |
887 |
387 |
374 |
761 |
2,877 |
26.5% |
25.2% |
| May 26-May 29, 09 |
919 |
556 |
514 |
1,070 |
3,173 |
33.7% |
25.3% |
| June 1-June 5, 09 |
940 |
422 |
398 |
821 |
2,901 |
28.3% |
25.4% |
| June 8-June 12, 09 |
946 |
352 |
334 |
686 |
2,233 |
30.7% |
25.5% |
| June 15-June 19, 09 |
921 |
579 |
575 |
1,155 |
2,855 |
40.4% |
27.8% |

Influence on market
Since April 6, 2009 when S&P 500 index was at 857 points program trading
accounted for 30.9% of total NYSE volumes. Over the past two months when S&P
500 increased to 921 points program trading has increased to 40.4%. Similarly,
the relation between program trading and the S&P index was also witnessed
during December, 2008 - February, 2009. Increase in program trading historically
has been a major contributor of increased volatility due to abrupt price changes
due caused by automated rule based trading. Widespread use of program trading
has been one of the causes for the stock market collapse on October 19, 1987,
also referred as Black Monday. However, there are numerous other factors that
could explain the increased volatility and it would be difficult to discern
the sole impact of program trading on volatility.

Major Players
Goldman Sachs is the largest player in the program trading market space with
nearly 20.6% of program trading volumes as of June 19, 2009. Overall, Goldman
Sachs program trading volumes alone form a substantial 8.3% of NYSE total volumes,
up from 7.0% since 2009 beginning. Although, Goldman Sachs trading
volumes still dominate the program trading there has been significant surge
in program trading volumes of Deutsche Bank, Morgan Stanley, Barclays and Credit
Sussie with 158%, 89%, 152% and 118% increase in program trading volumes. Deutsche
Bank, Morgan Stanley's share have increased to 12.3% and 11.6%, respectively
for the week ended June 19, 2009 compared with 8.3% and 4.0%, respectively
for the week ended January 2, 2009 suggesting that some of the recent
rally could be driven by increased trading by these institutions.
NYSE Program Trading -
15 Most Active Members
Firms (mn shares) |
Total |
Share of
program
trading
volumes |
% of total
NYSE volumes
(June Mid) |
Share of
program
trading
volumes
(2009 beg) |
Change |
| June 15-June 19, 2009 |
| Goldman, Sachs & Co. |
1,192 |
20.6% |
8.3% |
24.9% |
-4.3% |
| Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC. |
953 |
16.5% |
6.7% |
14.0% |
2.5% |
| Morgan Stanley & Co. Inc. |
712 |
12.3% |
5.0% |
8.3% |
4.0% |
| Deutsche Bank Securities |
667 |
11.6% |
4.7% |
4.0% |
7.6% |
| Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, & Smith, Inc. |
436 |
7.5% |
3.1% |
12.0% |
-4.5% |
| Barclays Capital Inc |
408 |
7.1% |
2.9% |
n/a |
2.9% |
| RBC Capital Markets Corp. |
310 |
5.4% |
2.2% |
6.6% |
-1.3% |
| JP Morgan Securities |
219 |
3.8% |
1.5% |
5.2% |
-1.4% |
| BNP Paribas Brokerage Services Corp |
214 |
3.7% |
1.5% |
1.4% |
2.3% |
| Citigroup Global Markets |
116 |
2.0% |
0.8% |
4.7% |
-2.7% |
| UBS Securities, LLC. |
96 |
1.7% |
0.7% |
2.9% |
-1.2% |
| SIG Brokerage LP |
92 |
1.6% |
0.6% |
1.4% |
0.2% |
| Interactive Brokers LLC |
72 |
1.2% |
0.5% |
n/a |
0.5% |
| SG Americas Securities, LLC |
49 |
0.9% |
0.3% |
1.2% |
-0.4% |
| CIBC World Markets Corp. |
42 |
0.7% |
0.3% |
n/a |
0.3% |
| Total for 15 Member Firms |
5,577 |
96.6% |
39.1% |
|
| Total for All Firms Reporting |
5,773 |
100.0% |
40.4% |
|
Goldman Sachs
program trading |
Program trading
volumes |
% of total
NYSE volumes |
| Dec 29-Jan 2, 09 |
776 |
7.0% |
| Jan 5-Jan 9, 09 |
847 |
6.4% |
| Jan 12-Jan 16, 09 |
1,092 |
7.2% |
| Jan 20-Jan 23, 09 |
1,049 |
6.3% |
| Jan 26-Jan 30, 09 |
1,056 |
7.4% |
| Feb 2-Feb 6, 09 |
1,048 |
7.0% |
| Feb 9-Feb 13, 09 |
1,119 |
7.7% |
| Feb 17-Feb 20, 09 |
1,152 |
6.7% |
| Feb 23-Feb 27, 09 |
1,604 |
8.6% |
| Mar 2-Mar 6, 09 |
1,561 |
8.1% |
| Mar 9-Mar 13, 09 |
1,427 |
7.8% |
| Mar 16-Mar 20, 09 |
1,378 |
6.7% |
| Mar 23-Mar 27, 09 |
1,360 |
7.7% |
| Mar 30-Apr 3, 09 |
1,423 |
8.5% |
| Apr 6-Apr 10, 09 |
1,042 |
7.0% |
| Apr 13-Apr 17, 09 |
1,235 |
7.2% |
| Apr 20-Apr 24, 09 |
1,178 |
6.7% |
| Apr 27-May 1, 09 |
931 |
6.2% |
| May 4-May 8, 09 |
1,059 |
5.7% |
| May 11-May 15, 09 |
1,008 |
6.2% |
| May 18-May 22, 09 |
866 |
6.0% |
| May 26-May 29, 09 |
871 |
5.5% |
| June 1-June 5, 09 |
1,010 |
7.0% |
| June 8-June 12, 09 |
805 |
7.2% |
| June 15-June 19, 09 |
1,192 |
8.3% |

Now, I have warned about Goldman's increased VaR and exposure to trading activities
over a year ago (see "Goldman
Sachs Snapshot: Risk vs. Reward vs. Reputations on the Street"). For
those that believe Goldman is invincible in the trading markets, I strongly
suggest you query their December 2008 trading performance, which resulted in
a big loss. These results somehow became "orphaned", not being included in
Q4-08 or Q1-09 results. This was a convenient exercise of hide the sausage,
since the December result would have skewed either quarter significantly to
the negative. Goldman is now basically a big hedge fund, and would (and should)
be valued as such if not for the premium, "mystique" brand name that has been
attached to it by those who do not adequate vet the financial statements. I
will bring more on this topic tomorrow. In the mean time, I suggest all re-read
my missive from April of this year - "Who
is the Newest Riskiest Bank on the Street?". I saw this coming a while
back.
Maybe readers should send their local elected official a copy of "Newest
Riskiest Bank" as well as this article to their fellow taxpayers and elected
officials in Congress so all can see what our tax monies have been bailing
out and supporting over the last year - the continued and blatant risk taking
that was the root cause of this mess to begin with. I pray thee tell me, what
happens if Goldman crashes in a programmed trading meltdown??? More taxpayer
TARP, bank bailouts, supports and guarantees. Now, what do you think happens
if things go well for their trading program? The biggest bonuses in the history
of the company, in order to "incentivize" stars to stay. This is absolute nonsense,
and the takers of the risk need to be the ones to bear the consequences of
said risk, not simply be the sole persons and entities to benefit from the
rewards of said risk. I say the taxpayer should share in the Q1 Goldman bonuses,
since it was the taxpayers support that kept Goldman alive through Q1 (remember
the Decemember loss, the expedited federal bank charter, the debt guarantees,
the TARP, the ZIRP, the taking of junk assets as collateral, the TALF, the
PPIP, the AIG bailout funds forwarded to GS, and the whole enchilada???). Does
anyone really think that Goldman earned those bonuses without government assistance.
Now, I feel I should keep my bonus, if I were to get one, because no one gave
me $55 billion to keep me in business while I waded through risky mistakes
until I found some that paid off! Can Goldman say the same???
Do not simply follow accounting earnings without taking into consideration
the risk involved in generating said earnings. Consider yourself warned!
|
Reggie
Middleton
Reggie Middleton, LLC
Perpetual Interests, LLCTM
http://boombustblog.com/
Who
am I?
Well, I fancy myself the personification of the free thinking
maverick, the ultimate non-conformist as it applies to investment and analysis.
I am definitively outside the box - not your typical or stereotypical Wall
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Visit his blog Boom
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