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There
are those who sweat over every decision, worrying about how it will affect
their lives and investments. Then there is the school of thought that we should
focus on the big decisions. I am of the latter school.
85% of investment returns are a result of asset class allocations and only
15% come from actually picking investment within the asset class. Getting the
big picture right is critical. In this week's Outside the Box we look at a
very well written essay about the biggest of all question in front of us today.
Do we face deflation or inflation?
This OTB is by my good friends and business partners in London, Niels Jensen
and his team at Absolute Return Partners. I have worked closely with Niels
for years and have found him to be one of the more savvy observers of the markets
I know. You can see more of his work at www.arpllp.com and
contact them at info@arpllp.com.
John Mauldin, Editor
Outside the Box
Make Sure You Get This One Right
By Niels C. Jensen
"You can't beat deflation in a credit-based system." ~ Robert Prechter
As investors we are faced with the consequences of our decisions every single
day; however, as my old mentor at Goldman Sachs frequently reminded me, in
your life time, you won't have to get more than a handful of key decisions
correct - everything else is just noise. One of those defining moments came
about in August 1979 when inflation was out of control and global stock markets
were being punished. Paul Volcker was handed the keys to the executive office
at the Fed. The rest is history.
Now, fast forward to July 2009 and we (and that includes you, dear reader!)
are faced with another one of those 'make or break' decisions which will effectively
determine returns over the next many years. The question is a very simple one:
Are we facing a deflationary spiral or will the monetary and fiscal stimulus
ultimately create (hyper) inflation?
Unfortunately, the answer is less straightforward. There is no question that,
in a cash based economy, printing money (or 'quantitative easing' as it is
named these days) is inflationary. But what actually happens when credit is
destroyed at a faster rate than our central banks can print money?
A Story within the Story
Following the collapse of the biggest credit bubble in history, there has
been no shortage of finger pointing and the hedge fund industry, which has
always had an uncanny ability to be at the wrong place at the wrong time,
has yet again been at the centre of attention. And politicians, keen to divert
attention away from themselves as the true culprits of the crisis through
years of regulatory neglect, have been quick at picking up the baton. Admittedly,
the hedge fund industry is guilty of many stupid things over the years, but
blaming it for the credit crisis is beyond pathetic and the suggestion that
increased regulation of the hedge fund industry is going to prevent future
crises is outrageously naïve.
If you prohibit private investors from investing in hedge funds which on
average use 1.5-2 times leverage but permit the same investors to invest
in banks which use 25 times leverage and which are for all intents and purposes
bankrupt, then you either don't understand the world of finance or you don't
want to understand. Shame on those who fall for cheap tactics.
Let's begin by setting the macro-economic frame for the discussion. I have
been quite bearish for a while, suspecting that the growing optimism which
has characterised the last few months would eventually fade again as reality
began to sink in that this is no ordinary recession and that 'less bad' doesn't
necessarily translate into a quick recovery. I still believe there is a good
chance of enjoying one, maybe two, positive quarters later this year or early
next; however, a crisis of this magnitude doesn't suddenly fade into obscurity,
just because the economy no longer shrinks at an annual rate of 6-8%.
Going forward, not only will economic growth disappoint, but the economic
cycles will become more volatile again (see chart 1) with several boom/bust
cycles packed into the next couple of decades. This is a natural consequence
of the Anglo-Saxon consumer-driven growth model having been bankrupted. Growing
consumer spending over the past 30 years led to rapidly expanding service and
financial sectors both of which will now contract for years to come as overcapacity
forces players to downsize.

This will again lead to higher corporate earnings volatility which will almost
certainly drive P/E ratios lower, making conditions even trickier for equity
investors. At the bottom of every major bear market in the last 200 years,
P/E ratios have been below 10. As you can see from chart 2 overleaf, few countries
are there yet. The next decade is therefore not likely to be a 'buy and hold'
market for equity investors. The combination of low economic growth and pressure
on valuations will create severe headwinds. The most likely way to make money
in equities will be through more active trading.
So now, two years into this crisis, where do we stand and where do we go from
here? History offers limited guidance, as we have never experienced the bursting
of a bubble of this magnitude before. The closest thing is the collapse of
the Japanese credit bubble around 1990. As the Japanese have since learned,
recovering from a deflated credit bubble is a long and very painful affair.
Governments and central banks on both sides of the Atlantic are pursuing a
strategy of buying time, hoping that a recovery in economic conditions will
allow our banking industry to re-build its capital base. The Japanese pursued
a similar strategy back in the early 1990s. It failed miserably and set the
country back many years in its recovery effort. Ironically, the Japanese approach
was almost universally condemned as hopelessly inadequate. It is funny how
you always know better how to fix other people's problems than your own. A
little bit like raising children, I suppose.

Another lesson learned from Japan is that once you get caught up in a deflationary
spiral, it is exceedingly hard to escape from its grip. The Japanese authorities
have used every trick in the book to reflate the economy over the past two
decades. The results have been poor to say the least: Interest rates near zero
(failed), quantitative easing (failed), public spending (failed), numerous
attempts to drive down the value of the yen (failed); the list is long and
makes for painful reading.
We are effectively caught in a liquidity trap. The Bank of England, the European
Central Bank and the Federal Reserve have all flooded their banking system
with enormous amounts of liquidity in recent months but what has happened?
Instead of providing liquidity to private and corporate borrowers as the central
banks would like to see, banks have taken the opportunity to repair their balance
sheets. For quantitative easing to be inflationary it requires that the liquidity
provided to the market by the central bank is put to work, i.e. lenders must
lend and borrowers must borrow. If one or the other is not playing along, then
inflation will not happen.

This is illustrated in chart 3 which measures the growth in the US monetary
base less the growth in M2. As you can see, the broader measure of money supply
(M2) cannot keep up with the growth in the liquidity provided by the Fed. In
Europe the situation is broadly similar.
There is another way of assessing the inflationary risk. If one compares the
total amount of credit destruction so far (about $14 trillion in the US alone)
to the amount spent by the Treasury and the Fed on monetization and fiscal
stimulus ($2 trillion), it is obvious that there is still a sizeable gap between
the capital lost and the new capital provided.
If we instead move our attention to the real economy, a similar picture emerges.
One of the best leading indicators of inflation is the so-called output gap,
which measures how much actual GDP is running below potential GDP (assuming
full capacity utilisation). It is highly unlikely for inflation to accelerate
during a period where the output gap is as high as it currently is (see chart
4). Theoretically, if you believe in a V-shaped recession, the output gap can
be reduced significantly over a relatively short period of time, but that is
not our central forecast for the next few years.

I can already hear some of you asking the perfectly valid question: How can
you possibly suggest that deflation will prevail when commodity prices are
likely to rise further as a result of seemingly endless demand from emerging
economies? Won't rising energy prices ensure a healthy dose of inflation, effectively
protecting us from the evils of the deflationary spiral (see chart 5)?

Good question - counterintuitive answer:
Contrary to common belief, rising commodity prices can in fact be deflationary so
long as demand for such commodities is relatively inelastic, which is
usually the case for basic necessities such as heating oil, petrol, food,
etc. The logic is the following: As commodity prices rise, money earmarked
for other items goes towards meeting the higher commodity price and consumers
are essentially forced to re-allocate their spending budget. This causes
falling demand for discretionary items and can in extreme cases lead to deflation.
We only have to go back to 2008 for the latest example of a commodity price
induced deflationary cycle.
A price increase on a price inelastic commodity is effectively a tax hike.
The only difference is that, in the case of the 2008 spike in energy prices,
the money didn't go towards plugging holes in the public finances but was instead
spent on English football clubs (well, not all of it, but I am sure you get
the point) which have become the latest 'must have' amongst the super-rich
in the Middle East.
For all those reasons, I am becoming increasingly convinced that the ultimate
outcome of this crisis will turn out to be deflation - not inflation. Inflation
may eventually become a problem, but that is something to worry about several
years from now. The Japanese have pursued an aggressive monetary and
fiscal policy for almost 20 years now, and they are still nowhere.
So why are interest rates creeping up at the long end? Part of it is due to
the sheer supply of government debt scheduled for the next few years which
spooks many investors (including us). And the fact that the rising supply is
accompanied by deteriorating credit quality is a factor as well. But countries
such as Australia and Canada, which only suffer modest fiscal deficits, have
experienced rising rates as well, so it cannot be the only explanation.
Maybe the answer is to be found in the safe haven argument. When much of the
world was staring into the abyss back in Q4 last year, government bonds were
considered one of the few safe assets around and that drove down yields. Now,
with the appetite for risk on the increase again, money is flowing out of government
bonds and into riskier assets.
Perhaps there are more inflationists out there than I thought. Several high
profile investors have been quite vocal recently about the inevitability of
inflation. Such statements made in public by some of the industry's leading
lights remind me of one of the oldest tricks in the book which I was introduced
to many moons ago when I was still young and wet behind the ears. 'Get long
and get loud' it is called; it is widely practised and only marginally immoral.
Nevertheless, when famous investors make such statements, it affects markets.
The point I really want to make is that the inflation v. deflation story
is the single biggest investment story right now and being on the right side
of that trade will effectively secure your investment returns for years to
come. If I am wrong and inflation spikes, you want to load your portfolio with
index linked government bonds (also known as TIPS for our American readers),
gold and other commodities, commodity related stocks as well as property.
If deflation prevails, all you have to do is to look towards Japan and see
what has done well over the past 20 years. Not much! You cannot even assume
that bonds will do well. Recessions are bullish for long dated government bonds
but a collapse of the entire credit system is not. The reason is simple - with
the bursting of the credit bubble comes drastic monetary and fiscal action.
Central banks print money and governments spend money as if there is no tomorrow,
and all bets are off. Equities will do relatively poorly as will property prices.
But equities will not go down in a straight line. The market will offer plenty
of trading opportunities which must be taken advantage of, if you want to secure
a decent return.
All in all, deflation is ugly and not conducive to attractive investment returns.
It is also not what governments want and need right now. With a mountain of
debt hitting the streets of Europe and America over the next few years, as
the cost of fixing the credit and banking crisis is financed, one can make
a strong case for rising inflation actually being the favoured outcome if you
look at it from the government's point of view. The problem, as the Japanese
can attest to, is that deflation is excruciatingly difficult to get rid of,
once it has become entrenched. I am in no doubt which of the two evils I would
prefer, but we may not have the luxury of choosing our own destiny.
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