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Half the lies they tell about me aren't true. --Yogi Berra
Term Structure and Roll Yield
Question: if something is stated repeatedly as fact, does that make it necessarily
true? We no longer believe the sun circles the earth, but that idea was once
conventional wisdom.
A similar issue faces investors who use passive commodity indexes. In a recent
Financial Times story, "Steep 'contango' forces traders to adapt commodities
plans", we are told that investors in commodity index products "obtain a separate
return, known as the roll yield, as they shift their positions each month from
the expiring futures contract into the following month." This idea is so commonly
asserted that it is accepted as fact -- but is it?
The problem is that empirical tests using a variety of models have produced
inconsistent conclusions as to whether there is in fact positive expected returns
from speculating in the futures market. This is vexing to financial institutions
who sell products structured around commodity benchmarks such as the S&P
GSCI or DJ-AIG, and who need to "market" a structural source of return in what
is essentially a zero-sum game.
Notably, ten years ago mainstream thinking about commodities was largely negative.
Thomas Schneeweis and Richard Spurgin in their 1996 paper, "Multi-Factor Models
in Managed Futures", stated that the low level of investment in managed futures
was due to the fact that investors required both a theoretical basis and supporting
empirical results.[1] In other words, prevailing
wisdom at the time was against speculation in commodities.
The industry's marketing solution came in the form of a series of studies
over the past decade of which the most cited is "Facts and Fantasies about
Commodity Futures" written by Gary B. Gorton and K. Geert Rouwenhorst, two
Yale University academics.[2] After their paper was
referenced by Jim Rogers in his book Hot Commodities, the concept and theory
of the roll yield became well established in the investor mindset.
Our working paper "Is Managed Futures an Asset Class; The Search for the Beta
of Commodity Futures" nonetheless takes issue with Gorton and Rouwenhorst's
conclusions.[3]
To begin with, the roll yield is derived from a simplified definition of backwardation
and contango based on what Hilary Till, co-editor of Intelligent Commodity
Investing, describes as the "term structure of the futures price curve." Nowadays,
backwardation is commonly defined as conditions when "the futures price is
below the current spot price" and contango as conditions when "the futures
price is above the current spot price."
However, this paradigm is not in line with the original definition of normal
backwardation as described by John Maynard Keynes (1923, 1930), and related
phenomena identified by Nicholas Kaldor (1939) and Holbrook Working (1948,
1949).[4] Classically, backwardation and contango
correlate the futures price to the "expected future spot price," which is an
unknown, to be discovered in the future, at the time the futures converges
with the spot.
This difference in assumptions is not insignificant. The conundrum is that
for every buyer of a commodity futures contract there is a seller -- sine qua
non, there is no intrinsic value in forward contracts. They are simply agreements
which commit delivery of an asset at some place/point in time. So how does
rolling contracts yield positive expected returns?
Rolling the Futures Contract Backward
Futures and forward contracts, unlike securities, are instruments with a finite
life and terminate on pre-specified dates when the futures contract converges
with the spot price. At that point the spot price is discovered and delivery
of the underlying cash commodity is made between commercial participants.
A wheat futures contract, for example, has delivery contracts for March, May,
July, September and December. For this reason, and as a matter of practice,
most speculators do not allow their positions to enter the delivery period,
and a perpetual long futures position requires a trader to "roll the contract" from
one contract month to the next.
A close look at the studies written by proponents of the roll yield reveals
use of a model or algorithm that results in a fictional trade. Rather than
rolling the futures contract forward, they in effect roll the futures contract
backward to provide "proof" for their thesis. This is facilitated with the
assumption that the "expected future spot price" is a pre-determined static
constant, which it is not.
As a real world example, let's assume that a trader goes long a March futures
contract at $100. The trader subsequently rolls that contract in sixty days
by selling it at $120, and simultaneously reenters the long position via a
July futures contract at $121. Another sixty days later the trader exits the
position altogether by liquidating the July contract at $111.
The long March futures contract trade results in a $20 realized gain and the
long July futures contract trade results in a $10 realized loss. Using a simple
method for calculating rate-of-return of an investment, the net gain of $10
is divided into the original $100 March futures contract price, resulting in
a 10% return. This is straightforward and logical.
By contrast, the model for calculating the roll yield is complicated and arguably
illogical. The following example is based on formulas conventionally used by
researchers to calculate roll yield as documented by Till.[5]
Let's assume a trader goes long a March futures contract at $100, and then
sixty days later sells the March contract at $120. The net gain of $20 is then
divided into the original investment of $100 resulting in a 20% return. This
is referred to as the "spot return."
Now at the time the trader purchased the March futures contract, assume that
the July futures contract was trading at $90. The algorithm for calculating
the roll yield then subtracts this $90 July futures contract price in the past
from the current $120 March contract liquidation price. This is called "excess
return" and the net gain of $30 is then divided into the $90 July contract
price for a 33% return.[6]
The "arithmetic roll yield" is calculated by subtracting the spot return of
20% from the excess return of 33%, which results in a supposed 13% return to
the investor. Obviously, this mathematical trick mixes up past and present
prices, and creates roll yield out of an imaginary transaction that is impossible
to duplicate in the real world.
Admittedly, models are an abstraction from reality. Expecting such models
to be exactly right is unreasonable, and it is generally understood that neoclassical
economic models have inherent limitations. Ergo, we must be careful not to
follow models over a cliff.
As noted by Robert Greer in his paper "What is an Asset Class, Anyway?", the
inherent problem with investing in commodities as an "asset class" is that
they are not capital assets but instead consumable, transformable (and perishable)
assets with unique attributes.[7]
By definition, any commodity trading facilitated for financial rather than
commercial reasons is speculation. Further, derivatives are risk management
tools, fundamentally different from the "rising tide raises all ships" concept
of the capital formation markets.
Investors should recognize that commodity markets are more complex than what
many proponents would have you believe. In truth, the "zero-sum conundrum" makes
it impossible to isolate a persistent source of return without that source
eventually slipping away.
NOTES AND REFERENCES
[1] Schneeweis, Thomas; Spurgin, Richard (1996). "Multi-Factor Models in Managed
Futures, Hedge Fund and Mutual Fund Return Estimation" University of Massachusetts,
School of Management
[2] Gorton, G.; Rouwenhorst, K.G. (2006). "Facts and Fantasies about Commodities
Futures" Financial Analysts Journal, 62(2), pp. 47-68.
[3] Frankfurter, Mack; Accomazzo, Davide (2007). "Is Managed Futures an Asset
Class? The Search for the Beta of Commodity Futures" December 2007. Available
at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1029243
[4] Kaldor, Nicholas (1939). "Speculation and Economic Stability" Review of
Economic Studies 7, No. 1, October, pp. 1-27.
Keynes, John Maynard (1923) "Some Aspects of Commodity Markets" Manchester
Guardian, and "A Treatise on Money, Vol. II: The Applied Theory of Money" London:
Macmillan, 1930, pp. 142-147.
Working, Holbrook (1948). "Theory of the Inverse Carrying Charge in Futures
Markets" Journal of Farm Economics, 30(1), pp. 1-28, and "The Theory of Price
of Storage" American Economic Review 39, No. 6, December 1949, pp. 1254-1262.
[5] Till, Hilary (2007). "Part I of A Long-Term Perspective on Commodity Futures
Returns: Review of the Historical Literature" from Intelligent Commodity Investing,
(Till, and Eagleeye, Ed.), Published by Risk Books, a Division of Incisive
Financial Publishing, Ltd., pp. 39-82. See pages 73-78 for the calculation
of roll yield.
[6] Hilary Till cites the following with respect to excess returns: "As explained
by Shimko and Masters, the convention in calculating excess returns is to treat
the futures investment as being fully collateralized based on the second-nearby
price." D. Shimko and B. Masters, 1994, "The JPMCI -- A Commodity Benchmark." JP
Morgan Securities Inc. Commodities Derivatives Research, 20 September.
[7] Greer, Robert J. (1997). "What is an Asset Class, Anyway?" Journal of
Portfolio Management, Winter, pp. 86-91.
Commodity Return Sources:
* Spot Return - Gain or loss from changes in the underlying spot prices. When
the spot price of the commodity rises, the value of the futures contract tends
to rise.
* Collateral Return - Interest on the deposit required to trade derivatives.
* Strategy Return - Some analysts refer to a return derived from how one weights
and rebalances the components of a commodity index.
* Roll Return - Generated by owning a futures contract for a time, and subsequently
selling that contract and buying a longer dated contract on the same commodity.
This article was originally published by Opalesque Futures Intelligence
(Issue 5, April 7, 2009), and is a synopsis of the paper "Term Structure
and Roll Yield: Not Your Father's Backwardation."
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