July 10, 2009
The Difference Between a Professional Investor and a Professional Reporter is...
by Reggie Middleton
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That the professional (fundamental) investor always looks for the numbers
to back up the assertion while the reporter may often run with the assertion.
I have caught a lot of executives lying over the last two years, and many of
those lies have ended up in insolvency, bankruptcy, emergency mergers and collapse
(speaking of bankruptcy, I should have preliminary previews of 2 or 3 very
likely bankruptcy candidates coming on tap within a week or so for subscribers).
Case in point (in terms of lying, that is) is the recent article in the Wall
Street Journal regarding PNC Bank - Jun. 29 PNC
Waits to Repay TARP Funds:
Some banks have repaid their TARP funds. There are many more that still
can't. And then there's PNC
Financial Services Group Inc. Who is one of
those banks that "still can't"!
Unlike competitors such as J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. and U.S. Bancorp,
the Pittsburgh-based regional bank has chosen not to repay the Treasury Department's
investment in the firm, even though PNC likely could do so immediately. Yeah,
right!
While bank officials declined to comment for this article, PNC Chairman
and Chief Executive James Rohr was asked by an analyst in May about the company's
plans for paying back $7.6 billion in preferred shares the government purchased
from PNC last year through the U.S. government's Troubled Asset Relief Program.
"We see significant advantages in redeeming TARP" sooner rather than later,
and could do so "as soon as possible," he said. I
don't see where he said he can do so now, though!
Mr. Rohr added, though, that "we're going to do it in a shareholder-friendly
manner."
Mr. Rohr's comments suggest that PNC shareholders are unlikely to face the
heavy dilution that other bank investors have faced recently. But
they are going to face the heavy losses from the poorly thought out acquisition
of National City using thos very same TARP funds that they now wish they
didn't take, and would love to be able to pay back but can't since they need
it to cushion against the train wreck that they just purchased. Many
firms re-paying TARP have raised the necessary cash in part by issuing new
shares, which dilutes current investors. The National
City purchase is a prime example of how the loose money bandied about by
the Bush administration with no strings attached was abused by the banks
that recieved TARP. The government gives PNC billions of dollars of TARP
money to strengthen the banking system and PNC goes off and buys a subprime
and Alt-A slush fund called National City, instantly becoming a bank at risk,
funded by the US taxpayer. Hey, other reporters noticed it...
PNC Will
Post Loss on Provision Tied to National City
PNC to
cut 5,800 jobs; shares sink after weaker Q4
PNC
Bank considered less stable after buying National City Corp.
PNC,
Wells Fargo Slump Into 2009 After Buying Lenders
In contrast, PNC intends to re-pay Uncle Sam by setting aside future profits,
rather than minting new shares, Mr. Rohr said. Really?
I would have thought you were in little bind when Congress decided to put
a little teeth in the TARP, but after you had already went on your rather
irresponsible shopping spree at the taxpayers expense...
The stance also signals a willingness to limit the compensation of PNC's
managers according to the government stipulations that come with TARP. Those
curbs have made executives at financial firms with large trading and investment-banking
operations eager to escape TARP. Willingness, or
inability to do anything about it due to their current situation?
"It's very different if you have a bunch of managers that are about to jump
ship," says Anton Schutz, manager of the Burnham Financial Services Fund. "If
you run an investment bank, that's where you really run into compensation
issues." That's because investment bankers are
overpaid and everyone knows it, except for investment bankers, of course.
They think they deserve every thick dime...
Another reason why PNC isn't racing to abandon TARP, according to analysts:
PNC acquired National City Corp. last year after the Cleveland-based rival
started teetering from losses on subprime loans.
Although most analysts think PNC will eventually turn hefty profits from
the deal, a further downturn could force PNC to dip into its capital reserves
to support National City loans. Whew! It's about
time you came around to this line of thinking. Let's delve into this a little
farther, shall we?
In addition, the firm holds far more construction and industrial loans than
some consumer-focused competitors. Those loans have been slower to show losses
than mortgages and credit cards, and could yet hammer PNC and other regional
firms.
Somebody should write to the reporter, Marshall
Eckblad and inform him of the work done over at BoomBustBlog.
PNC and the government's estimation of what PNC needs to be considered
a "healthy" bank
The recent Fed's estimation of total capital requirement of $06 bn under the
adverse case scenario in the SCAP bank stress tests would lead to a dilution
impact of about 3.2% for existing shareholders' based on current market price
of $42.2 per share. However PNC's capital requirement of $0.60 bn seems overly
conservative considering the banks deteriorating capital position. PNC's tangible
equity capital to risk weighted assets has declined to 2.32% as at December
31, 2008 from 7.89% as at December 31, 2006 largely due to acquisition of National
City Bank. Based on the expected tangible equity capital of $4.9 bn and risk
weighted assets of $237 bn as of December 31, 2010 PNC's actual capital requirement
is estimated at $4.7 bn to maintain a minimum ratio of 4% for Tangible Equity
Capital to Risk Weighted Assets. The above capital requirements of $4.7 bn
could result in dilution impact of 25% for its existing shareholders' based
on PNC's current share price.
| |
Fed 2 yr
cumulative
loss rate
range |
Fed 2 yr
cumulative
average
loss rate
for US banks |
2 yr
cumulative
loss rate
for PNC |
2 yr
cumulative
loss rate
for STI |
| |
Base
Case |
Adverse
Case |
Base
Case |
Adverse
Case |
Fed's loss
rate
assumptions |
Realistic
loss rate
assumptions |
Realistic loan
loss estimate |
| First Lien Mortgages |
5 - 6 |
7 - 8.5 |
5.5% |
7.8% |
8.1% |
9.9% |
2.6 |
| Prime |
1.5 - 2.5 |
3 - 4 |
2.0% |
3.5% |
|
| Alt?A |
7.5 - 9.5 |
9.5 - 13 |
8.5% |
11.3% |
|
| |
| Subprime |
15 - 20 |
21 - 28 |
17.5% |
24.5% |
12.7% |
|
| Second/Junior Lien Mortgages |
9 - 12 |
12 - 16 |
10.5% |
14.0% |
|
| Closed?end Junior Liens |
18 - 20 |
22 - 25 |
19.0% |
23.5% |
|
3.2% |
0.3 |
| HELOCs |
6 - 8 |
8 - 11 |
7.0% |
9.5% |
|
3.7% |
0.9 |
| |
| C&I Loans |
3 - 4 |
5 - 8 |
3.5% |
6.5% |
6.0% |
6.1% |
3.2 |
| |
| CRE |
5 - 7.5 |
9 - 12 |
6.3% |
10.5% |
11.2% |
11.6% |
4.3 |
| Construction |
8 - 12 |
15 - 18 |
10.0% |
16.5% |
|
21.5% |
2.6 |
| Multifamily |
3.5 - 6.5 |
10 - 11 |
5.0% |
10.5% |
|
7.3% |
0.2 |
| Nonfarm, Non?residential |
4 - 5 |
7 - 9 |
4.5% |
8.0% |
|
6.9% |
1.6 |
| |
| Credit Cards |
12 - 17 |
18 - 20 |
14.5% |
19.0% |
22.3% |
21.4% |
0.3 |
| Other Consumer |
4 - 6 |
8 - 12 |
5.0% |
10.0% |
|
0.3 |
| Securities (AFS and HTM) |
|
1.9 |
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| Others* |
2 - 4 |
4 - 10 |
3.0% |
7.0% |
|
2.5% |
0.3 |
| Total loan losses |
|
7.3% |
12.9 |
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| *including misc commitments and obligations |
The Fed estimates the 2 year cumulative losses in first lien mortgages and
junior lien mortgages at 8.1%. However, most of the regions in which PNC operates
have witnessed significant housing price decline with an average housing price
decline of 8.9% since 2008 while some of the regions including Florida, New
Jersey, Maryland and Michigan we have witnessed double digit price decline.
In order to arrive at more realistic assumptions about the charge-offs for
loans secured by residential properties, we analyzed the delinquencies and
foreclosure trends as well house price movement in these states and have adjusted
the general loss rates observed in these regions for the credit quality of
PNC's portfolio. Based on our expectations PNC's 2 year cumulative net charge-offs
for First Lien Mortgages (incl Alt A) is expected to reach 9.9%.
| Primary geographies of PNC and National City |
1Q-08 |
2Q-08 |
3Q-08 |
4Q-08 |
%
change
since
2008 |
Alt-A
loss rate |
Sub prime
loss rate |
| Pennsylvania |
2.4% |
1.2% |
-0.4% |
-0.8% |
2.4% |
14.3% |
33.5% |
| New Jersey |
-1.5% |
-3.2% |
-4.8% |
-5.4% |
-14.1% |
23.5% |
43.4% |
| Washington |
3.0% |
0.5% |
-2.0% |
-3.8% |
-2.4% |
11.1% |
27.1% |
| Maryland |
-1.4% |
-4.2% |
-6.3% |
-7.7% |
-18.3% |
18.8% |
38.6% |
| Virginia |
-0.3% |
-2.6% |
-3.8% |
-4.6% |
-10.9% |
21.2% |
37.3% |
| Ohio |
0.6% |
-0.3% |
-2.3% |
-1.9% |
-3.9% |
15.6% |
35.4% |
| Kentucky |
2.8% |
3.1% |
1.7% |
1.0% |
8.8% |
14.2% |
34.7% |
| Delaware |
1.0% |
-1.2% |
-2.0% |
-4.2% |
-6.3% |
16.2% |
39.1% |
| Florida |
-8.6% |
-13.0% |
-16.4% |
-19.5% |
-46.5% |
37.1% |
52.3% |
| Illinois |
0.5% |
-0.6% |
-2.6% |
-3.0% |
-5.6% |
22.9% |
41.3% |
| Indiana |
2.3% |
1.6% |
-0.1% |
-0.5% |
3.3% |
16.1% |
35.2% |
| Michigan |
-3.5% |
-5.2% |
-7.0% |
-6.9% |
-20.8% |
22.5% |
45.7% |
| Missouri |
1.5% |
0.6% |
-0.3% |
-0.6% |
1.3% |
13.4% |
36.1% |
| Wisconsin |
1.7% |
0.8% |
-0.9% |
-0.9% |
0.6% |
17.8% |
41.7% |
Average (assuming equal
weights) |
0.0% |
-1.6% |
-3.4% |
-4.2% |
-8.9% |
18.9% |
38.7% |
| |
| Overall U.S |
-0.2% |
-1.9% |
-3.9% |
-4.5% |
-10.1% |
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| Price change relative to National Average |
0.2% |
0.3% |
0.5% |
0.3% |
1.3% |
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| Source: Federal Housing Finance Agency |
So long story short, or short story long - depending on how you look at it,
I think the government, the WSJ, and those wishful PNC shareholders have a
rude awakening coming...
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Reggie
Middleton
Reggie Middleton, LLC
Perpetual Interests, LLCTM
http://boombustblog.com/
Who am I?
Well, I fancy myself the personification of the free thinking
maverick, the ultimate non-conformist as it applies to investment and analysis.
I am definitively outside the box - not your typical or stereotypical Wall
Street investor. I work out of my home, not a Manhattan office. I build my
own technology and perform my own research - in lieu of buying it or following
the crowd. I create and follow my own macro strategies and am by definition,
a contrarian to the nth degree.
Since I use my research as a tool for my own investing
to actually put food on my table, I can stand behind it as doing what it is
supposed too - educate, illustrate and elucidate. I do not sell advice, I am
not a reporter hence do not sell stories, and I do not sell research. I am
an entrepreneur who exists just outside of mainstream corporate America and
Wall Street. This allows me freedom to do things that many can not. For instance,
I pride myself on developing some of the highest quality research available,
regardless of price. No conflicts of interest, no corporate politics, no special
favors. Just the hard truth as I have found it - and believe me, my team and
I do find it! I welcome any and all to peruse my blog, use my custom hacked
collaborative social tools, read the articles, download the files, and make
a critical comparison of the opinion referencing the situation at hand and
the time stamp on the blog post to the reality both at the time of the post
and the present. Hopefully, you will be as impressed with the Boom Bust as
I am and our constituency.
I pay for significant information and data, and am well
aware of the value of quality research. I find most currently available research
lacking, in both quality and quantity. The reason why I had to create my own
research staff was due to my dissatisfaction with what was currently available
- to both individuals and institutions.
So here I am, creating my own research for my own investment
activity. What really sets my actions apart is that I offer much of what I
produce to the public without charge - free to distribute and redistribute,
as long as it is left unaltered and full attribution is given to the author
and owner. Why would I do such a thing when others easily charge 5 and 6 digits
annually for what some may consider a lesser product? It is akin to open
source analysis! My ideas and implementations are actually improved and
fine tuned when bounced off of the collective intellect of the many, in lieu
of that of the few - no matter how smart those few may believe themselves to
be.
Very recently, I have started charging for the forensics
portion of my work, which has freed up the resources to develop the site to
deliver even more research for free, particularly on the global macro and opinion
front. This move has allowed me to serve an more diverse constituency, which
now includes the institutional consumer (ie., investment turned consumer banks,
hedge funds, pensions, etc,) as well as the newbie individual investor who
is just getting started - basically the two polar opposites of the investing
spectrum. I am proud to announce major banks as paying clients, and brand new
investors who take my book recommendations and opinions on true wealth and
success to heart.
So, this is how I use my background and knowledge in new
media, distributed computing, risk management, insurance, financial engineering,
real estate, corporate valuation and financial analysis to pursue, analyze
and capitalize on global macroeconomic opportunities. I have included a more
in depth bio at the bottom of the page for those who really, really need to
know more about me.
Visit his blog Boom
Bust Blog.
Copyright © 2007-2009 Reggie Middleton
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