Home Is The Heart (Of The Matter)...The Fed Flow of Funds report for
the period ended 4Q 2003 hit the Street a number of weeks back. You might remember
that the 3Q report was delayed considerably into the early part of this year.
We always consider the Flow of Funds report to be nothing short of a treasure
trove of data for anyone having the time and endurance to plow through approximately
140+ pages of nothing but numbers. As per the recent Flow of Funds report,
to suggest that 2003 was a year of significant credit driven reflation is simply
an understatement. Here are some very broad overview numbers to help put current
circumstances into perspective.
| SECTOR |
Growth In 2003 |
Total Sector Debt Outstanding Has Doubled Since |
| Total Credit Market Debt |
8.7% |
1Q 1995 |
| Household Debt |
10.6 |
2Q 1995 |
| Non-Financial Corporate Debt |
3.4 |
4Q 1992 |
| Financial Sector Debt |
10.1 |
1Q 1998 |
| Nominal GDP |
5.9% |
4Q 1988 |
| GSE Debt |
10.4% |
4Q 1998 |
| Asset Backed Issuer Debt |
11.5 |
3Q 1998 |
| Federal Mortgage Pools |
10.5 |
4Q 1996 |
Just as a very quick note, the doubling in nominal GDP since 1988 is not a
typo. Although most forms of systemic leverage have doubled in well under 10
years, it has taken nominal US GDP over 15 years to double. The table above
is clear in its message, households and the financial sector were primarily
responsible for credit expansion and broader systemic liquidity creation in
2003. On the asset side of the equation, the success of reflation in 2003 was
simply more than evident as per the Flow of Funds report. We included wages
and salaries as well as payroll employment numbers for reference in the following
table.
| Household Balance Sheet Item |
Growth In 2003 |
Growth Since 4Q 1999 |
| Household Real Estate |
10.3% |
45.9% |
| Household Financial Assets |
12.9 |
(1.9) |
| Household Liabilities |
10.7 |
41.9 |
| Household Net Worth |
11.5% |
10.2% |
| Wages And Salaries |
2.6% |
11.7% |
| Payroll Employment |
(0.1) |
(0.4) |
We ask you quite importantly and quite sincerely, just where would our economy
be today had it not been for household real estate inflation over the last
four years? You probably do not want to know the answer. All of the data in
the tables above point to the same conclusion. The leveraging of continuously
inflating real estate values over the last four years has been absolutely crucial
to the economy. Whether Greenspan will ever admit it or not, this is exactly
how the Fed "has successfully dealt with the aftermath of the stock market
bubble". All of these numbers come directly from the Fed. The very same folks
who simply cannot be ignorant of their meaning. The problem, of course, being
just what will or can the Fed attempt to inflate next if the residential real
estate market runs into price turbulence at such a presently high altitude?
Especially given that the labor market appears a bit under the weather and
wage and salary growth is not even keeping pace with lowball estimates of understated
headline inflation. As of the end of 4Q 2003, household real estate assets
totaled approximately $15.1 trillion. Household financial assets climbed to
$34.3 trillion during the same period, but of this equities account for only
about $8 trillion. The bottom line is that residential real estate is almost
twice as meaningful to households in terms of total household assets as are
stock holdings specifically. Although a number of stock market followers may
be concerned about an equity crash or severe downturn ahead, maybe what they
should really be worried about is US residential real estate values. In terms
of total household well being, emotional stability and forward perceptions,
there is no other singular household asset class that means as much in dollar
terms. Not even pension entitlements. Get the picture?
And, as you know, this is how we have treated this precious asset over the
last half century.We've levered it like there's simply no tomorrow.
If Tomorrow Never Comes...Although equity as a percentage of the (inflated)
market value of residential real estate in 4Q was up very modestly from 2Q
and 3Q of last year, on a year over year basis, we ended 2003 with the lowest
percentage of collective residential real estate equity relative to the total
market value of household real estate in US history. Moreover, although it
is very clear that nominal real estate prices continued their skyward ascent
in favored areas such as the bicoastal regions of the country during last year,
we find a statistic published by the Federal Housing Finance Board quite interesting
and worthy of both current note and tracking ahead. These folks publish the
history of purchase prices of all homes financed with conventional single family
mortgages. This includes both new and existing homes. What you see in the chart
below is both the history of aggregate home prices and the accompanying monthly
year over year rate of change.
It just so happens that January of this year (the latest data) was comping
against a very strong like January period of 2003, hence the year over year
rate of change is modestly negative. Nonetheless, the recent trajectory of
moving price rate of change is almost straight down from an annual rate of
change cycle peak in January of last year. Hard to believe to be honest. Headline
numbers regarding housing prices sure don't seem to support this declining
rate of change data at all. As you can probably barely make out above, historical
experience in the current annualized rate of change area in which we find ourselves
at present has been accompanied by relatively flat home prices in forward periods.
This type of occurrence was both obvious and extended in duration during the
late 1980's and early 1990's. In the early 1980's experience, prices grew at
a much less accelerated rate than in the late 1970's when, once again, the
zero annual rate of change environment occurred. Are we potentially just at
the entry point of a period of price flattening in very broad real estate prices
as evidenced by this data? Again, we do not see it in the rather sensational
bicoastal price quotations, but we need to remember that cyclical real estate
price weakness in the late 1980's did not begin in the bicoastal areas, but
rather ended there.
In juxtaposition to what you see above, the most widely followed home price
data in the US comes from the OFHEO (Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight).
What you see below is the annualized quarter over quarter change in their HPI
(Housing Price Index).
Essentially breathtaking quarterly change in 4Q 2003. But just who are we
to believe when it comes to the macro trend in housing prices, the OFHEO or
the Federal Housing Finance Board data? First, the OFHEO data, despite being
the most widely watched, is a bit quirky. During periods of extraordinary refi
activity, it could very well be that the OFHEO data is understating the rise
in housing prices as many refi's are being done with no new appraisal. Mortgage
providers are simply resetting terms for a nice fee for current clients. Subsequently
when refi's die down, the OFHEO data is simply playing catch up ball. That's
exactly what we think happened in the 4Q data you see above. Another further
explanation in the apparent discrepancy between these two housing price data
sets lies in the relationship between fixed and adjustable rate mortgage lending.
Adjustable rate mortgages as a percentage of total mortgages outstanding spiked
over the last year without a coincidental spike in interest rates in general.
As you can see in the following chart, historically the use of adjustable rate
mortgages usually accelerates when interest rates rise, as would seem rational.
But recently, those taking on new mortgages are going adjustable at close to
the lowest fixed mortgage rates of our lifetimes. Clearly, this phenomenon
is happening for one of two reasons. Either home buyers are absolutely convinced
interest rates are going even lower, or a good portion of current buyers are
no longer able to qualify for higher cost fixed mortgages, despite their incredibly
low absolute rate levels. Does this hint at the last marginal buyer influencing
current prices?
Could it be that the current popularity of lower cost adjustable rate mortgage
debt is skewing the OFHEO housing price data to the high side, given that the
Federal Finance Housing Board data does not include prices of homes financed
with adjustable mortgages? Could be to a point. In one sense, it would certainly
be a tribute to what in large part we would characterize as the "minimum monthly
payment economy" of the moment. After all, tomorrow may never come, right?
Is Everybody In Yet?...For now, the home ownership rate in the US sits
at an all time high as of the end of 2003. What we believe is important to
note is that as the home ownership rate flattened between 1988 and the mid-1990's,
we also experienced coincidental flattening of home prices as per the Federal
Housing Finance Board data in the chart above. Seems simply common sense. Perhaps
one clue as to a potential near term peaking in residential real estate prices
will be a distinct flattening in the aggregate US home ownership rate somewhere
ahead. In looking at the chart below, the rate of annual change in the US home
ownership rate has been slowing over the past few years relative to the rocket
launch in rate of change during the mid-1990's. But to declare even a short
term peak quite yet is still a bit premature.
What we also find interesting and perhaps very telling about just where we
are in the present residential real estate cycle is the historical complexion
of real estate buyers as categorized by age demographics. The following table
documents the long term homeownership rate in this country by age classification:
| US HOMEOWNERSHIP RATE BY AGE CLASSIFICATION |
| Year |
Less Than 35 |
35 to 44 |
45 to 54 |
55 to 64 |
Over 65 |
| 1982 |
41.2% |
70.0% |
77.4% |
80.0% |
74.4% |
| 1983 |
40.7 |
69.3 |
77.0 |
79.9 |
74.4 |
| 1984 |
40.5 |
68.9 |
76.5 |
80.0 |
75.0 |
| 1985 |
39.9 |
68.1 |
75.9 |
79.5 |
75.1 |
| 1986 |
39.6 |
67.3 |
76.0 |
79.9 |
74.8 |
| 1987 |
39.5 |
67.2 |
76.1 |
80.2 |
75.0 |
| 1988 |
39.3 |
66.9 |
75.6 |
79.5 |
75.5 |
| 1989 |
39.1 |
66.6 |
75.5 |
79.6 |
75.8 |
| 1990 |
38.5 |
66.3 |
75.2 |
79.3 |
76.3 |
| 1991 |
37.8 |
65.8 |
74.8 |
80.0 |
77.2 |
| 1992 |
37.6 |
65.1 |
75.1 |
80.2 |
77.1 |
| 1993 |
37.3 |
65.1 |
75.3 |
79.9 |
77.3 |
| 1994 |
37.3 |
64.5 |
75.2 |
79.3 |
77.4 |
| 1995 |
38.6 |
65.2 |
75.2 |
79.5 |
78.1 |
| 1996 |
39.1 |
65.5 |
75.6 |
80.0 |
78.9 |
| 1997 |
39.7 |
66.1 |
75.8 |
80.1 |
79.1 |
| 1998 |
39.3 |
66.9 |
75.7 |
80.9 |
79.3 |
| 1999 |
39.7 |
67.2 |
76.0 |
81.0 |
80.1 |
| 2000 |
40.8 |
67.9 |
76.5 |
80.3 |
80.4 |
| 2001 |
41.2 |
68.2 |
76.7 |
81.3 |
80.3 |
| 2002 |
41.3 |
68.8 |
76.3 |
81.1 |
80.5 |
| 2003 |
42.7 |
69.0 |
76.4 |
81.5 |
80.8 |
Although it's not wildly surprising by any means, it's absolutely crystal
clear that the younger folks predominantly drove the macro US homeownership
rate higher in the late 1990's and early into this decade. It's also clear
that homeownership rates among those under 45 are more cyclical than is the
case with other age groups.And this is the same age classification of younger
folks driving current home ownership rates higher whose current trajectory
of unemployment demographics look a whole lot different than the direction
of the headline aggregate unemployment rate of the moment.
As you know, what you see above is quite a contrast to the official headline
unemployment rate trends of the last year or so. Quite a contrast indeed. So
it seems pretty obvious that the drivers of the increase in the home ownership
rate since the mid-1990's, and more so since year end 1999, are those clearly
bearing a good portion of the brunt of current labor market weakness over the
past four years. Does this suggest that housing prices have elevated based
on a rock solid wage driven financial footing, especially in the case of new
younger buyers over the last 5+ years? You probably didn't need us to drag
you through all of this primary data. It's simple. Financial leverage is driving
housing demand among those least able to afford it and among those quite susceptible
to current labor market weakness as is displayed above. When it comes to the
current housing cycle, that's the heart of the matter, shall we say.
The Flow Down...From the Fed's Flow of Funds data, we find the following
graphical data quite revealing. What you see below is the quarter over quarter
growth rate in household real estate holdings based on the Fed's version of
market value. Notice anything funny?
Quarterly growth in household real estate values at market per the Fed's data
in the fourth quarter of last year has no parallel over the last three years
at least. A period of significant housing price inflation and some of the lowest
mortgage rates on record. Of course the 4Q 2003 experience comes literally
one quarter after the for now bottom in mortgage finance rates. In conjunction
with this price burst, total household net worth climbed to a new high as 2003
came to an end. In the following chart we document the historical components
of household net worth. Once again, it's clear as to what has driven household
net worth over the last four years as financial assets are not yet back to
their prior annual peak set in late 1999.
Although 2003 was one heck of a snap back year for equities in this country,
household holdings of equities grew $1.1 trillion in 2003 while the market
value of household real estate apparently jumped $1.4 trillion. Again, when
we get right down to the bottom line, which is more meaningful to households,
real estate or common stocks? If you ask us, any so-called wealth effect is
being primarily driven by ascending real estate values. Real estate values
very heavily dependent on the existing US credit bubble. And dependent on its
continued expansion.
Too Much Of Everything Is Just Enough?...Picking tops in any asset class
is dangerous work. Especially for an asset class driven by the Molotov cocktail
of mania thinking, record setting financial leverage, and credit bubble characteristic
ease of access to credit itself. With accelerating real estate values and the
continuation of a low absolute interest rate environment, as well as very aggressive
mortgage financing opportunities, the self reinforcing cycle of higher prices
and growth in aggregate leverage could have further to run for all we know. Yet
at the same time, we already have many ingredients completely in place for the
ultimate conclusion of the current residential real estate cycle. A conclusion
that just might be quite dramatic and have very meaningful consequences not only
for the domestic economy but the global economy as well. The fact that US wage
and salary growth is basically stagnant at the current time compared to understated
inflation rates (a near fifty year low on an annualized rate of change basis)
is ultimately a serious and negative financial underpinning to real estate values
that cannot be dismissed lightly. In like manner, the current era of global wage
arbitrage has huge implications for really global real estate values in our opinion,
especially over the longer term. Not only are we redistributing forward wealth
in terms of significant global wage rate differentials, but ultimately it would
seem logical that we redistribute geographically specific real estate values
that are supported by those same wage rates. From our point of view, at this
point in the broader global economic cycle, global wage rate arbitrage opportunities
are still in their infancy. The build up of household mortgage debt in the US
will ultimately limit consumer flexibility at some point ahead, especially when
combined with the fact that adjustable rate mortgages comprise 30+% of new current
mortgage activity. From our perspective, the thought that households have substituted
tax advantaged mortgage debt for non-tax advantaged consumer credit is complete
garbage. A simple look at the facts from the Fed's own data tells the story.
Both have accelerated in directional similarity.
Again, although timing is the ever present uncertainty, it would be very easy
for us to conclude based on the factual data that the current US residential
housing cycle has been pushed to extraordinary lengths based on credit bubble
dynamics. In fact the final straw may very well be the recent spike in adjustable
rate financing without any corresponding spike in fixed rate costs. In like
manner, even a leveling off or minor price retracement in this asset class
would have very significant consequences for US consumer spending and broader
systemic liquidity creation. It's certainly no secret that the Fed is clearly
in the "inflate or die" mode at the present. And the key asset in terms of
household participation in the "inflate or die" campaign is residential real
estate. Up to this point, the Fed has been completely unsuccessful in "reflating" payroll
employment growth as well as wage and salary growth. Hence, residential real
estate inflation has rested almost entirely on the health and continued expansion
of the credit bubble, as well as mania thinking on the part of buyers. We suggest
that unless meaningful job and wage growth is clearly evident directly ahead,
residential real estate is skating on very thin ice. Ice that could easily
be broken by continued payroll weakness accompanied by the coming conclusion
of direct consumer stimulus, to say nothing of potential upward movement in
interest rates.
Maybe rather than suggesting that US residential real estate prices are a
credit dependent a time bomb with an already lit fuse, let us briefly have
a look at one last chart. Here's the experience of year over year change in
new dwelling construction in Japan from 1988 through to year end 2003. Obviously
it encompasses the post stock market Nikkei bubble peak in late 1989. Clearly
enthusiasm for residential real estate continued, at least for a while, even
as the Japanese Nikkei and economy began sinking significantly in the early
to mid 1990's. Of course necessarily accompanying this spurt in Japanese residential
construction were large declines in Japanese interest rates post the stock
market bubble peak. As the Nikkei crested in early 1990, the Japanese discount
rate was approximately 5.5%. By the time the residential construction boom
ended in 1996, the Japanese discount rate was 0.5%. It's just a good thing
that our present experience in the US is nothing like what occurred in Japan
a decade back, right?
At The Wire...Just prior to publishing, we received some info we believe
indispensable in terms of suggesting where we are in the residential real estate
cycle of the moment. You may remember that our home perch is the San Francisco
Bay Area. In other words, the outer limits when it comes to unbelievable price
activity in residential real estate. We can certainly attest to you that present
conditions in the SF Bay Area are nothing short of a frenzy, and we're not
being melodramatic in that characterization. From the office of the State of
California that issues real estate licenses, here it comes. Real estate licenses
issued by the State increased 44% during the 2002-2003 period (47,000 new licenses
issued). Relative to the 2000-2001 period? Licenses issued are up 95%. That's
right, a doubling in less than four years. Remember, this is not the number
of total realtors, but rather the number of new licenses issued. If this isn't
a testimony to feverish mania, then what is? As you may remember, we saw the
same thing with CFA test applicants in the late 1990's about ten seconds prior
to the equity peak. As always, everyone wants a ticket to the promised land.
At least until it turns into a dust bowl, anyway.