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Dear Prudence, Won't You Come Out To Play?...For years now, we have been focused
on the macro theme of the credit cycle in all its wonderful glory quite intently.
For those reading our work over the years, you'd probably characterize it as
focused "to a fault". Again and again during the current decade we asked, is
it a business cycle or a credit cycle? Of course after the events of the last
few years, it sure seems that question has been answered in spades. At the
moment, we believe our little credit cycle obsession is still the key focal
point for what may lie ahead in terms of real economy and financial market
outcomes. In this discussion we want to have a brief look at components of
credit cycle character that as of today simply have no precedent over the last
six decades of recorded Fed data. After looking at these data points, we want
you to ask yourself, should we really be expecting a "typical" economic recovery?
Secondly, we want to briefly have a look at historical patterns of consumption
in prior recessionary cycles and what experience of the moment may be telling
us relative to behavioral patterns of the past. Let's get right to it.
When it comes to the macro credit and conjoined economic cycle, we suggest
an important item to keep in mind is that historically; US economic recoveries
of the last half-century have had similar "fingerprints". Those being pent
up demand for auto's, housing and accelerating credit usage by the private
sector. Every single one. They all look the same. But what we are seeing at
the current time that is completely different than anything seen over the last
six decades is net private sector credit contraction. The following chart could
not be more clear on the issue. Remember, the private sector is made up of
households and corporations (including the financial sector).

As you can see in the chart, even at the depths of any recession of the last
half-century plus, year over year credit demand by the private sector has always
been in positive territory. We're currently breaking new ground. And this new
ground begs the question, is Fed monetary policy impotent? Here we have the
lowest Fed funds rate of a generation, and credit is contracting. Completely
the opposite of what we have experienced in prior cycles. It could not be clearer.
We are convinced this key fact is simply not getting the attention it deserves.
Moreover, we need to remember that government stimulus efforts have been focused
on reviving credit demand as of late. C4C (cash for clunker) and the tax credit
for home buying was the sheep's clothing used in an attempt to spark credit
reacceleration. Crazily enough, despite the success of C4C in August, non-revolving
(largely car loans) consumer credit balances actually shrank in the month!
Not even C4C could offset the power of household balance sheet reconciliation.
That's a very loud message.
We know we are going to sound like pessimists and doom and gloomers with a
few of these comments. We also know that we risk looking like idiots down the
road by suggesting we buck the longstanding Street truism of "do not bet against
the US consumer". But every dog has its day, and we believe the consumer/household
dog is barking, and loudly. Is it the end of the world? Of course not, but
we believe changing patterns of behavior at the household level will have very
meaningful consequence for investment outcomes ahead. As it applies to US households,
two themes emerge from the numbers. First, we are currently in the beginning
stages of a household balance sheet reconciliation cycle that we feel will
be of a magnitude greater than anything we have seen in the post War era. Secondly,
and we're still early in this, household behavior regarding consumption is
likewise in the midst of necessarily important change directly linked to the
balance sheet reconciliation phenomenon. Lastly, we believe these two forces
will be greater in magnitude than Wall Street may be discounting and will play
out over a longer time period than the consensus now expects. Let's get to
the numbers and trends relative to historical precedent.
It should be no surprise to anyone that household debt outstanding fell again
in 2Q (the latest Fed Flow of Funds data), making this now three quarters in
a row of household net debt contraction. The important character fingerprint
in the 2Q period being that debt contraction at the household level accelerated.
Over the last three quarters through 2Q, US household debt balances have fallen
1.4%. In nominal dollars that's a contraction of $199 billion. Admittedly pocket
change set against the totality of household balance sheets, but from a thematic
perspective, this contraction was a diversion from consumption. As we'll see
in a minute, consumption patterns in the current cycle are very different from
prior cycles. Balance sheet reconciliation does not happen in isolation, and
that should be key to our investment thinking ahead. The combo chart below
chronicles close to six decades of the quarter over quarter change in household
credit balances. The anomaly that is the past three quarters is clearly noticeable
and nothing short of a dramatic contrast to experience of the current decade
through middle 2008. Very quickly, although official Fed numbers are not yet
available, anecdotal monthly data such as consumer credit suggests strongly
the contraction in household credit balances continued in 3Q.

Certainly contributing to the net US private sector credit contraction highlighted
above. If this is not the very picture of changing US consumer behavior, we
just don't know what is. Household sector credit contraction is a first in
post War history.
And given yet still current levels of household debt relative to GDP, it seems
a very easy bet that there is plenty more to come in this reconciliation cycle.
Although it may sound a bit confusing to hear this, the household debt to GDP
ratio depicted in the following chart has actually been quite healthy over
the last few quarters. The ratio fell just a bit in the current quarter, but
the positive is this ratio fell in a period where GDP also fell. That's the
picture of a household sector determined to restructure its balance sheet.
Very healthy from a longer-term standpoint. And you probably thought you'd
never see the day, right? In the spirit of non-linearity, that day has arrived.

As you can see above, the average for this ratio over close to the last six
decades was 53%. There is no way we are going back to that level any time soon
and we do not expect current cycle reconciliation to come even close to that
number. But is it reasonable to expect that over a period of years with the
combination of very modestly increasing GDP and continued net debt reduction
by households that we approach a household debt to GDP ratio near where we
began the current decade? Let's say somewhere between 70-75%? We believe that's
more than reasonable. And that will change the face of the domestic economy
and have important ramifications for consumption, and the investments represented
by household consumption. This does not mean the world has to come to an end.
It just means the world (the character of the US domestic economy) we have
come to know over the past few decades, and especially this, is going to look
different ahead. And that means we once again highlight the need for correct
identification of active sector participation and avoidance. Retailers and
the consumer discretionary sector have been riding a wave of macro liquidity,
momentum and coveted out of the starting blocks high beta participation since
March of this year. The character behavior of households as exemplified by
the Flow Of Funds numbers suggests that may be one dangerous wave.
We're going to step out of the Fed numbers for just a second and have a little
walk down memory lane. Memory lane of personal consumption expenditures. As
we see it, this is the natural counterpart to what we see playing out in the
FOF numbers. If households are paying debt down, then something has to be given
up for that balance sheet reconciliation decision. And the give up is consumption.
Although you may not realize this, and this is clearly one of the key reasons
why the long tenured Street truism suggests no one bet against the US consumer,
personal consumption in nominal dollars has actually increased during each
and every recession of the last six decades (at least). Each and every recession
until the present, that is. The following table documents the increase in nominal
personal consumption expenditures during each recession since 1960. Of course
in the table we are assuming the current recession ended 6/09, given the perceptually
positive 3Q GDP number.
The History Of Personal Consumption
Expenditures During Recessions |
| Recession |
Increase In PCE During Recession |
| 4/60-2/61 |
1.1% |
| 12/69-11/70 |
5.8 |
| 11/73-5/75 |
17.4 |
| 1/80-7/80 |
4.8 |
| 7/81-11/82 |
11.1 |
| 7/90-3/91 |
3.0 |
| 3/01-11/01 |
2.7 |
| 12/07-6/09 |
(.01) |
It's no wonder the Street does not want to bet against the US consumer, right?
But it is also clear that the current cycle is very different. From December
of 2007 until August of this year, point to point there has been no increase
in US personal consumption levels. Completely the opposite of what history
would suggest. Important enough to suggest secular change? We're still early
in the game so we'll just have to see how it goes.
Okay, we know the numbers above are nominal. We also know that during the
1970's and early 1980's inflation was a major theme and certainly could have
worked its wonderful way into these numbers. So the next table below looks
at the personal spending numbers adjusted for inflation (using the CPI to reflect
consumer prices). The numbers change a bit, but the current cycle still stands
as the anomaly of weakness relative to the last half century.
The History Of Inflation Adjusted Personal
Consumption Expenditures During Recessions |
| Recession |
Increase In PCE During Recession |
| 4/60-2/61 |
0.1% |
| 12/69-11/70 |
0.8 |
| 11/73-5/75 |
2.2 |
| 1/80-7/80 |
(1.1) |
| 7/81-11/82 |
4.0 |
| 7/90-3/91 |
(0.3) |
| 3/01-11/01 |
1.9 |
| 12/07-7/09 |
(1.8) |
Of course we also need to remember that ours has been the longest official
recessionary period on record since the Depression. So everything you see in
the tables above for prior cycles happened over a much more compressed space
of time. In other words, we have had much more time in the current cycle for
personal consumption to pick up, but it has not. Lastly, we believe it's also
important perspective to remember that in our current circumstances, households
have been treated to some of the lowest interest rates of a lifetime and consumer
product price weakness has been pronounced. Yet still zip in terms of consumption
gains 19 months into official recession territory.
Because of the extraordinary length of the current recession, we also felt
it important to quickly review the acceleration in personal consumption in
post recessionary cycles since 1960. And that's exactly what the following
table reveals. Remember, some of these cycles saw official recession periods
of less than one year. Important point being post every single recession on
record since 1960, up went consumption. In fact, as is absolutely clear in
the table, percentage growth in personal consumption proceeded in linear fashion
each and every quarter, each and every period, over the 3,6,9, and 12 month
periods following all recessions of the last half century. Like literal clockwork.
The History Of Personal Consumption Expenditure Growth
In Post Recession Environments |
| Recession Ends |
3 mos. |
6 mos. |
9 mos. |
12 mos. |
| 2/61 |
1.9% |
2.5 % |
4.8 % |
6.1 % |
| 11/70 |
3.3 |
5.3 |
7.4 |
9.8 |
| 5/75 |
2.7 |
5.6 |
8.7 |
10.2 |
| 7/80 |
4.0 |
7.1 |
9.1 |
11.2 |
| 11/82 |
1.3 |
4.5 |
7.9 |
11.1 |
| 3/91 |
0.6 |
1.8 |
2.8 |
5.2 |
| 11/01 |
0.8 |
1.7 |
3.4 |
3.9 |
| Average |
|
8.3% |
| Average '91 and '01 |
|
4.6 |
We concluded the table above with a few averages. The first is the average
growth in personal consumption one year after all recession conclusions since
1960. The other covers only the post 1991 and post 2001 periods as these were
considered "jobless recoveries". Okay, what does this entire picture mean in
dollars and cents and just how likely are US consumers to follow these historical
patterns in the post recessionary period ahead? Well, at least as of September
quarter end, the recession is now finally DOA as per the numbers from the Bureau
of Economic Analysis (government reporting). In terms of headline or consensus
thinking, this is where we are. So let's mark June as the government's version
of the recession end period. As of the end of June, personal consumption expenditures
stood at a SAAR (seasonally adjusted annual rate) of $10.05 trillion. So, using
the historical averages and applying these numbers to current PCE levels, an
8.3% increase in nominal PCE over the next 12 months post recession implies
a pick up in spending of $836 billion. Wow, that's one big number.
Unfortunately, US wage and salary trends have been deteriorating since mid-2008.
From the peak last year, annualized wages and salaries have fallen close to
$300 billion since the third quarter of 2008. And remember, this is the exact
period over which households have actually paid down debt. Very difficult to
do in a deteriorating wage environment and very much a statement on a changed
household outlook given their determination to reconcile balance sheets in
a wage hostile environment.

So our question becomes, just how will consumers follow historical patterns
and increase consumption in a post recession environment anywhere even near
the magnitude of growth we have experienced historically? There is only one
answer to that question and that is to increase debt. But this is exactly what
consumers are not doing right now. Quite the opposite. To finance $800 billion
of consumption in the twelve months ahead, total household debt would need
to increase by 6.1%. Not a chance. We ask you, given these pretty darn clear
facts of the moment, how could anyone be expecting a sustained "V" economic
recovery in a consumption based US economy? We're scratching our collective
heads.
Very quickly, we did mention the jobless recovery periods of post 1991 and
post 2001 recession environments. PCE grew much less in those initial post
recession periods because job recovery ultimately took place years after official
recession end. Not too hard to figure out why out of the starting gate consumption
growth was sluggish. But you already know current consensus thinking is that
the present will also be a "jobless recovery" period. So, for drill, if we
were to experience "jobless recovery" average consumption growth over the next
twelve months, we'd be looking at $455 billion in household consumption growth.
If debt financed, household debt would have to accelerate 3.4%. Again, one
tall order we believe has little to no chance of occurring.
We know that at this point you get the picture. Let us try to quickly summarize
the key thematic issues here.
For
now, asset disposition is not an option for many US households. Remember, a
huge chunk of current homeowners have little to no equity in their homes. So
it follows that household balance sheet reconciliation will be driven primarily
by income used to pay down debt, income that will not find its way into consumption.
For
boomers and their retirement expectations, reality has hit home. The need to
save in the absence of asset inflation is here. The ability to do that, as
well as pay down debt and consume means something in the equation has to give.
Again, the logical give point is consumption. Below is a quick table we believe
provides point blank perspective regarding demographics. The massive pre or
post retirement boomer wave is moving beyond their consumption years and the
numbers below tell us the demographic wave behind them is much smaller in size.
Again, this says something about aggregate consumption levels ahead. A secular
inflection point for the boomers in terms of their consumption habits? We suggest
this should not be dismissed lightly.
| Age Demographic |
Growth In Age Specific
US Population Fro 1950-Present |
| 20-24 years |
85% |
| 25-34 |
75 |
| 35-44 |
99 |
| 45-54 |
158 |
| 55-64 |
153 |
| 65+ |
237 |
Although
we only have one quarter of household net worth growth under our belts as of
official Fed Flow of Funds 2Q period end numbers, the personal consumption
numbers tell us the "wealth effect", per se, from higher equity prices is simply
not kicking in. Not this time. Just the opposite as households accelerated
their balance sheet rationalization in 2Q. We suggest that the whole idea of
the wealth effect ahead will be tested as a concept or perception. Again, in
recent FOMC commentaries looking specifically at the Fed's own recorded meeting
minutes, they cited growth in equity values had offset a number of negatives
at the household level. For now, it appears that the Fed is banking on the
wealth effect with the liquidity driven equity levitation act to change consumer
behavior. Is this a good assumption on the part of the Fed? Perhaps a key test
of this theory lies literally dead ahead during the Holiday shopping season.
Hopefully in a bit of quick summation, consumers appear to have for now taken
a vow of frugality. Whether by necessity or choice, prudence seems the order
of the day. Does that mean consumers are not going to come out to play in the
land of increased personal consumption any time soon? We think that's the theme,
along with continued household balance sheet reconciliation that must come.
Is monetary policy now impotent in an environment where consumers choose not
to borrow and spend? If so, that leaves increased fiscal policy as the lever
ahead for the government, with all the consequences that come along with that.
Finally, as we have said for years now, we believe investment success in the
current period will necessarily be accomplished by active sector participation
as well as active sector avoidance. Moreover, we believe it is critical to
at least be open to the thinking that economic and financial market relationships
we have grown to know and love over the past three to four decades are in the
midst of meaningful change, perhaps secular change. As we see it, from a longer
term standpoint linear thinking is death on Wall Street. If there was ever
a time to think out of the proverbial box, so to speak, and leave the linear
pathway, this is it. And for better or worse, so we will. The current unprecedented
character of the credit cycle is simply forcing us to take this unbeaten path.
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