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Every financial crisis seems to produce its own crop of economic fallacies.
The Great Depression gave us the mercantilist fallacy of "demand deficiency" that
Keynes dressed up in mathematical garb and convoluted language. Instead of
the boom's inevitable bust being treated as a case of "disproportionalities" that
needed to be liquidated if the equilibrium was to be restored it was now defined
as a simple case of insufficient demand could be easily corrected by increased
government spending, i.e., a monetary expansion. (Incidentally, Keynes never
argued that this policy would have restored full employment in the 1930s, quite
the opposite. Those who argue to the contrary should read T. W. Hutchison's Keynes
v. the 'Keynesians'...?, The Institute for Economic Affairs, 1977.)
Astute economists at the time pointed out the inflationary consequences of
the Keynesian solution. The great error that the vast majority of economists
make with inflation is to simply treat it as a case of rising prices. Although
some of them may make passing comments on the distorting affects of inflation,
this is always done with respect to financial decision-making and never to
real factors. This is why their references to distortions are framed in terms
of financial imbalances.
Failure to understand how monetary expansion distorts a country's capital
structure and pattern of foreign trade in such away as to result in plant closures
and severe trade imbalances is bound to give birth to demands for greater government
intervention on the grounds that the market has failed. Nevertheless, every
proposed act of government meddling requires a theoretical justification if
only to keep opponents at bay.
It is being put to Democrats that the emergence of China has resulted in a
massive increase in the world's labour force that is now threatening US prosperity.
Although this labour has always been present it never posed a serious threat
because it lacked the necessary capital, technology and access to world markets.
When Beijing opened up the Chinese economy it terminated this self-imposed
economic embargo, allowing the free flow of capital and technology into the
country. The result is that the flow of Western capital is now pushing down
Western wage rates. This process is bound to continue until wages have been
equalised.
This is really terrible stuff and is just another version of the long-discredited
cheap labour fallacy. Those who push this line do not realise that it could
only hold in a world in which labour was the sole cost of production irrespective
of the supply of capital goods. Moreover, they overlook the fact that wage
rates are not absolute. Therefore what matters is the wage rate relative to
the marginal value of the worker's production. This is why in the 1920s European
unions argued for tariffs against US goods on the grounds that American labour
was more productive and hence more competitive because it had a greater quantity
of capital goods to work with and that's why it was better paid.
If so-called cheap labour is threatening Western wages why export capital
goods to Asia? Why not simply invest in hiring cheap labour and export its
products? The contradiction should be obvious. Capital (meaning producer goods)
and labour are complementary. Capital is used to raise the productivity of
labour. In other words, capital lowers the price of labour relative to the
value of its output. When looked at from this angle we see that though American
wages are higher than Asian wages labour costs per unit are lower. At least
this is how it would be in an unhampered market.
As an economy becomes more capital intensive its wage rates rise. This means
that labour intensive activities in tradable goods can no longer compete against
countries whose economies are labour intensive. But note: these activities
contract or shut down because of the success of capital accumulation in raising
real wages and not because they have been undercut by cheap foreign labour.
These shifts in the pattern of international trade are usually explained by
economists in terms of comparative advantage. But -- and it's and important
'but' -- comparative advantage was developed by the classical economists within
the framework of a gold standard. As Joseph Schumpeter pointed out:
In the first place, the 'classical' writers, without neglecting other cases,
reasoned primarily in terms of an unfettered international gold standard.
There were several reasons for this but one of them merits our attention
in particular. An unfettered international gold standard will keep (normally) foreign
exchange rates within specie points [emphasis added] and impose and 'automatic'
link between national price levels and interest rates. (Joseph Schumpeter, The
History of Economic Analysis, Oxford University Press, 1994, p. 732).
Schumpeter's reference to "specie points" is extremely important because what
is being said is that the classical economists assumed a sound monetary policy,
which is what the gold standard supplied. Now every economist worth his salt
knows that all goods have export and import points (which we shall call commodity
points), the difference between them being largely determined by transport
costs. An overvalued currency would have the effect of destroying the cost
difference and by doing so wipe out that country's comparative advantage. (Ricardo
pointed out that a tax can have the same effect).
That it is commodity points and not the price of labour that makes exports
sensitive to price changes is confirmed by Asian central banks -- particularly
the People's Bank of China -- buying up US dollars in an attempt to prevent
a depreciation that would hammer their export industries, regardless of the
fact that their labour is 'cheap'. If it were a simple question of 'cheap'
labour then why worry about a sinking dollar? (By buying dollars these countries
are inflating their own money stocks. So we have a situation where the US is
in effect exporting inflation).
What all of this means is that if a sound money policy is abandoned in favour
of permanently increasing monetary stocks (an inflationary policy) -- which
is what we have now -- then we can expect the emergence of overvalued currencies
with the result that the pattern of international trade will be badly distorted.
A country that runs an overvalued currency for a lengthy period will find its
production structure becoming more domestic oriented: its export industries
will decline and imports will rise.
In such an economy one should expect to witness the emergence of a "rustbelt" accompanied
by an excessive expansion of the financial and service sectors along with delirious
claims that the economy has now entered a "post-industrial" phase. The irony
is that this process was accurately described 77 years ago. (Friedrich von
Hayek, Money, Capital and Fluctuations: Early Essays, Routledge & Kegan
Paul, 1984, pp. 150-2.) More than 80 years ago Bresciano-Turroni noted how
a rapid and sustained monetary expansion could expand the financial sector:
The increase in banking business was not the consequence of a more intense
economic activity. The work was increased because the banks were overloaded
with orders for buying and selling shares and foreign exchange, proceeding
from the public which, in increasing numbers, took part in speculations on
the Bourse. The banks did not help in the production of new wealth; but the
same claims to wealth continually passed from hand to hand. (Bresciano-Turroni, The
Economics of Inflation: A Study of Currency Depreciation in Post-War Germany,
John Dickens & Co LTD, 1968, p. 404).
Money is not merely a veil that hides the reality that ultimately goods exchange
against other goods but that money itself is an extremely potent force that
influences real factors. Failure to understand this fact is creating financial
chaos and giving rise to dangerous fallacies.
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