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Long
time Outside of the Box readers are familiar with John Hussman of the eponymous
Hussman Funds. And once again he is my selection for this week's OTB.
This week he touches on several topics, all of which I find interesting. As
he notes:
"We face two possible states of the world. One is a world in which our economic
problems are largely solved, profits are on the mend, and things will soon
be back to normal, except for a lot of unemployed people whose fate is, let's
face it, of no concern to Wall Street. The other is a world that has enjoyed
a brief intermission prior to a terrific second act in which an even larger
share of credit losses will be taken, and in which the range of policy choices
will be more restricted because we've already issued more government liabilities
than a banana republic, and will steeply debase our currency if we do it again.
It is not at all clear that the recent data have removed any uncertainty as
to which world we are in."
Have a good week.
John Mauldin, Editor
Outside the Box
Reckless Myopia
by John P. Hussman, Ph.D.
I was wrong.
Not about the implosion of the credit markets, which I urgently warned about
in 2007 and early 2008. Not about the recession, which we shifted to anticipating
in November 2007. Not about the plunge in the stock market, which erased the
entire 2002-2007 market gain, which was no surprise. Not about the "ebb and
flow" of short-term data, which I frequently noted could produce a powerful
(though perhaps abruptly terminated) market advance even in the face of dangerous
longer-term cross-currents. I expect not even about the "surprising" second
wave of credit distress that we can expect as we move into 2010.
From a long-term perspective, my record is very comfortable. But clearly,
I was wrong about the extent to which Wall Street would respond to the
ebb-and-flow in the economic data - particularly the obvious and temporary
lull in the mortgage reset schedule between March and November 2009 - and drive
stocks to the point where they are not only overvalued again, but strikingly
dependent on a sustained economic recovery and the achievement and maintenance
of record profit margins in the years ahead.
I should have assumed that Wall Street's tendency toward reckless myopia -
ingrained over the past decade - would return at the first sign of even temporary
stability. The eagerness of investors to chase prevailing trends, and their
unwillingness to concern themselves with predictable longer-term risks,
drove a successive series of speculative advances and crashes during the past
decade - the dot-com bubble, the tech bubble, the mortgage bubble, the private-equity
bubble, and the commodities bubble. And here we are again.
We face two possible states of the world. One is a world in which our economic
problems are largely solved, profits are on the mend, and things will soon
be back to normal, except for a lot of unemployed people whose fate is, let's
face it, of no concern to Wall Street. The other is a world that has enjoyed
a brief intermission prior to a terrific second act in which an even larger
share of credit losses will be taken, and in which the range of policy choices
will be more restricted because we've already issued more government liabilities
than a banana republic, and will steeply debase our currency if we do it again.
It is not at all clear that the recent data have removed any uncertainty as
to which world we are in.
Taking the weighted average outcome for the two states of the world
still produces a poor average return/risk tradeoff. Taking the weighted average investment
position for the two states of the world is somewhat more constructive.
As I noted several weeks ago, I have adapted our weightings accordingly. As
a result, we have been trading around a modest positive net exposure, increasing
it slightly on market weakness, and clipping it on strength, as is our discipline.
Currently, the Strategic Growth Fund has a net exposure to market fluctuations
of less than 10%, but enough "curvature" (through index options) that our exposure
to market risk will automatically become more muted on market weakness and
more positive on market advances, allowing us to buy weakness and sell strength
without material concern about the (increasing) risk of a market collapse.
There is no chance, even in hindsight ("could have, would have, should have" stuff)
that I would have responded to the existing evidence in recent months with
more than a moderate exposure to market risk during some portion of the advance
since March. But our year-to-date returns might now be into a second digit
had I recognized that investors have learned utterly nothing from the bubbles
and collapses of the past decade. That recognition might have encouraged a
greater weight on trend-following measures versus fundamentals, valuations,
price-volume sponsorship, and other factors.
Still, our stock selections continue to perform well relative to the market,
our risks remain well-managed through a substantial (though not full) hedge,
and our investment approach has nicely outperformed the S&P 500 over complete
market cycles, with substantially less downside risk than a passive investment
approach. We have implemented some modest changes to improve our potential
to benefit from (even ill-advised) speculative runs, but we've done fine nonetheless,
and we can sleep nights.
Whether or not I have focused too much on probable "second-wave" credit risks
is something we will find out in the quarters ahead - my record of economic
analysis is strong enough that a "miss" on that front would be an outlier.
What I do think is that over the past decade, investors (including people who
hold themselves out as investment professionals) have become far more susceptible
to reckless myopia than I would have liked to believe. They have become speculators
up to the point of disaster.
Frankly, I've come to believe that the markets are no longer reliable or sound
discounting mechanisms. The repeated cycle of bubbles and predictable crashes
over the recent decade makes that clear. Rather, investors appear to respond
to emerging risks no more than about three months ahead of time. Worse, far
too many analysts and strategists appear to discount the future only in the
most pedestrian way, by taking year-ahead earnings estimates at face value,
and mindlessly applying some arbitrary and historically inconsistent multiple
to them.
This is utterly different from true discounting - which does not rely
on multiples, but instead carefully traces out the likely path of future revenues,
profit margins, cash flows and earnings over time, and explicitly discounts
expected payouts and probable terminal values back at an appropriate rate of
return. That's what we actually do here. Talking in terms of multiples can
make the process easier to explain, and can be a reasonable approach to the
market as a whole if earnings are normalized properly, but ultimately, an investment
security is a claim to a long-term stream of cash flows. It is not simply
a blind multiple to the latest analyst estimate.
Fortunately, the evidence suggests that the long-term returns to a careful
discounting approach tend to be strong even if investors repeatedly behave
in speculative and short-sighted ways. This is because long-term returns
are fully determined by the stream of cash flows actually received by
investors over time, and because inappropriate valuations ultimately tend to
mean-revert. In the face of speculative noise, the long-term returns from a
proper discounting approach may not capture as much speculative return as might
be possible, but over time, many of those speculative swings tend to wash out
anyway.
In part, the market's increasing propensity toward speculation reflects the
increasing lack of fiscal and monetary discipline from our leaders. Policy
makers who seek quick fixes and could care less about long-term consequences
undoubtedly encourage investors to embrace the same value system. Paul Volcker
was the last Fed Chairman to have any sense that discipline and the acceptance
of temporary discomfort was good for the nation.
Our current Fed Chairman's voice literally quivers in response to the phrase "bank
failure," even though in the present context, a bank failure implies none of
the disorganized outcomes that characterized the Great Depression. It simply
means that the bondholders take a loss and the remaining part of the institution
survives intact as a "whole bank" entity (and can be sold or re-issued back
to public ownership, less the debt to bondholders, as such). The same outcome
would have been possible with Lehman had the FDIC been granted authority from
Congress to take conservatorship of a non-bank financial entity.
In my estimation, there is still close to an 80% probability (Bayes' Rule)
that a second market plunge and economic downturn will unfold during the coming
year. This is not certainty, but the evidence that we've observed in the equity
market, labor market, and credit markets to-date is simply much more consistent
with the recent advance being a component of a more drawn-out and painful deleveraging
cycle. Meanwhile, valuations are clearly unfavorable here, and even under the "typical
post-war recovery" scenario, we are observing an increasing number of internal
divergences and non-confirmations in market action.
As Gluskin Sheff chief economist David Rosenberg noted last week, "Even if
the recession is over, the historical record shows that downturns induced by
asset deflation and credit contraction are different than a garden-variety
recession induced by Fed tightening and excessive manufacturing inventories
since the former typically induce a secular shift in behavior and attitudes
towards debt, asset allocation, savings, discretionary spending and homeownership.
The latter fades more quickly.
"This is why people didn't figure out that it was the Great Depression until
two years after the worst point in the crisis in the 1930s; and why it took
decades, not months, quarters or even years, for the complete transition to
the next sustainable economic expansion and bull market.
"Mortgage applications for new home purchases hit a 12-year low in the middle
of November (down 22% in the past month!), fully two weeks after the Administration
said it was going to not only extend but expand the program to include higher-income
trade-up buyers. Once again, there is minimal demand for autos and housing,
and that is partly because the market is still saturated with both of these
credit-sensitive big-ticket items after an unprecedented credit and consumer
bubble that went absolutely parabolic in the seven years prior to the collapse
in the financial markets an asset values. We are probably not even one-third
of the way through this deleveraging cycle. Tread carefully."
Andrew Smithers, one of the few other analysts who foresaw the credit implosion
and remains a credible voice now, concurred last week in an interview with
my friend Kate Welling (a former Barrons' editor now at Weeden & Company): "The
good news so far is that the stock market got down to pretty much fair value
or even, possibly, a tickle below it, at its March bottom. But now it has gone
up... we probably have a market which is, roughly, 40% overpriced. In order
to assess value, it is necessary either to calculate the level at which the
EPS would be if profits were neither depressed nor elevated, or to use a metric
of value which does not depend on profits. The cyclically adjusted P/E (CAPE)
normalizes EPS by averaging them over 10 years. It thus follows the first of
those two possible methods. Using even longer time periods has advantages,
particularly as EPS have been exceptionally volatile in recent years - and
using longer time periods raises the current measured degree of overvaluation.
The other methodology we use measures stock market value without reference
to profits: the q ratio. It compares the market capitalization of companies
with their net worth, also adjusted to current prices. The validity of both
of these approaches can be tested and is robust under testing - and they produce
results that agree. Currently, both q and CAPE are saying that the U.S. stock
market is about 40% overvalued."
In the chart below, the current data point would be about 0.4, not as extreme
as we observed in 1929, 2000, or 2007 of course, but equal to or beyond what
we've observed at virtually every other market peak in history. This aligns
well with our own analysis, where as I've noted in recent weeks, the S&P
500 is priced to deliver one of the weakest 10-year total returns in history
except for the (ultimately disappointing) period since the mid-1990's.

One of the fascinating aspects of the past few months is the lack of equilibrium
thinking with respect to what happened to the trillions of dollars in government
money that has been spent to defend the bondholders of mismanaged financial
companies. Almost by definition, money given to corporations will show up most
quickly as improvements in corporate earnings, and then slightly later, as
executive compensation. A few pieces came across my desk last week, hailing
the ability of the corporate sector to bounce back from the recent economic
downturn even though revenues have continued to suffer and employment has been
steeply cut. Why is this a surprise? Where else could the money have gone?
Labor compensation? It is truly mind-numbing that a moment after a temporary
surge of trillions of dollars, borrowed and tossed out of a helicopter
(though to specific corporations and private beneficiaries), analysts would
hail a subsequent improvement in corporate results as evidence of "resilience."
What matters is sustainability, and unfortunately, it is clear that credit
continues to collapse. Banks are contracting their loan portfolios at a record
rate, according to the latest FDIC Quarterly Banking Profile. Even so, new
delinquencies continue to accelerate faster than loan loss reserves. Tier 1
capital looked quite good last quarter, as one would expect from the combination
of a large new issuance of bank securities, combined with an easing of accounting
rules to allow "substantial discretion" with respect to credit losses. The
list of problem institutions is still rising exponentially. Overall, earnings
and capital ratios have enjoyed a reprieve in the past couple of quarters,
but delinquencies have not, and all evidence points to an acceleration as we
move into 2010.
Urgent Policy Implications
From a policy standpoint, it is effectively too late to forestall further
foreclosures absent explicit losses to creditors. The best policy option now
is to make sure that the second wave does not result in a debasement of the
U.S. dollar. The way to do that is to require three things:
First, the FDIC should be given regulatory authority to take non-bank financials
into conservatorship the way they should have been able to do with Bear Stearns
and Lehman. If this authority had existed in 2008, Bear's bondholders would
not now stand to get 100% of their money back, with interest, as they presently
do, and Lehman's disorganized liquidation would have been completely unnecessary.
As I've noted before, the problem with Lehman was not that it went bankrupt,
but that it went bankrupt in a disorganized way. If the FDIC had authority
over insolvent non-bank financials and bank holding companies, it could wipe
out equity and an appropriate amount of bondholder capital, and sell the fully-functioning
residual to an acquirer, as is typically done with failing banks, without any
loss to depositors or customers.
Second, bank capital requirements should be altered to require a substantial
portion of bank debt to be of a form that automatically converts to
equity in the event of capital inadequacy. This would force losses onto bondholders,
rather than onto taxpayers. This policy adjustment is urgent - we have perhaps
a few months to get this right.
Finally, Congress should be clear that government funds will be available
only to protect the interests of depositors, not bondholders. Specifically,
any funds provided by the government should be contingent on the ability to
exert a senior claim to bondholders in the event of subsequent bankruptcy,
even if a category is created to allow those funds to be counted as "capital" for
purposes of satisfying capital requirements prior to such bankruptcy. Government-provided
capital should be subordinate only to depositor claims, if equity and
bondholder capital ultimately proves insufficient to meet those obligations.
Since early 2008, beginning with the provision of non-recourse funding in
the Bear Stearns debacle, the Federal Reserve and the Treasury have repeatedly
allocated or implicitly obligated public funds to defend the bondholders of
mismanaged financial companies. This has included the outright and non-recourse
purchase of nearly a trillion dollars in mortgage securities that have no explicit
guarantee by the U.S. government. By purchasing these securities outright (rather
than through a well-defined repurchase agreement), the Fed is effectively obligating
the U.S. government to either guarantee them or to absorb any future losses.
Aside from the fraction of bailout funding that was specifically allocated
by Congress through legislation, these actions represent an unconstitutional
breach into enumerated spending powers that are the domain of the elected members
of Congress alone. The issue here is not whether the Fed should be independent
from political influence. The issue is the constitutionality of the Fed's actions.
The discretion that it has exerted over the past two years crosses the line
into prerogatives reserved for Congress. That line needs to be clarified sooner
rather than later.
Emphatically, the trillions of dollars spent over the past year were not in
the interest of protecting bank depositors or the general public. They went
to protect bank bondholders. Instead of taking appropriate losses on those
bonds (which financed reckless mortgage lending), those bonds are happily priced
near their face value, for the benefit of private individuals, thanks to an
equivalent issuance of U.S. Treasury debt. But that's not enough. Outside of
a very narrow set of institutions that are subject to compensation limits,
just watch how much of the public's money - which benefitted several major
investment banks following a very direct route - gets allocated to Wall Street
bonuses in the next few weeks.
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