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As a quick recap: I pointed out the illogical, self destructive, circular
relationship between Goldman and its clients/customers as significant monies
are lost following bad advice and purchasing trash in the form of financial
and investment products. See "Reggie
Middleton vs Goldman Sachs, Round 1". Goldman has recently issued a buy
rating on the commercial REIT sector (of course, Goldman has started underwriting
and selling REIT securities), something that I consider to be suicidal at best.
Let's take some anecdotal glances into the commercial real estate world to
see exactly what it is that Goldman would have us buy, and why.
In December of 2007, I wrote an article "Will
the commercial real estate market fall? Of course it will", which I will
excerpt from...
Sam Zell, one of the most successful real estate investors of our time,
sold his Equity Office Properties Trust of Class A and B buildings to Blackrock
for what I assuredly thought was a fools price. When I saw the numbers, I
said easy money or not, there is an ass for every seat. Well, little do I
know. Blackrock found someone to pass the cherry on to, and in near real
time at that - and they paid even lower cap rates than Blackrock did. Hats
off to the Blackrock folk. You found the guys at the very tip top of the
market to drop those cap rates off on.
Now, the problem for the last guys to buy these properties (as Sam Zell
sits there smiling on his $21 billion pile of cash) is that it is going to
be nigh impossible to find someone who will pay a ZERO cap rate, and try
as you might it will be damn hard to raise lease rates amongst an economic
hard landing and negative trending earnings... And thus, this is the fate
of commercial real estate. The many guys who overpaid, will get burnt as
values tumble from their peak bubble highs. Old school real estate guys email
me and say they never even heard of 5, 6 and 7 percent cap rates until recently
(after 30 years in the biz). Well, some of these guys are pushing zero (literally
1.5% to 3 and 4%).
Let's fastforward to today, where we may learn the fate of those guys who
bought that CRE flip from Blackrock. From Crain's Chicago Business, "Zombie
fears stalk Tishman in the Loop"
A venture led by Tishman Speyer Properties L.P. has defaulted on part of
a package of loans used to finance the $1.72-billion purchase of six prime
downtown office towers during the frenzied real estate market of 2007, sources
familiar with the deal say.
The New York developer bought the 5.7-million-square-foot portfolio from
Blackstone Group, which flipped them as part of the New York private-equity
firm's $39-billion leveraged buyout earlier that year of Sam Zell's Equity
Office Properties Trust. [Anybody reading my blog in 2007 or even
knew me in 2006 could have seen this coming a mile away!]
The buildings, including such Loop landmarks as the Civic Opera Building
and the 10 & 30 S. Wacker Drive complex, have lost much of their value
amid the broad decline in the commercial real estate market...

Tishman Speyer, led by longtime developer Jerry Speyer, is in hard-nosed
negotiations with officials of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to rework
an estimated $1.4 billion in loans. The Fed inherited the mortgages
as part of the 2008 collapse and sale of Wall Street investment bank Bear
Stearns Cos. With the talks at a stalemate, the Fed is taking
an aggressive tack, cutting off a key source of capital for leasing costs.
The portfolio, which also includes 161 N. Clark St., 30 N. LaSalle St. and
1 N. Franklin St., already illustrates several recent real estate trends,
such as rapidly falling property values after prices peaked thanks to large
amounts of cheap debt. With credit now virtually gone, defaults
on downtown buildings are likely to rise, forcing them into foreclosure or
onto the market at big discounts that will put more downward pressure on
prices in a spiral similar to the struggles of residential real estate across
the country.
"Virtually all the assets bought between '05 and '07 cannot be
refinanced today without a significant capital infusion," says
Shawn Mobley, executive vice-president at real estate firm Grubb & Ellis
Co. "These buildings need to be recapitalized to get back in the business
of being active real estate."
Without a financial restructuring, the properties are likely to join a new
trend -- "zombie buildings," which can't compete for new tenants because
they lack the money to cover brokers' commissions and interior office reconstruction.
...
Many tenants won't consider zombie buildings because they need landlords'
cash [for tenant improvements].
Avoiding a "Night of the Living Dead" scenario could be tough even for an
established firm like Tishman Speyer, whose local portfolio totals 12.2 million
square feet.
A company-led venture is in default on a mezzanine loan of undetermined
size, part of an estimated $1.4-billion package of mortgages, sources say. The
loans come due next year but can be extended until 2012, sources say [when
prices have corrected even farther, put your head in the sand].
... The number of zombie buildings in the Chicago area is likely to grow
in 2010, according to a forecast by California-based Grubb & Ellis.
For landlords, the trend means even top-quality office properties are likely
to divide themselves into "haves" and "have-nots," with the latter seeing
their vacancy rates worsen because of the lack of financing. [SHHHH! You
Freakin' Idiots! You didn't get the memo?!?! Goldman just upgraded the
sector! Goldman needs to underwrite REIT securities to fund the 2010 $23
billion, 500% of the dividend payout bonus pool]
Even landlords that may have cash are hoarding it. Dallas-based Behringer
Harvard REIT I Inc., which owns five downtown office buildings, says it is
avoiding upfront costs by cutting rents on existing leases in exchange for
lengthening the agreements.
From NYC's local real estate rags:
Midtown
Manhattan sees double-digit drop in office rents, London's West End still
world's most expensive office market
As commercial real estate floundered across the globe, the cost of renting
office space plummeted in some of the world's most prominent financial centers.
On average, office markets saw a 7.7 percent decline in rental expenses,
according to a CB Richard Ellis report released this week, but several dozen
markets experienced drops in the double-digits. Midtown Manhattan slipped
to 24th on that list, at $68.93 per square foot, down from its 15th-place
ranking last year, though it is still the most expensive office market in
the U.S. Nearly three-quarters of the 179 markets surveyed saw declines,
and Singapore, Hong Kong's Central Business District, and Downtown New York
City were among those hit hardest. Those markets ranked second, fourth and
ninth for largest rental cost decreases with roughly 53 percent, 41 percent,
and 30 percent, respectively. Kiev, Ukraine came in first with a crushing
65 percent drop. Meanwhile, the West End district in London clung to its
title as the world's most expensive office market, with costs averaging $184.85
per square foot. "While there are signs that commercial real estate values
are stabilizing in some markets in Asia and parts of London, underlying property
fundamentals are still weak," Raymond Torto, global chief economist at CBRE,
said in a statement.
Stuyvesant
Town ruling post-mortem report examines which properties are in danger
New York City multi-family landlords who took advantage of the same J-51
tax abatement program that got Stuyvesant
Town into legal trouble are facing legal
battles of their own, according to a Deutsche Bank report released this
week. The report, a culmination of an analysis of hundreds of these tax break
recipients whose loans are secured by commercial
mortgage-backed securities, said landlords of properties like the tony
Belnord and the Ansonia on the Upper West Side, as well as the Meyberry House
on the Upper East Side, would have to make due with decreased operating income
as a result of the October Stuyvesant Town ruling,
which stipulated that rents cannot be destabilized while J-51 is being utilized. "In
the longer term, owners may face decreased investor demand for rent-stabilized
properties since the growth rate of cash flow is now severely limited," the
report said. Many rent-stabilized buildings will not
be able to increase tenants' monthly payments until 2017, according to
the report. The Belnord, which has a loan balance of $375 million, topped
Deutsche Bank's list of largest CMBS loans on properties affected by the
ruling. [WSJ]
Experts
see steep rise in deadbeat renters
The percent of residential apartment dwellers in the city who are not paying
their rent has as much as quadrupled since the market weakened last year,
industry leaders on a panel discussing multi-family properties said earlier
this week. "Collections, especially in New York City, have become more of
an issue," said Mark Stern, senior vice president at Waterton Residential,
a Chicago-based building owner and operator. His firm is planning on making
acquisitions in New York City. "[They are] going from the 5 percent range
to now 10 or 20 percent in collections, which makes a difference on the bottom
line," he said. Mason Sleeper, a principal with the real estate investment
firm Praedium Group, said he has seen a similar distress in the market. "You
have your collection issue which is increasingly creeping up to becoming
a little bit of a problem," he said. They were speaking on a panel that also
included Kevin Davis, partner of Area Property Partners; Tim Wang, vice president
at ING Clarion and Max Herzog, senior vice president at CB Richard Ellis.
The panel, moderated by Mike Kelly, president of Caldera Asset Management,
was part of a day-long forum covering multi-family real estate organized
by GreenPearl.
NYC
real estate pounded with layoffs
The New York City real estate industry shed 600 broker-related jobs in October,
bringing the 2009 tally thus far to 5,700, or 4.7 percent of that sector's
labor force, according to a new employment report from Eastern Consolidated.
Nationwide, brokerage firms cut 2,200 employees during the month, for a current
total of 105,500 job losses, or 5.1 percent, since December 2008. The construction
industry alone, however, is weathering a more serious fallout. A whopping
16,300 New York City construction jobs -- 12.3 percent -- were lost during
the month, though that was only a fraction of the nearly 1.6 million construction
employees terminated across the country, who comprised 20.7 percent of the
industry. TRD
Michael Stoler
-- "Extend and pretend," the new rule for commercial real estate loans
As the fall of 2009 comes to a close, many of the commercial real estate
lenders continue to limit their exposure to financing for real estate. The
buzzword for 2009 is "extend
and pretend," whereby a bank extends the term of a loan to a later date.
The legendary Samuel
Zell, chairman of Equity Group Investments, the keynote speaker at the
NYU Capital Markets conference Nov. 19, stated that "our government has become
the bailout city. If a loan is kept current, banks will 'pretend and extend.'" No
one is surprised by the "pretend and extend concept," especially if you had
the opportunity to gain insight from the Federal Reserve's October 2009 Senior
Loan Officer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending Practices and hear the comments
made by Ben Bernanke, chairman of the Federal Reserve, in a speech at the
Economic Club of New York Nov. 16
Dubai
impact on NYC limited to distressed hotels, but signals end to sovereign
wealth rescue
As the international credit crisis spread into the kingdom of the United
Arab Emirates, real estate experts said that while any direct impact on New
York would be limited, it may signal the inability of sovereign wealth funds
to bail out distressed assets here. The financial world briefly shuddered
last week after Dubai World, the main investment arm of the powerful Gulf
region city-state, asked lenders for a six-month suspension of nearly $60
billion in debt payments. Analysts say the suspension may force Dubai to
sell many of its trophy assets around the world, including several high-profile
buildings in New York, like the Jumeriah
Essex House, the former Knickerbocker
Hotel and the flagship W New York-Union Square hotel, whose mezzanine
debt is scheduled for a Dec. 8 foreclosure auction. "Dubai got drunk with
debt just like we did here in New York," said Dan Fasulo, managing director
of research at Manhattan-based investment research firm Real Capital Analytics. "A
lot of people think Dubai [was financing its deals with] oil. In actuality,
it was very much of a debt-fueled building boom."
So, hopefully, between my link-dense introductory post and this anecdotal
'semblage of newsbytes you can fathom that there may be a rather selfish motive
to

Goldman's CRE sector update. Let's suppose you are an institutional investor
that may have doubts that Goldman has been/is/will act in your best interests.
What should you do? Well, for one, I would unplug my ass from the Matrix and
shake that dizzying spell of "Goldman is the best in the world-itis", and pay
more attention to the smaller, independent, and considerably less non-conflicted
sources of analysis, data and opinion. This does NOT include the major rating
agencies. As I have stated in the past, if your research sources benefits from
transactions in the marketplace and/or sales, you had most asuredely best be
on the same side of the trade that they are on. Goldman clients cannot say
this!
Lets revisit Goldman's sector upgrade - "Goldman
Sachs Upgraded US REITS to Neutral; Ups BKD, AVB, GGWPQ, Downgrades
KIM" in which they probably don't have anything on the underwriting
calendar for KIM (hence the downgrade), and they have upgraded GGP from
sell to neutral (after it has fallen from $60 to pennies and has filed
for bankruptcy, thanks fellas - I would have done better reading a blog).
Notice that they have also upgraded Taubman, whom I have done a decent
amount of analysis on for my subscribers (The
Taubman Properties Research is Now Available). What are the odds that
a Taubman underwriting is in the pipeline? Did you know that Goldman packaged
Taubman mortgages into CMBS already? Let's take a look at how those mortgaged
properties are faring (keeping in mind how well [horribly] investors fared
in that RMBS offering illustrated in my last vs GS post, see graphic)...
In 2006, Goldman issued CMBS to institutional investors (mostly insurance
companies and asset managers) under the moniker GSMS 2006 - GG6, with 19 tranches
from junk to AAA rated under both Fitch and S&P (Uh Oh! See the sidebar
below for what is happening to S&P rated CMBS debt). This included
the mortgages financing the Northlake Mall and the Mall at Wellington GreenTaubman
properties - one of which is just about at the underwater mark, and the other
that is already past the refinanceable LTV limit imposed by the newly prudent,
risk averse CRE financing market. When the CMBS was sold to the investors,
the max LTV could not have been more than 70, and was probably less. As you
can see, things can get much worse, quite quickly. I anticipate one these properties
to be completely underwater by 2010 year end and the other to need a significant
equity infusion by suckers, victims future Goldman clients.
What the investors should be concerned about is that although the properties
are not quite under water yet, the macro and fundamental trends are heading
sharply downward and the debt behind them currently cannot be rolled over without
a significant equity infusion. I would assume mezz debt would be out of the
question. Now, of course there is a diversity of properties other than Taubman
behind these derivatives (just as thier was in the GSAMP Trust RMBS offering
graphic above, hint, hint!), but if GS recommends Taubman, one must assume
that GS considers Taubman to be one of the better players (or GS is preparing
to do another Taubman offering, which is the wager I'd put my money on).
As in the RBMS scenario above, as the underlying properties decrease in value,
the lower tranches of the CMBS face the possibility of a total wipeout, and
even the higher rated ones fave the possiblity of material risk. Is this the
AAA comfort and complacency that you had in mind when you reached for that
measly blip of several basis points in additional yield over treasuries???
When dealing with the big name brand banks that need to fund $19 billion bonus
pools, it is not necessarily return on your capital that you need to be concerned
with. Its the return OF your capital, lest it wind up in the GS bonus pool!!!
The German Reinsurance Company, the Japanese and American asset managers,
and the US life insurer that bought heavily into this "bound to make your career" CMBS
offering from Goldman are welcome
to contact me. Believe it or not, there are CMBS offerings floated by other "name
brand" banks that have done even worse in terms of the properties that are
backing them. I will get into that in my next post, and give Goldman Sachs
a break, after all, they are about to lose half of their (very hard to conceive
that they deserved) bonsues. See Darling
Places 50% Levy on U.K. Bank Bonuses, Will Raise Wage Taxes in '11. Can
you believe it. The capital goes from GS clients who followed GS advice and
bought GS products to GS's bonus pool, just to end up in the hand of the UK
taxing authority. I'll bet your left nipple that congress is weighing their
options as I type this. I warned my readers for months that GS upper management
was pushing their luck much, much too hard. One would think they actually started
drinking their own Kool-Aid marketing in believing that "Masters of the Universe" stuff.
They strutted and dared, and taunted and just very well might have created
a precedent that would prove most difficult to unwind.
Darling actually had darling of a soundbite that I just couldn't resist posting:
"There are some banks who still believe their priority is to pay substantial
bonuses," Darling said in Parliament. [Nawwww!!! Say it ain't
true!] "I am giving them a choice. They can use their profits to build
up their capital base. If they insist on paying substantial rewards,
I am determined to claw money back for the taxpayer."
What are the chances that the bankers would rather take shareholder capital
and increase the bonus amount to compensate for the tax increase than do something
a little more,, umm,,, shareholder friendly with it? What are the chances the
sheepish shareholders would just sit back and let them do it? After all, the
lion's share of net revenue ALREADY goes to the bonus pool as it is, right???
S&P Looks to be Taken Seriously???
As per our analysis S&P has, of late, been very aggressive in reducing
its ratings for the CMBS tranches in the last six months as it changed its
rating methodology in May 2009, which had the impact of downgrading most of
2005-2008 CMBS classes. Note the reporting
from ZeroHedge.
Moreover, we believe that a large percentage of the downward revision in the
ratings must have been done by now as S&P initially intended to roll out
its results from new methodology over the next 3-6 months, after it had launched
the new methodology in May 2009.
Below is the comparative S&P rating for most MSC 2007-HQ12 CMBS tranches
issued for Deptford Mall from MAC's portfolio, for your reference:
| |
S&P Rating |
| |
7-Apr-09 |
9-Sep-09 |
| MSC 2007 - HQ12 AJFL |
AAA- |
B+ |
| MSC 2007 - HQ12 AJ |
AAA- |
B+ |
| MSC 2007 - HQ12 B |
AAA- |
B+ |
| MSC 2007 - HQ12 D |
A- |
B |
| MSC 2007 - HQ12 F |
BBB+- |
B- |
| MSC 2007 - HQ12 G |
BBB- |
B- |
| MSC 2007 - HQ12 C |
AA-- |
B |
| MSC 2007 - HQ12 H |
BBB-- |
B- |
| MSC 2007 - HQ12 E |
A-- |
B |
| MSC 2007 - HQ12 J |
BB+- |
B- |
| MSC 2007 - HQ12 L |
BB-- |
CCC+ |
| MSC 2007 - HQ12 N |
B- |
CCC |
| MSC 2007 - HQ12 K |
BB- |
CCC+ |
| MSC 2007 - HQ12 M |
B+- |
CCC+ |
| MSC 2007 - HQ12 O |
B-- |
CCC |
| MSC 2007 - HQ12 P |
CCC+- |
CCC |
| MSC 2007 - HQ12 Q |
CCC- |
CCC |
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Reggie
Middleton
Reggie Middleton, LLC
Perpetual Interests, LLCTM
http://boombustblog.com/
Who
am I?
Well, I fancy myself the personification of the free thinking
maverick, the ultimate non-conformist as it applies to investment and analysis.
I am definitively outside the box - not your typical or stereotypical Wall
Street investor. I work out of my home, not a Manhattan office. I build my
own technology and perform my own research - in lieu of buying it or following
the crowd. I create and follow my own macro strategies and am by definition,
a contrarian to the nth degree.
Since I use my research as a tool for my own investing
to actually put food on my table, I can stand behind it as doing what it is
supposed too - educate, illustrate and elucidate. I do not sell advice, I am
not a reporter hence do not sell stories, and I do not sell research. I am
an entrepreneur who exists just outside of mainstream corporate America and
Wall Street. This allows me freedom to do things that many can not. For instance,
I pride myself on developing some of the highest quality research available,
regardless of price. No conflicts of interest, no corporate politics, no special
favors. Just the hard truth as I have found it - and believe me, my team and
I do find it! I welcome any and all to peruse my blog, use my custom hacked
collaborative social tools, read the articles, download the files, and make
a critical comparison of the opinion referencing the situation at hand and
the time stamp on the blog post to the reality both at the time of the post
and the present. Hopefully, you will be as impressed with the Boom Bust as
I am and our constituency.
I pay for significant information and data, and am well
aware of the value of quality research. I find most currently available research
lacking, in both quality and quantity. The reason why I had to create my own
research staff was due to my dissatisfaction with what was currently available
- to both individuals and institutions.
So here I am, creating my own research for my own investment
activity. What really sets my actions apart is that I offer much of what I
produce to the public without charge - free to distribute and redistribute,
as long as it is left unaltered and full attribution is given to the author
and owner. Why would I do such a thing when others easily charge 5 and 6 digits
annually for what some may consider a lesser product? It is akin to open
source analysis! My ideas and implementations are actually improved and
fine tuned when bounced off of the collective intellect of the many, in lieu
of that of the few - no matter how smart those few may believe themselves to
be.
Very recently, I have started charging for the forensics
portion of my work, which has freed up the resources to develop the site to
deliver even more research for free, particularly on the global macro and opinion
front. This move has allowed me to serve an more diverse constituency, which
now includes the institutional consumer (ie., investment turned consumer banks,
hedge funds, pensions, etc,) as well as the newbie individual investor who
is just getting started - basically the two polar opposites of the investing
spectrum. I am proud to announce major banks as paying clients, and brand new
investors who take my book recommendations and opinions on true wealth and
success to heart.
So, this is how I use my background and knowledge in new
media, distributed computing, risk management, insurance, financial engineering,
real estate, corporate valuation and financial analysis to pursue, analyze
and capitalize on global macroeconomic opportunities. I have included a more
in depth bio at the bottom of the page for those who really, really need to
know more about me.
Visit his blog Boom
Bust Blog.
Copyright © 2007-2010 Reggie Middleton
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