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Economic growth now depends crucially on the strength of wealth and profit
creation. Mr. Greenspan and the bullish consensus economists claim that America
is enjoying its highest rate of wealth creation in history - through rising
asset prices.
Fed members are claiming that this is a perfectly normal transmission mechanism
of monetary policy. This is an outright lie. Never before have inflating asset
prices been a key driver of real economic activity.
To be sure, asset prices have always risen in the early stages of a cyclical
economic recovery in response to monetary easing. But such increases do little
or nothing to boost economic growth.
First of all, in past recoveries, price rises were generally very limited
in size, particularly for housing; and secondly, there was no way to convert
the asset inflation into cash, because the reckless lenders of today did not
exist. Besides, Americans of the 1960 - 1970s would have been too proud to
practice inflated-asset liquidation and too intelligent to mistake it for wealth
creation. There is no precedent for such profligate behavior of private households.
Worst of all, asset-price inflation is not wealth at all. That is strikingly
obvious from the macro perspective. The best way to realize this, we think,
is a comparison against the true wealth creation that generations before us
have experienced and that generations of economists have regarded as the one
and only way to greater, lasting prosperity. It comes from investment spending
on income-creating buildings, plant and equipment.
Investment spending creates demand, employment and incomes in the first instance
through the production of the necessary capital goods. When finished and installed,
the new capital goods go into production, creating further employment, incomes
and demand. And most importantly, debts incurred in connection with this wealth
creation are self-liquidating through the underlying income creation.
And what really happens to incomes and debts in the case of so-called wealth
creation through appreciating asset prices? Nothing at all. Generations before
us never thought of it as wealth creation. This new attitude arises principally
from a general convention to consider total outstanding assets of a certain
category as being worth the price of the last trade, however small that trade
may have been. Clearly, small trades have tremendous capitalization effects.
For good reasons, such so-called wealth creation is not practiced in most countries.
In Japan's case, the principal beneficiaries of the asset bubbles in the late
1980s were industrial and real estate businesses. In the U.S. case, it is the
consumer. But in order to enjoy the wealth effects of rising stock and housing
prices, the American consumer had to encumber himself with soaring debts in
order to afford the price-driving asset purchases.
For Mr. Greenspan and the bullish consensus it is a virtuous circle, as the
overall gains in capitalized asset prices have outpaced the rise in debt levels.
Implicitly, the big net gain in asset values can be used as collateral for
borrowing, which funds higher spending for consumption.
In their economic effects, these two patterns of wealth creation have nothing
in common. The key feature of the capital investment model is correlated increases
in current and future incomes. It boosts economic growth both in the short
and long run. What's more, the associated initial rise in corporate debt amortizes
itself through the following depreciations.
The striking key feature of so-called wealth creation through asset bubbles
in favor of the consumer is, first of all, the associated record production
of debt, set against the total absence of income creation. To maintain demand
creation through this kind of wealth creation, ever more debt creation is needed
- first, to keep the asset prices inflating; and second, to fund the spending
on consumption.
Thinking it over, one realizes that "wealth creation" is really a grotesque
misnomer for asset prices that are rising out of proportion to current income.
The economic reality is not wealth creation, but impoverishment. We repeatedly
hear from Americans that they are living in houses or apartments they cannot
afford to buy with their present incomes. But many years ago, with incomes
and prices as they were at the time, they could afford the houses. That says
it all.
The writing has been on the wall for years. In 1996 the American consumer
increased his spending on current goods and services by $281 billion, with
debt growth of $345.7 billion. In 2000 he spent $456.9 and borrowed $566.9
billion. And in 2003 spending of $367.9 compared with debt growth of $879.9
billion.
But consumer borrowing was not alone in escalating to unprecedented extremes.
Government borrowing also soared, in particular borrowing for boundless financial
speculation.
In 1997, the U.S. economy grew by $487.4 billion in current dollars, with
an overall credit expansion of $1,406.8 billion. That was already an unusually
high borrowing ratio. In 2003, it took $2,717.5 billion of new credit to generate
nominal GDP growth of $504.7 billion.
Credit excess - always due to artificially low interest rates - implicitly
means spending excess. But the problem is that these spending excesses tend
to distribute very unevenly across the economy. In the United States, for years,
the spending excesses have been overwhelmingly directed towards the whole range
of asset markets - stocks, bonds, housing - and in the economy towards consumption.
Given the enormity of these credit and spending excesses, it goes without
saying that they have involved tremendous distortions in the economy's whole
structure, being typically located in three areas: first, they misdirect output;
second, they distort relative prices, costs and profits; and third, they strain
balance sheets.
It used to be true among policymakers and economists that for an economy ailing
from such structural distortions, a return to sustained growth is only possible
after these have been significantly moderated, if not removed. Mr. Greenspan
has plainly opted for the diametrically opposite strategy of fighting economic
weakness, regardless of existing maladjustments, through more and more credit
excess.
Pointing to the U.S. economy's rates of real GDP growth, Mr. Greenspan claims
full success for his policy. Compared with the far higher rates of growth of
past cyclical recoveries, his policy has grossly failed, even by that measure.
But considering the horrible development of employment, it has been a policy
disaster.
Regards,
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