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The further fate of America's consumer borrowing and spending binge is of
major concern at this juncture. Last year, in particular, it was the key prop
to the U.S. economy. If it definitively falters, the recovery will surely derail.
The creation of a huge carry trade in bonds was crucial in lowering mortgage
rates. Consequently, a massive mortgage refinancing bubble was provoked, characterized
by massive home equity extraction. This freshly created equity provided the
funds for simultaneous bubbles in housing and stocks. Soaring pseudo wealth
was then offered as collateral to facilitate the borrowing binge.
All of a sudden, sliding asset prices have hammered these highly leveraged
asset and credit bubbles. Ironically, the trigger was pulled by a string of
strong economic data. Fretting about higher inflation and a possible hike in
short-term rates, heavily leveraged investors started cautionary liquidations.
But given the leverage, more and more selling was bound to follow. In short,
investors had simply become too optimistic, giddy from the artificially low
interest rates.
There can be no question that, in time, badly performing financial markets
will take their toll on general sentiment. The change in sentiment always comes
after the markets have already declined dramatically - falls that most people
are not prepared for. A recently published OECD report spells pure optimism
about the world economic prospects and thus provides a warning that markets
may be about to fall.
In its March Quarterly Review, under the title 'Appetite for Risk Lifts Markets,'
the Bank for International Settlements in Basel, Switzerland, reports, "Financial
markets around the world rallied into the new year, adding to the impressive
gains recorded in 2003. Improvements in global growth prospects and corporate
finances, coupled with a robust appetite for risk, underpinned increases in
equity and credit prices. Not even further revelations of corporate malfeasance
seemed to unsettle investors." We hasten to add that the Bank has been highly
critical of this development.
As we have already said, the sudden rise in long-term U.S. rates, which started
in mid-March, was not caused by bad news, but by unexpectedly good news. For
us, it is an unbelievable irony that the strong employment gains were so coveted
by the Fed yet, at the same time, ultimately proved to be the needle that pricked
the bond bubble.
To quote Ramsay King on this point: "It will be an irony of biblical proportion
if dubious employment gains spook the markets, which then impairs the economy,
which in turn costs Bush the election. That irony would be compounded if there
was any political maneuvering or pressure to produce great but unwarranted
employment numbers."
For us, and for Mr. King, it is a great irony that the prevailing perception
of a strongly rebounding U.S. economy, which caused interest rates to rise
so suddenly, is so badly flawed in the first place. Consumer spending has effectively
slumped during the first quarter. What's more, the recent impairment of the
mortgage refinancing bubble is a compelling reason to assume that the consumer-spending
slump will continue to get worse.
Thanks to all these bubbles, the American consumer borrowed a mind-boggling
$879.9 billion last year, having borrowed $775.7 billion the year before. However,
most of the borrowed money went into housing and stock purchases, fueling the
rise in their prices, rather than into living expenses.
Pursuing the discussion about the outlook for stock markets, it strikes us
that the question of potential buyers and their finances is never touched upon.
In the late 1990s, the necessary funding came primarily from American and foreign
corporations through huge stock buybacks and frenzied merger and acquisition
activity. Private households just jumped on the running bandwagon.
Since 2000, all buying on these accounts has vanished. Last year, private
households stepped in as the standalone buyer. With poor income growth and
virtually no savings at their disposal, their stock buying implicitly depended
on heavy borrowing from the mortgage-refinancing boom. But having largely depleted
this source of funds, we see a grossly overvalued stock market without any
potential buyers.
During the past two to three years, the U.S. economy and its financial system
obtained an unusually high dose of monetary and fiscal stimulus. Yet it was
really the interplay of three bubbles - in bonds, housing, and mortgage refinancing
- that enabled the consumer to sustain such an elevated level of spending.
Meanwhile employment and income growth fell precipitously.
Manifestly, these policies, having involved heavy rigging of markets, were
a palliative that prevented disaster for the U.S. economy in the short run.
But instead of redressing the economic and financial imbalances from the prior
boom, these policies propelled the imbalances to new extremes. After all, the
U.S. economy is now, in many ways, in worse shape than ever before.
There has been some involuntary unwinding of the global reflation trades.
Yet we have still only seen the tip of the iceberg. It is our view that the
leverage used in the carry trading of bonds, in particular, has grown to such
an absurd scale that orderly deleveraging is now impossible.
To point out the obvious: The asset and credit bubbles that have been inflating
consumer spending - bonds, stocks, mortgage refinancing - are plainly deflating.
The property bubble will soon follow for lack of funding. In short, we see
savage deflation for the asset markets, but stagflation for the economy - and
it is so obvious that no one can see it. This will soon change.
Regards,
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