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The Convenience Of History...It often times amuses us that history can be both our greatest ally and worst
enemy. For those who expect tomorrow to play out exactly as yesterday would
suggest, disappointment is often the order of the day going forward. In like
manner, for those who disregard history, very often the conceptual lessons
bestowed upon our forbears are once again taught in real time, only on a more
expensive absolute dollar basis. One of the most important investment lessons
which we try to reinforce in ourselves constantly is to avoid invoking history
on a selective basis. It's often convenient to do so and usually quite self
satisfying. But, certainly in a game where the minimization of risk is the
key to long term success, maintaining balance in relating historical human
decision making to what is happening in the here and now becomes a necessary
art.
We've mentioned this in prior discussions, but we are convinced that in today's
world where personal time seems to have become the ultimate scarce commodity,
thinking for one's self takes on vital importance. The very nature of the service
driven economy defines the fact that so many today are dependent on others
for essential services. Food, shelter, clothing, entertainment, etc. These
are givens. But, when it comes to investing, possibly the most dangerous current
service related dependency is to allow others to think and make decisions for
us. Especially when it comes to the popular media and mainstream messages from
Wall Street. We find it nothing short of disturbing that many of today's headline
financial pundits are now choosing to embrace history as the basis for declaring
a classic economic recovery ahead. As you know, these were many of the same
folks that would have absolutely nothing to do with historical precedent at
the height of the mania. We certainly do not take the power of the classic
recovery message lightly as it can and has influenced both short term decision
making and asset price movement. Yet, at the same time, we need to continually
look behind the headlines for the facts that will relate to the integrity and
sustainability of economic growth, and more importantly the potential for corporate
profit expansion ahead of us.
The prior bull market in financial assets and accompanying economic expansion
was very far from what could be considered classic in terms of the experience
of US financial history. The now ending so-called recession was one of the
mildest on record from the standpoint of real GDP contraction. Yet at the same
time, the downturn in corporate profits was one of the worst on record. On
both counts, anything but classic recessionary experience. So now the economic
recovery should be the only aspect of this cyclical economic experience that is classic?
The jury remains out, but we have the strong feeling that the popular financial
media is guilty of invoking the convenience of history at the moment. If ultimately
true, how inconvenient for most investors.
Yesterday Came Suddenly...Well, it's now official. There never really
was an academic recession in the first place, now was there? As is certainly
clear in hindsight, the financial markets already knew this given the rally
we have seen since the September lows. 4Q 2001 GDP reported this week came
in at a real growth rate of 1.7%. As you know, GDP in this country is reported
in real terms. In other words, adjusted for inflation. In nominal, or absolute
dollar terms, year over year GDP growth in 2001 put in one of the worst showings
since the early 1960's:

We find it instructive to look at nominal trends in that we live in a nominal
world. Corporate profits are not reported in "real" terms. Just how
many employees do you believe have an understanding of their "real" pay
when they cash their paychecks? Outside of the economic academician crowd,
we'd have to say the number is pretty close to zero. In nominal terms, which
is ultimately coincidental with nominal corporate profit experience, the weakness
in the current GDP report relative to historical experience suggests to us
that investors will need to be shown reacceleration in corporate profits experience
to validate current financial asset valuations.
At least for a while, headline GDP numbers ahead are set advance strongly.
As we have mentioned before, the inventory rebuild cycle is upon us. It can
be seen clearly in the economic statistics of late. Unquestionably, the fourth
quarter of 2001 was the beneficiary of some very special assistance in terms
of stimulating macro growth. Growth that materialized in significant consumer
spending on autos and housing. The 4Q period witnessed dramatically increased
government spending, unusually warm weather, tax rebate and refunds, low mortgage
rates than spawned significant housing refi and new purchase activity, 0% auto
financing schemes, as well as low retail gasoline prices. In many cases, strong
tailwinds that have now dissipated. The stimulative influences of 4Q were not
met at the time with increased production, but rather a continued draw down
in inventories. The fact is that during 4Q, inventory draw downs lopped 2.2%
from the real GDP number. Had inventories just stayed flat, GDP would have
come in at 3.9%. The slowdown in inventory deceleration and partial restocking
of inventories we are witnessing in 1Q 2002 will have a positive influence
on reported GDP ahead. Perhaps dramatically positive. Be prepared for a 4-5%+
1Q 2002 GDP number because it's coming.
As always, though, it will be the translation of GDP growth into corporate
profits that will matter the most for the future direction of the financial
markets. From the peak, after tax "nominal" corporate profits as
a percentage of nominal GDP have plunged:

There is absolutely no question in our minds that the key question for the
financial markets to sort out ahead will be the question regarding a corporate
profits recovery. As we have said, the financial markets have correctly discounted
an academic headline economic recovery, but have they given corporations too
much credit for a profits rebound? Certainly the question will be answered
ahead, but in the chart above, one can see that the directional experience
of corporate profits relative to GDP is similar to the plunge in nominal GDP
itself. Although the financial pundits are correct in that recent economic
numbers suggest a classic economic recovery, the translation into equity market
attraction is another matter altogether. One historical relationship currently
neglected in the mainstream is to relate the chart above to the chart below.
In our book, a vital relationship.

There certainly have been a number of periods in recent US financial history
where corporate profits as a percentage of GDP were well above what would be
considered a historical norm. Periods of very high profitability. The mid-1940's,
the early and mid-1960's, and mid and latter 1990's. In each case, these periods
of well above average corporate profitability were rewarded with above average
common equity valuations in the financial markets. Deservedly so. What is also
clear in the charts is that these periods of above average profitability were
separated by decades, not by years. So were the periods of above average valuations.
Despite "depressed" earnings of the moment, the market is implicitly
expecting a return to peak profitability performance ahead given current valuation
levels. So what happens if corporate profit recovery is slower than typical
post recessionary experience? What happens if absolute dollar corporate profits
do not accelerate quickly from here? Can current valuations levels hold? What
if the macro economic recovery itself slows post the burst in inventory rebuild?
ISM-Metrics...The so-far perceptual drivers of the classic recovery
thought process is the improvement in manufacturing numbers and continued stability
in housing as of late. Corporate capital spending is still quite subdued at
best. Likewise on the retail consumer front, revenue growth strength is seen
as the province of the discount sector. Humble question: Can an economic recovery
be built on the back of profit expansion at WalMart alone? Strength residing
in the low margined discount community simply begs the question of an improvement
in macro corporate profitability. As you know, manufacturing is certainly one
of the more volatile sectors of the economy historically. Both from a revenue
and employment standpoint. A more true characterization of boom and bust than
not. Ultimately our economy is dependent on consumption.
For the new age market historian crowd, the Institute of Supply Management
(ISM) index has decisively crossed 50 in recent months for the first time in
a year and one half. (Being a diffusion index, a reading above 50 connotes
expansion.) At least for now, a manufacturing recovery is in process:

The ISM (former National Association of Purchasing Managers Index) along with
other purchasing indices such as the Chicago PMI, etc., have been one of the
cornerstones of predictive substantiation for modern day historians. In each
post recessionary period of decades past, equity markets have performed very
well after the ISM has broken 50 to the upside. But, as to how the real economy
relates to the current financial markets, a further turning of the very dusty
pages of history reveals the following:
| Post Ressionary
Date ISM Exceeds 50 |
S&P Return
(based on month end data) |
S&P Price
To Operating Earnings |
| 3mos |
6mos |
9mos |
12mo |
24mos |
| Feb '71 |
3.0% |
2.4% |
(2.9)% |
10.1% |
15.5% |
16x's |
| Aug '75 |
5.0 |
14.9 |
15.3 |
18.4 |
11.4 |
12x's |
| Feb '83 |
9.7 |
11.0 |
12.4 |
6.1 |
22.0 |
12x's |
| Jun '91 |
4.5 |
12.4 |
8.8 |
9.7 |
21.4 |
14x's |
To no one's real surprise, the historical twist left out of the modern day
message is valuation. In no post recessionary period of the last three decades
has macro equity valuation been as high as we now experience. We do not debate
headline economic improvement in the least. It's the ability of the stock market
to move significantly higher from here that is in question. The "history" contained
in the table above suggests that to attain similar post recession S&P performance,
currently depressed earnings are going to have to double ahead. Players, place
your bets.
The Confidence Game...Recently coinciding with improving macro economic
stats has been a dramatic improvement in Consumer Confidence from the lows.
Important in that consumer follow through in terms of spending, or the continuance
of spending, will be a big piece of the economic puzzle ahead. In fact, the
March CC reading was the largest one month jump since the period near the end
of the last recession in March of 1991. With the report, the headlines were
filled with quotes such as the following from an economist at one of the nation's
larger banks. "It clearly suggests that consumers now believe the recession
is over, and that's an important milestone". The fact is that the history
of consumer confidence readings at economic bottoms is anything but precisely
predictive. History suggests quite the opposite:

The fits and starts of confidence during both the early 1970's, 1980's and
1990's is as clear as a bell. In our minds, post recessionary confidence ultimately
rests with employment prospects. Do consumers currently believe the recession
is over because they can feel it in their job prospects, paychecks and individual
business opportunities, or because they have heard it on TV and seen it in
print on the front page of financial tabloids?
Without sounding too melodramatic, we're not so sure consumer confidence readings
are reflecting short term movements in the equity markets. It's certainly far
from perfectly correlated, but the coincidental directional movement is a bit
too close to dismiss outright:

With about a one month lag (clearly due to the timing of the Conference Board
survey periods), the directional change in consumer confidence approximately
mirrors the directional change in the broad based equity indices. Almost like
clockwork. The real question for the market is whether a survey reflective
of stated optimism or pessimism will translate into needed actual corporate
and consumer spending. As you know, the CC reading was hitting its lows during
October and November of 2001 at the exact time auto sales were gearing up to
set a one month record.
Although the current consumer confidence reading shot the headline statistic
lights out, subcomponents of the survey were scurrying in the opposite direction.
Despite current expectations, future expectations and business expectations
rising, actual plans to buy real things fell across the board. Home buying
plans fell to a reading not seen since November of 2000. Plans to buy a car
fell to a nine month low. Plans to buy appliances also fell. Clearly purchasing
plans are inconsistent with generally optimistic overall expectations.
Quickly referring back to the long term chart of consumer confidence above,
we believe it fair to say that the volatile reality of sentiment at recessionary
lows relates to real employment possibilities. As an example, the recession
that ended in early 1991 did not see job growth pick up for at least a good
year and one half beyond the recession end. During the recession of 1990 and
on into 1991, jobless claims spiked and then stabilized at a high level for
a long while post the official recession finale:

At the moment, current experience is not too far from the initially jobless
recovery of the early 1990's:

This is not to say that job growth will not pick up from here, but rather
that history suggesting a perfect economic recovery based on recent jobless
claims experience may just be a bit premature.
The Wheel Is Spinning And You Can't Slow Down?...The last little tidbit
of history as it relates to economic recoveries that often misses sensible
discussion on CNBC's "squawk box" is how money and credit growth
influence nominal GDP expansion. We simply will not drag you through a retrospective
of money and credit expansion during the last decade plus. You already know
that existing household, corporate and financial sector leverage relative to
benchmarks such as GDP has no precedent in US financial history. That's fine.
But what may be most important in the current environment is that money supply
(ultimately reflective of credit expansion) growth is "buying" the
lowest rate of nominal GDP growth seen anywhere in the last 40 years at least:

Another way of looking at this is to view the spread between year over year
M3 growth and GDP growth:

Certainly credit expansion and money supply expansion have been a hallmark
of economic recoveries past. Simplistically, usual pent up demand for consumer
durables has lent itself to purchases financed with credit as consumers become
more comfortable with job growth in an expanding economic environment. But
the fact is that we have witnessed a historical anomaly during the recent economic
weakness. Credit expansion and money growth never slowed in any meaningful
way at all, but nominal GDP and corporate profits dropped like a rock. From
our vantage point, the fact that excessive liquidity during the last few years
bought us so little in terms of nominal GDP expansion is history screaming
at us. History suggests that this type of leverage assumption should have bought
us immediate improvement in nominal economic results. This little message of
history is missing from current economic recovery headlines.
I Believe In Yesterday?...Very simplistically, we are simply arguing
that we are in a period where a potential resurgence in corporate profitability
is unproven at best. We are in a period where current valuations are implicitly
anticipating significant improvement. Our academic economic recovery has started.
Longevity, depth and ultimate acceleration remain to be seen. New media talking
head converts to the "of the moment" importance of historical precedent
may be conceptually guilty of violating SEC rule FD - selective disclosure.
History can be a dangerous animal. We need to make sure we examine all sides
to the story. And always important, we need to listen to the voice of the market
as the final arbiter.
For now, the market has successfully discounted a near term macro economic
rebound. From our perspective, the market still mistrusts a significant return
in corporate profit acceleration as it looks ahead. After all, during this
quarter that has proven to us that the economic rebound is on for now, the
S&P was basically flat, the NASDAQ down and the new era institutional hiding
place, the Dow, was up modestly. The macro market discounted the current economic
rebound during 4Q. From a longer term standpoint, it seems that the market
is now suggesting that the undisputed economic savior of the late 1990's, the
Fed, is yesterday's news. Again, today's modern day history buffs have shoved
the following table in a dark drawer as its only historical counterpart is
a period you'd probably rather not know about:
Date of 2001
Interest Rate Cut |
DOW |
S&P |
NASDAQ |
| 3 Mos. |
6 Mos |
1 Yr. |
3 Mos. |
6 Mos. |
1 Yr. |
3 Mos. |
6 Mos. |
1 Yr. |
| 1/3 |
-13.3% |
-3.4% |
-7.1% |
-17.9% |
-8.4% |
-13.5% |
-36.1% |
-18.2% |
-21.9% |
| 1/31 |
-1.4 |
-3.1 |
-8.9 |
-8.5 |
-11.3 |
-17.3 |
-23.7 |
-26.9 |
-30.2 |
| 3/20 |
9.5 |
-13.8 |
8.0 |
7.0 |
-13.8 |
0.8 |
9.4 |
-20.8 |
-1.3 |
| 4/18 |
-0.4 |
-13.7 |
NA |
-2.5 |
-13.7 |
NA |
-3.0 |
-20.5 |
NA |
| 5/15 |
-4.8 |
-9.2 |
NA |
-5.7 |
-8.6 |
NA |
-8.0 |
-8.9 |
NA |
| 6/27 |
-16.8 |
-2.9 |
NA |
-15.9 |
-4.5 |
NA |
-29.6 |
-4.7 |
NA |
| 8/21 |
-3.3 |
-3.3 |
NA |
-1.7 |
-6.6 |
NA |
2.4 |
-6.3 |
NA |
| 9/17 |
10.9 |
18.5 |
NA |
9.2 |
12.2 |
NA |
25.8 |
2.0 |
NA |
| 10/2 |
12.5 |
NA |
NA |
9.8 |
NA |
NA |
32.6 |
NA |
NA |
| 11/6 |
0.6 |
NA |
NA |
-3.2 |
NA |
NA |
-1.2 |
NA |
NA |
| 12/11 |
7.3 |
NA |
NA |
2.8 |
NA |
NA |
-3.6 |
NA |
NA |
| INDEX |
Price Move From 1/3/01 to 3/28/02 |
| DOW |
(4.94)% |
| S&P |
(14.87) |
| NASDAQ |
(29.5) |
As you know, we are 15 months into one of the greatest periods of Fed accommodation
ever seen in history. Is the market simply asking the economy and real corporate
profitability to finally please stand up after all of these years? It appears
so.
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