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Overnight Fears
On Friday November 26, 2004 the Shanghai-based China Business News quoted
monetary policy committee member, Yu Yongding, as saying that China had cut
its stake in U.S. Treasuries to $180 Billion (USD). Immediately following this
announcement U.S. Treasuries declined sharply, the dollar traded lower, and
gold rallied. Volatility in these markets - not to mention a sharp decline
in U.S. equity futures - generated fears that there would be a mini crash when
Wall Street opened.
Morning Calm
A few hours after the Yongding story broke - and well before the major U.S.
financial markets opened for business - Yongding said that his comments had
been 'misinterpreted'. Reverting to statistics current as of September Yongding
pointed out that while China's U.S. Treasury stake as percentage of total
foreign exchange holdings had decreased, China's total investment in U.S.
Treasuries had 'actually increased'. Seemingly contradicting his 'misinterpreted'
insights into the amount of U.S. Treasury Securities China currently owns Yongding
added, "I have no knowledge of what action the State Administration of Foreign
Exchange has taken or is about to take on foreign exchange reserves". The
financial markets stabilized following Yongding's clarification.
Why Fear?
The U.S. needs to attract approximately $1.8 billion a day in to fund its
current account deficit. Accordingly, and to overly simplify things, if $1.7
billion or less in foreign capital flows into America tomorrow the value of
the U.S. dollar declines, and if $1.9 billion or more flows into America tomorrow
the dollar's value increases.
Keeping this in mind, the fear is not that China will reduce its Treasury
holdings per se. Rather, that any tremors in the currency markets resulting
from Chinese capital shifts will reverberate in the fixed exchange market.
Again to overly simplify things, $1.7 billion or less in foreign capital into
America per day decreases the value of U.S. dollar, but a continued string
of sub $1.8 billion daily tallies would, eventually, mean that U.S. interest
rates would be forced higher (until enough capital to make up the shortfall
is attracted).
In short, any hint that China is reducing its $174 billion stake in U.S. Treasury
Securities is alarming; not only because of the negative implications for the
U.S. dollar, but also because the U.S. could potentially lose its seemingly
omnipotent grip on interest rates. Yongding sent alarm bells off last Friday
morning, if only for a moment.
China Has Become A Less Important U.S. Debt Player
That China is losing its penchant for U.S. debt is not as startling as it
first sounds. Rather, the statistics - along with incessant speculation from
analysts and unnamed insiders - have been suggesting for some time that China
was shifting more of its reserves into gold and Euros while paying less attention
to U.S. dollar backed assets.
To put the numbers into perspective, China has increased its holdings of U.S.
Treasuries by $27.7 billion over the last 12-months. Notwithstanding the limitations
of these statistics, $27.7 billion
equals a $0.076 billion per day average over the last year (or 4.2% of the
U.S.'s current daily capital requirements). While certainly noteworthy, China
U.S. Treasury purchases pale in comparison to Japan. Indeed, Japan has purchased
more than $229 billion in Treasury Securities over the last 12-months; an amount
that equates to 34.9% of the U.S.'s current daily funding needs.
Not only is China playing second fiddle to Japan - China's Treasury Securities
stake is matched only by Japan's $720.4 billion position - but the importance
of China's capital flows have recently been tuned out by other nations. To
be sure, over the last 12-months the UK has purchased more than twice the amount
of Treasuries than China, and Caribbean Banking Centers have purchased 1.78-times
more Treasuries than China.
Although China is a still a crucially important U.S. Treasury owner,
the country has quickly become a significantly less active U.S. Treasury player.
Accordingly, and paying no attention to the Yuan revaluation situation, you
could argue that fears over China not buying U.S. Treasuries has become overstated.
Assuming, of course, that you believe China will never become a net seller
of U.S. Treasuries.
Yongding Statements And Other Anti-Dollar Factors
How can we be so sure that Yongding was misinterpreted by China Business News
given that the conspiratorially mind can easily conjure up visions of irate
U.S. officials making threatening phone calls to Chinese policy makers demanding
that Yongding recant? Because the original story said that China reduced its
U.S. Treasury position to $180 billion. China - at least according to U.S.
statistics - has never owned as much $180 billion in U.S. Treasuries.
* Ironically, if the original Yongding story had been true - which would only
be possible if China had dramatically increased its Treasury position and then
reduced it - it would have meant that China wad actually adding to its net
U.S. Treasury position at a faster pace than seen during the last 12-months.
In other words, the original misquotes from Yongding should have eased investor
concern that foreign central banks were readying to flee the dollar. Instead
the story caused a brief period of chaos in the financial markets.
The illogical reaction in the financial markets following the Yongding story
was the direct result of building tensions/fears in the currency markets. To
be sure, leading into last Friday countless Central bankers had already begun
to offer rhetoric laced with interventionist plans. Moreover, rumors were emerging
on what seemed like a daily basis that China, Japan, and others were losing
their appetite for U.S. debt. Lastly, there were currency policy/reserve shifts
from countries like Russia - as well as the economically unmentionable Cuba
- that suggested the U.S. dollar's reserve currency status was in jeopardy.
The Yongding story highlighted that China was worried about the U.S. dollar's
decline enough to switch more reserves to Euros...the Yongding story - ignoring
that actual statistics contained within - further exposed just how extremely
reliant the U.S. is on foreign capital.
Yongding No Hashimoto
As suggested last year in 'The
Hashimoto Factor' - well before current investor/media fascination with
the U.S. current account began to bubble - "The U.S. economy and the bubbles
inherent to its financial markets are only sustainable so long as foreign
capital (and those who control it) is placated." Nothing has changed
since last year. In fact, the U.S. has become even more reliant on foreign
capital and even more complacent about how the unsustainable U.S. current
account deficit can be remedied. For example, Fed Chairman Greenspan - who
at every turn since 2001 has served to facilitate and implore consumers and
businesses to leverage, borrow, and spend - actually had the audacity to
recently suggest that increased savings is the correct course of action (to
help remedy the CA). As was the case during the stock market bubble years
(today's market included), Greenspan helps create the imbalance and then
he says 'act rationally' to correct it.
"Policy success, of course, requires that domestic saving must rise relative
to domestic investment..." Greenspan
Although the recently appointed Yongding is not nearly as memorable an instigator
as Hashimoto, he is nonetheless probably the lowest ranking Chinese official
to ever have such a dramatic, albeit brief, impact on the global financial
markets. What Yongding's words did was bring investor fears to the surface.
The dormant fear now threatening to explode is that the end result of unsustainable
deficits - as Greenspan recently suggested - is that foreign investors eventually
demand more of a return on their investment.
The original and revised Yongding story does not represent any new threat
or policy shift out of China. Rather, Yongding's statements simply pointed
out that foreign central banks have, and will, opt to increase non-U.S. dollar
reserves. This is the cost associated with the unabated printing of dollars.
The cost America is likely to become increasingly more familiar with in the
future.
"Like gold, U.S. dollars have value only to the extent that they are strictly
limited in supply. But the U.S. government has a technology, called a printing
press (or, today, its electronic equivalent), that allows it to produce as
many U.S. dollars as it wishes at essentially no cost..." Bernanke.
Nov 2002
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