|
The Fact Of The Matter...For those who have kindly read our discussions for almost the past half decade,
you know that we try to deal in facts when approaching financial market and
economic analysis. We hope to leave the ranting and raving to someone else.
At this point in the bear market cycle, the landscape is changing anew. No
longer is the investor of the moment merely faced with the dilemma of assessing
whether knowable facts justify an investment opportunity, but now investors
must jump the hurdle of whether apparent facts themselves reflect reality.
For years, the bearish underground has been decrying the perceptual presentation
of many a corporate earnings report. Pro forma numbers, operating earnings,
earnings devoid of acquisitions costs, write-offs and one time events. That
now appears to be child's play as we move on to a whole new level of questioning
what is fact and what is fiction in the financial and economic environment
of the here and now.
For domestic investors already a bit nervous that equity markets have not
been traveling the path promised to them by Wall Street and the popular financial
media, the investment confidence factor ahead becomes a paramount question
mark. Especially given the fact that there have been no net outflows from equity
mutual funds at all over any annual or quarterly period since this bear market
began. (Although the numbers are not yet final, the current June quarter just
may become the first quarterly net outflow experience for this cycle.) For
the foreign investment community who has so graciously recycled trade related
dollars back into US dollar denominated financial assets, the stakes may be
even higher in terms of the maintenance of investment confidence given that
they must also deal with currency exchange rates that are such an important
overlay in terms of global capital placement. It sure appears to us that the
markets are headed for double trouble dead ahead. It's no longer just a question
of whether the facts justify the investment, but whether one can justify the
investment of any trust in the facts.
Messages in Flow Motion...For now, we can only hope to judiciously
approach factual examination of data we simply must accept as trustworthy.
One of those data compilations we routinely plow through is the Fed Flow of
Funds report. Let's put it this way, if the market ever comes to find that
Fed publications or data are a fabrication, the whole game is over, isn't it?
It just so happens that the recent Flow of Funds report also suggests a fair
amount of potential for factual financial market double trouble on the horizon,
completely independent of the accounting landmines that are blowing off in
semi-erratic fashion on the Street these days. The two double trouble data
point extremes witnessed in the current Flow of Funds report concern both households
and the corporate sector. Let's get right to the numbers.
During the first quarter of 2002, total credit market debt grew as follows:
| Credit Market
Debt Outstanding |
| SECTOR |
1Q 2002 Annualized
Growth |
| Federal |
3.3% |
| Total Household |
9.0 |
| Household Mortgage |
10.1 |
| Household Consumer Credit |
4.7 |
| Total Business |
1.8 |
| Total Non-Financial Corporate |
0.3 |
| Total Domestic Non-Financial/Non-Federal |
5.5 |
| Total Domestic Financial |
9.9 |
Just a few tidbits before we get to the household and corporate sectors. This
is the first time in many a moon that the Federal debt has been in a more than
benign expansion mode. Chances are this accelerates possibly significantly
ahead. From a purely longer term macro standpoint, periods where government
borrowing and spending has been in a significantly expansionary mode have been
periods where common equity P/E multiples have not. We're in the early innings
of government deficit spending for this cycle. Our second comment is that domestic
financial sector debt has been in a meaningful expansionary mode for more than
a decade now. The consistency of financial sector credit expansion has been
such that most investors are now numb to the recurring double digit characterization
of growth. Much as the mainstream became numb to equity valuation levels just
24 short months ago. The good news for now being that the numbness in terms
of equity valuation has worn off. The bad news being that shock has now begun
to set in.
We believe that two of the more important messages of the current Flow of
Funds report can be found in household and corporate data. Corporations appear
to be telegraphing their need to pull their own balance sheets into the financial
repair shop. As you know, some more begrudgingly than others. This may very
well be the beginning of an important trend and sends a much broader message
about corporate financial flexibility. Households, alternatively, have simply
thrown another quart of oil into the engine and gotten right back on the road
in terms of credit expansion. For households, the facts are truly indicative
of the intergenerational change in attitudes toward leverage that have come
to characterize the modern era. A credit expansion the size of which has not
been seen since the days of our grandparents. One key data point really regarding
systemic financial flexibility that we will throw into the mix is that of the
contextual meaning of the foreign sector to both households and corporations.
THE CORPORATE SECTOR
Certainly one of the highlights of the 1Q FOF report is corporate debt expansion,
or more correctly, lack thereof. The last time year over year growth in corporate
debt was this low was during the last recession. No real surprise:

What we believe makes this experience so meaningful at the current time is
that not only was the corporate sector largely responsible for the bulk of
the recent economic downturn via a collapse in capital spending, but we feel
that it is primarily the corporate sector that will govern the character of
economic growth ahead. Certainly the health of the corporate sector will be
reflected in labor market conditions. Although weakness may be moderating at
the moment, we are nowhere near significant or sustainable employment growth
as of yet. As first half corporate budgets are reviewed with an eye toward
2H planning, we just may be in for further labor market weakness as cost cutting
to meet current business circumstances intensifies.
More importantly, maybe the larger issue centers around the potential for
forward capital spending. In our book, the need for balance sheet repair and
the potential for increasing absolute dollar capital spending are two dichotomous
objectives over any shorter term time frame. The chart above is a picture of
financial repair in action. Will adequate balance sheet mending be completed
overnight? The following chart suggests that is simply not in the cards from
a cyclical standpoint:

Peaks and troughs in corporate debt accumulation and reconciliation relative
to the benchmark of GDP have been multi-year processes by nature. Cyclical
in duration. The length of stay in the repair shop is measured in years, not
quarters. It just so happens that the historical peak in the relationship between
absolute dollar corporate debt and GDP was seen in the fourth quarter of last
year. We're just getting started in terms of corporations tending to their
balance sheets. The corporate sector faces many of the same dynamics as households
in terms of leverage reconciliation. We suggest that just like their household
brethren, corporations face a world ahead where the ability to refinance debt
at the largesse of lower interest rates is largely over. This has been a two
decade refinancing boom that has most likely breathed its last as far as the
contribution of interest rates to that process. And quite unfortunately, current
corporate interest payments as a percentage of pretax corporate profits are
at levels seen when historically interest rates were much higher in a prior
cycle. Periods where the gift of refinancing remained in front of corporate
America, not behind it:

Implicitly, the striking message of the slowdown in debt acceleration on the
part of the corporate sector is that capital spending ahead is a huge question
mark while balance sheets are under repair. A huge question mark for the macro
economy. Certainly there will be fits and starts in capital spending as we
move forward. By definition, it is not going to zero, but we'd guess that the
potential to enter a period such as we lived through in the latter half of
the 1990's is half a decade to a decade away at least. In this week's second
revision to 1Q GDP, it was trumpeted far and wide that capital spending was
one of the reasons for the upward nature of the numbers reworking. The fact
is that capital spending in 1Q was revised from a decline of over 2% to an
increase of all of 0.1%. As you know, that's a hair above a strike out in terms
of growth rate:

So just how does the foreign community fit into the domestic corporate picture?
We thought you'd never ask. In our wonderful world of global financial connectivity,
it turns out that the foreign investment community was one major support to
the corporate capital spending boom of the late 1990's. See what we mean?

On an absolute dollar basis, over the last seven plus years foreign investors
have almost quadrupled their commitment to US domestic corporate debt. From
close to 14% in 1995, the foreign community now owns approximately 24% of total
US corporate debt. Do you think they have a vested interest in the integrity
and quality of US corporate accounting? Just what do you think would happen
if foreigners decided to sell just 25% of their holdings of US corporate debt?
Do you really need us or want us to answer these questions?
Through the recycling of trade driven dollars into US financial assets such
as you see above, the foreign community played a major role in financing the
US "new era" of the latter 1990's, to say nothing of corporate debt
driven stock buybacks. Given the recent accounting disclosures in the marketplace
you can bet they are rethinking that investment decision. In addition to investment
trust being chipped away, the recent real world movement in the dollar relative
to foreign currencies is entering the global financial capital allocation decision
in a significant way. Even if US corporations were to decide to lever anew
in supporting renewed capital spending, the foreign community simply may not
be the capital support it has been over the last half decade plus. In fact
it may be many moons before we see this type of capital transfer again. Unfortunately,
given the way events are unfolding in our financial markets, it may not be
that long before we do witness a certain type of capital reallocation on the
part of foreigners - one characterized by the term "180 degrees".
THE HOUSEHOLD SECTOR
As we seem to be witnessing at least the beginnings of change in the corporate
leverage cycle, we can't help but wonder just how long it will be before
this type of corporate behavior catches up with the consumer economy. The
consumer simply cannot continue to outspend and out borrow GDP growth rates
indefinitely. A GDP which owes a good chunk of its prior decade growth not
only to consumer spending, but importantly to corporate capital spending.
As you may remember, just a few short years ago virtually no one in the mainstream
consensus anticipated an implosion in corporate capital spending that was
literally right around the corner, despite the fact that anecdotal evidence
was in abundance. Does that same experience now hold true for consumer spending?
We are beginning to see the anecdotes right now. We ask you, is the following
a picture of a healthy economic recovery?

Certainly during the first quarter, household mortgage debt was the star performer
in terms of household leverage acceleration. In part, a warmer than normal
1Q was the beneficiary of well above seasonally normal new and existing home
purchase activity as well as picking up meaningful remnants of 4Q 2001 refi
madness. As you can see in the following chart, recessions have usually been
periods of declining annual mortgage debt rate of change. Not so this go around:

As a very generic and possibly haphazard comment, ease of credit availability
in the mortgage markets today probably has no parallel in any recessionary
period of recent memory. In recessions past, credit restrictions in terms of
mortgage lending have tightened. But, as you know, those were times when many
a bank actually held mortgage paper as an asset. They were simply protecting
their own capital. That was yesterday's ball game. The GSE's (Government Sponsored
Enterprises - Fannie, Freddie and Home Loan) sponsoring the bulk of current
system wide mortgage funding have not tightened the credit restriction screws
even one notch. In fact quite the opposite. Moreover, the "setback" in
the equity markets has tilted more and more investment and discretionary dollars
in the direction of real estate as an asset class, helping to sustain and advance
prices. The recent confluence of mortgage credit ease and real estate price
acceleration has been a source of consumption funds to the US household as
refi activity ballooned over the last twelve months.
Had it not been for the ease of mortgage credit that both allowed significant
monetization of real estate equity and supported absolute dollar real estate
price acceleration, household behavior in terms of total consumption may have
been much different over the last few years. We believe the real estate markets
just may hold the key to consumer confidence ahead, just as they have over
the last 24 months. Each quarter we monitor household net worth in trying to
gauge the fragility or strength of consumer confidence at any point in time.
Due to the destruction of financial asset values, household net worth plummeted
at one of the greatest rates in 25 years during 2001:

Yet during this period of total net worth decline, the real estate subcomponent
of household net worth kept climbing in value. We can only imagine what would
have happened had real estate values declined even slightly, or for that matter
just remained stable. As of the close of 1Q 2002, year over year household
net worth was as follows:
| US Household Year/Year Net Worth Change ($ in billions) |
| |
1Q 2002 |
1Q 2001 |
Change |
| Financial Assets |
$31,812.2 |
$31,472.0 |
1.1% |
| Tangible Assets |
16,504.2 |
15,458.1 |
6.8 |
| Liabilities |
(8,152.6) |
(7,499.3) |
8.7 |
| TOTAL |
$40,163.8 |
$39.430.8 |
1.9 |
As you can see in the table, the rate of change in total household asset appreciation
was outstripped by the year over year rate of change in household liability
expansion. Tangible assets, by far the bulk of which is real estate, continued
its upward march. Certainly tangible assets helped sustain and drive household
net worth expansion as of March 2002. As you know, since first quarter end,
equity markets in the US have behaved very poorly. It's virtually a sure bet
that once again in 2Q, the value of household financial asset holdings has
contracted. Perhaps significantly. It is our humble observation that consumer
behavior over the last half decade at least has been very dependent on having
at least one meaningful household asset inflate. Common equity did the trick
in the late 1990's, but it now seems that household confidence rests largely
on real estate inflation. Especially as households are now learning that the
popular financial media, Wall Street analysts, corporations and the corporate
auditing community cannot be completely trusted to be looking out for the best
interests of common stock shareholders.
Much as appears to be the case with corporations at the moment, will the US
household sector enter into a period of balance sheet reconciliation at some
point? Either willingly or as a result of credit market imposition? Endangering
the fragility of the now largely consumer dependent economic recovery? For
the moment, the jury is out. All we can do is look to points of continuing
extreme and surmise that the risks are high. The risks are very high. Again,
we humbly ask for how much longer can these two charts continue to trend in
the directions they have over the past decade plus?


If the above charts do not characterize a complete change in intergenerational
attitudes toward the acceptance of household leverage, we simply do not know
what does. And the big ticket in this picture is mortgage debt. As the bear
market in financial assets continues to unfold, households and the economy
as a whole are becoming ever more dependent on real estate price inflation.
Or more correctly, ever more dependent on mortgage credit creation. It's just
a good thing that most of the folks who lived through the post financial bubble
severe real estate price busts of the 1930's and the late 1800's are dead.
And, of course, everyone knows that what happened in the post bubble environment
in Japan during the 1990's simply can't happen here, even in part. Right? We're
not worried about an immediate real estate price bust. We're just questioning
whether mortgage credit creation can continue at the pace of the last 2-5 years.
Because if it can't, for the sake of US household confidence, the bear market
in equities better end soon.
Although few may realize this, just as in the case of the corporate sector,
the foreign community has been a key support to the US mortgage market. In
essence, a key support to US household confidence. How so? Just have a look:

Over the past seven and one half years, foreign ownership of US government
agency debt has quintupled. The foreign community now commands ownership of
over 14% of the total government agency market. To suggest that foreigners
have supported mortgage credit expansion in the US is simply an understatement.
Once again, should the foreign community even begin to question the soundness
of the US mortgage markets, the impact on mortgage credit creation in the US
vis-à-vis a potentially higher interest rate structure would change
the game in a big way. If nothing else, it would be lights out for the bulk
of refi activity.
If the domestic auditing community in this country had a tiny bit of difficulty
catching those off balance sheet entities at Enron, minor overstatements of
revenue at Xerox, capitalization of expenses at Worldcom that were just a touch
more than a rounding error, and a potential host of other "oversights" yet
to be revealed, do you really think they've got their hands around the interest
rate and derivatives exposure of these two entities? Notional derivatives exposure
at Freddie that has just about doubled over the past year?


Our very meek answer to the above question is, "You better sure as hell
hope so".
Seeing Double...We see double trouble ahead. The Flow of Funds report
is telegraphing the message that corporations cannot be counted on in aggregate
to increase capital spending significantly while simultaneously reconciling
balance sheet excess built up in the prior cycle. It's a good bet that balance
sheet excess is the very reason the Worldcom's, Xerox's, etc. of the world
have had to resort to creative accounting in the first place. Coincidentally,
the US household sector is clearly dependent on mortgage credit and real estate
price expansion to shore up household net worth near term. Given that mortgage
rates sit near multi-decade lows, possibilities for further refi activity depend
largely on price inflation ahead. The corporate sector and the household sector
represent double trouble for sustainable strength of a domestic economic recovery.
Overlay the extreme importance of foreign capital infusions to the US financial
system and the characterization of double trouble simply takes on a whole new
meaning, now doesn't it?
Let The Fear Take The Wheel And Steer...To suggest that the US equity
markets have had a rough go of it during the first half of this year is an
almost laughable comment. We believe the NASDAQ just experienced its worst
six month performance in history. It appears that at least for now, the Greenspan "put" has
turned to pot. Although monetary accommodation is surely working its way into
the real economy, the equity market has barely taken notice. We hear the calls
all around for a summer rally. For a technical bottom coincident with the Sept.
2001 lows. There is certainly a chance of that happening, but any definitive
statements to that effect on our part would be sheer guesswork. We instead
prefer to look for points of confirmation, of which there are or will be many.
Given the accounting shenanigans chipping away at the rock of domestic and
foreign investor confidence recently, one point of serious interest for us
are equity mutual fund inflows. So far on a YTD basis through last week, US
domestic equity mutual funds recorded their lowest absolute YTD dollar inflows
in at least five years.
It just so happens that since the equity bear market began, there have been
very few periods where we have experienced four straight weeks of equity fund
outflows. We've now just experienced five. In the past, each and every occurrence
has marked an intermediate term bottom in aggregate equity indices. In the
following chart we use the S&P 500 as an equity benchmark:

It may be that the bit of fear shown in recent equity fund redemptions represents
another of these bottoms of some form. Alternatively, if the equity markets
cannot recover ahead and equity fund outflows continue, we just may be looking
at the beginnings of something very different. Something that has not been
seen in this country for more than a decade. Keep an open mind, an open chart
book and an eye on domestic equity fund flows directly ahead. With all due
respect to the Conference Board, in our mind you are looking at one of the
most important modern day measures of consumer confidence directly above.
|