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My use of the word "hack" in the title, of course, is a reference to Senate
Minority Leader Harry Reid's quote in early March calling the Fed Chairman, "One
of the biggest hacks we have here in Washington." Now, even I have written
some rather tart comments about Mr. Greenspan in the past, but when words such
as these pop out of the mouth of someone like Senator Harry Reid, I expect
to find the exact opposite to be true. Besides standing as a record-setting
example of the pot calling the kettle black, Reid's remarks just struck me
as a bit over-the-top and got my long-acquired contrarian radar buzzing, forcing
me wonder if anti-Greenspan rhetoric continues to run just a little too hot.
Now, before I'm forever entombed in the "Dollar Bull Hall of Fame," I'd like
to remind readers that only in early December of 2004 did I become an advocate
of U.S. Dollar strength in '05 after having been quite the opposite over the
last few years. It might also surprise some to know that on a couple of recent
occasions, I've half-written an essay entitled "Francisco D'Greenspan," an
article advancing the notion that our Fed Chairman never really let go of his
Ayn Rand-ian roots, that lo these many years he has secretly fancied himself
the living incarnation of Francisco D'Anconia from Rand's "Atlas Shrugged," one
of three characters literally out to stop the world, D'Anconia by giving it
exactly what it wants (in Greenspan's real-life version, ever-increasing amounts
of unsound money). A tiny part of me still suspects this to be the case.
Rather than assuming that Greenspan is some evil villain, however, what if
the explanation for his actions is more benign? Isn't is possible that he's
someone who understands and might actually prefer a system based perhaps on
Austrian Economic principles, but has decided to use his knowledge of economics
to do the best he can in a world of floating, fiat currencies?
Such words are akin, no doubt, to chewing on tinfoil for the Dollar perma-bears,
but just indulge me for a moment or two. If such a benevolent explanation is
even remotely close to the truth, which is not just possible, but likely, then
it's easier to accept my suspicion that the Fed Chairman is simply engaged
in what I would call:
Bubble Juggling
Let's say you were the Fed Chairman and were confronted with a bursting technology
bubble and a potential economic meltdown in the aftermath of 9/11; isn't it
possible you'd say to yourself, "I know it may create other imbalances, but
I'm going to make credit as easy as it has ever been in order to fend off a
disaster, then deal with the consequences later." Look, I'm not penning my
own version of "Maestro" here, but playing devil's advocate. Although such
an approach is indeed fraught with peril, isn't it possible these were the
thoughts going through Greenspan's mind?
It's so easy to get caught up in the fanaticism and conspiracy theories surrounding
gold/the Dollar that sometimes it becomes difficult to view the Fed's actions
in an innocent light. If the hypothesis above is close, then it makes sense
to suspect that Greenspan would consider us to be in the "dealing with the
consequences" phase right now.
So, perhaps a falling dollar never was the goal, but merely the consequence
of recent monetary policy; the goal might have been to place the burden of
economic activity squarely on the shoulders of consumers while giving corporate
America an opportunity to clean up its balance sheets, even if it meant encouraging
unhealthy, leveraged economic decisions in the consumer sector for awhile.
If looked at from an unbiased perspective, this is essentially what we've
witnessed the last 3 years or so; while consumers have responded to low interest
rates by aggressively making use of them, America's corporations are in a healthier
economic position now, by and large. Greenspan may think he's now simply engaged
in the process of taking the punchbowl away from the consumer, even if it risks
some asset price deterioration, hoping that corporate America is ready to pick
up the baton.
Sometimes Central bankers Speak Clearly
While it used to be virtually impossible to make sense of "Fedspeak," for
sometime now the Federal Reserve, often through its minions, has been very
clearly signaling its policy intentions, perhaps starting with the now-infamous
helicopter reference of Ben Bernanke in November, 2002. While some of the extremists
set up their own neighborhood sky-watch programs in search of the black helicopters
they've long feared, Bernanke was clearly just the water boy carrying a clear
message to the markets from the Fed.
Likewise, recent comments from the Federal Reserve show their intentions to
still be clear, albeit in a new direction; the word "measured" plainly says
that the Fed realizes it needs to take away the record-setting monetary accommodation
it recently put in place, but also needs to do so very carefully for fear of
toppling a debt-dependent consumer/economy.
Bond market action confirms this.
The Fed's Biggest Challenge: Long Term Rates
Unfortunately for the Fed, while it has been nudging short-term rates upward,
the long end has not been cooperating. Now, some would wonder why I'd use the
word "cooperating," suggesting the Federal Reserve would actually want higher
long-term interest rates, but I do think that's precisely what it wants, at
least modestly higher long rates.
See, while the Fed might like to take the Fed Funds overnight rate up to the
4% range, it's the long-end that might not allow this to occur.
The bond market isn't stupid; in fact this is the deepest, most sophisticated
pool of capital in the world and it's one that's also quite fearful of inflation.
Here, then, the bond market has for some time been signaling exactly what the
stock market finally started to suggest in recent weeks and what commentators
are now acknowledging: the risk now is one of economic slowdown, perhaps a
nasty one.
One could speculate as to why the Fed is raising rates at this time, but certainly
one of the many reasons has to be concern for the dollar. While interest rates
alone don't determine a currency's value, higher short-term rates here will
certainly help prop up the Greenback. Perhaps the greatest risk to the continued
wisdom of my own 2005 dollar-strength scenario is an economy that can't withstand
much more in the way interest rate increases, one that ends up facing recession
as a result of these rate increases sooner than expected. Such an outcome would
spook the market into thinking that a new round of rates cuts might soon be
coming, once again putting the Dollar at risk.
If long-term rates keep coming in, the Fed may face precisely this scenario,
maybe before the year is out. Sticking with the theme of central bankers speaking
clearly, I believe this helps explain the "why now?" of Greenspan's recent
focus on the risks associated with Fannie Mae and comments dealing with excess
speculation in the housing market. The bond market isn't concerned that runaway
economic strength will cause an overheating, which could help move long-term
rates up, so Greenspan actually might not mind if other concerns, perhaps even
those about systemic risk actually did a little of that work for him.
Regardless, Greenspan needs room to take short-term rates higher, largely
in defense of the Dollar, and he may not care in the short run how he gets
that room to maneuver. The insightful Caroline Baum of Bloomberg seemed to
walk this path a few weeks ago when she reminded us in a column that the Fed
has little power over the long end of the bond market except to try and talk
it in one direction or the other.
Given the above, expect the Federal Reserve to hike by only 25 basis points
and, more importantly, to keep the word "measured" coming out of this week's
meeting; while Fed tightening cycles typically result in economic pain, Mr.
Greenspan can't further scare the market into thinking he's going to risk hastening
such an outcome by stepping up the pace of rate hikes. He'd rather be seen
as being behind the inflation curve (which is, of course, laughable since that's
the Fed's permanent state), than being seen by mainstreamers as an inflation
hawk.
If lower long-term interest rates, then, are actually problematic at this
point in time, it raises the question of:
What Sort of Disaster Might We face?
By this point in the article, the Dollar perma-bears are already apoplectic;
they truly can't relate to a word I've written above because they see only
one scenario unfolding: foreign central banks decide they've had it with funding
our deficits and not only quit buying Treasuries, but walk from the ones they
already own, leading to sky-high interest rates here and a total collapse of
the U.S. Dollar.
Amazingly, some actually argue with a straight face that such an outcome could
occur while only impacting the United States, that foreign economies would
essentially go unscathed under this scenario, which is preposterous.
Not only has our own Federal Reserve been speaking clearly of late, but foreign
central banks have, as well. As they danced their "we might diversify out of
the Dollar/no, we're just kidding" dance recently, essentially these foreign
institutions were saying that they didn't like the position they were in with
regard to buying our debt, but they realize they can't extricate themselves
quickly without meaningful pain - they clearly can't cut off their biggest
customer cold turkey.
So, we come back to the question of, what form, then, would any worst-case
scenario take?
Before you go any further, it's important that you read my friend, Gary Carmell's
latest commentary... go to Google and search the phrase "What Conundrum" in
parentheses and it should be the first link you see. This brief article shows
2 charts that are crucial to really relating to what I'm about to write. [Ed's
note: Gary's essay is
at SafeHaven]
Essentially, Gary's argument is that the past 40-plus years of interest rates
can be broken down into two distinct periods: the "inflationary era" that ended
in the early 1980's, and the "dis-inflationary era" of interest rate cycles
which continue to produce lower and lower interest rate peaks, which has been
in place since then. The charts contained within the article to make his case
are truly eye-popping, so please make a point of reading it.
My take-away from the charts in that article was this: what the Dollar perma-bears
are advocating, that we'll see sky-high interest rates any day now (which many
of them have been advocating for years), is a prediction that stands in opposition
to the 20-plus year trend that is still in place. If an interest rate surge
(inflationary blow-off) was the outcome we saw at the end of the "inflationary
era," why wouldn't we expect to see a blow-off in the direction of the trend
as finish to this latest era, meaning a deflationary meltdown accompanied by
shockingly low interest rates in a flight to safety?
To believe this is impossible, one would have to believe the bond market is
stupid, because this is clearly what it is saying will be our next concern:
deflation. To learn more on this possible outcome, awhile back Bob Prechter
wrote an excellent short essay called "Jaguar Inflation" that is worth tracking
down and reading. Perhaps the U.S. consumer has gotten his fill, will re-trench
based on higher rates and a global economy built to serve that consumer will
spiral into a nasty recession or worse as the American consumer vanishes.
This is not only possible but, according to recent market action, likely and
it holds major investment implications for those who have loaded up on commodities,
precious metals and foreign stocks and currencies. At the very least, it's
reasonable to place decent odds on an outcome somewhere between Steve Saville's
deflation scare and Prechter's outright deflationary collapse.
Conclusion
Have Greenspan's policies contributed to an environment in which we spend
to much and save too little? Certainly. Is it right to be worried about the
infamous twin deficits (the blame for which, by the way, is more appropriately
laid at the feet of our elected leaders than the Fed Chairman, but that's a
topic for another article)? Sure, but by far the more ominous of the two is
our enormous budget deficit... a trade imbalance could be sustainable for a
prolonged period, but when accompanied by the budget deficit, it is indeed
worrisome because it suggests we'd have a hard time covering these deficits
ourselves were it necessary. In reality, though, it's highly unlikely we'll
be forced to cover our budget deficit by ourselves anytime soon, nor is our
economy the only one that faces severe challenges. This doesn't excuse our
recent fiscal policies, but in a world of floating currencies that are priced
against one another, it's reality.
One can't look for economic malaise around every corner in the U.S., then
ignore the economic warning signs coming today from the biggest European economies,
can't decry our social security challenge and then ignore the horrific demographic
challenge Japan faces and one can't scream about our consumer-based economy
and simultaneously love the British Pound, for example, when consumer spending
makes up 70% of GDP in the U.K, as well.
I've been writing a lot lately about the possibility of a U.S. Dollar rally
because the certainty of its fall has become a bit too ubiquitous for my taste.
Admittedly, there are some top-flight economic minds who today suggest the
Dollar has farther to fall, but many of those who have gained notoriety lately
are the fringe-types who have been screaming the same story through the bullhorns
from their log cabins from time immemorial; in my opinion, its likely that
their recent notoriety and "foresight" are likely to be proven to similar to
that of Henry Blodget - finally, they've been at the right place at the right
time.
Maybe, as the extremists suggest, the end of American Empire and history's
greatest economic calamity are imminent; as an advisor, however, I believe
it's my job to remind people not to bet the farm on events that can only happen
once.
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