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"....to combat the depression by a forced credit expansion is to attempt
to cure the evil by the very means which brought it about ; because we are
suffering from a misdirection of production, we want to create further misdirection
- a procedure which can only a lead to a much more severe crisis as soon
as the credit expansion comes to an end."
- Friedrich Hayek, "Monetary Theory and the Trade Cycle", London 1933
Because of a strong US dollar, a recovery in the stock market, further strength
in the US housing industry, disappointing news from Europe, and rallying US
government bonds to new 2005 highs, the super-bulls on the American wonder-economy
are again out in force telling the world with great conviction "we told you
so"! In fact, the more the audience that watches CNBC in the US declines (down
60% from the peak in 2000) the louder the voice of the bullish camp seems to
become.
But, let us look at some facts. From figure 1, courtesy of Ed Yardeni, we
can see that following a slump post year 2000, global semiconductor sales have
rebounded strongly and are at about the level they were in year 2000.
Figure 1: Global Semiconductor Sales and Earnings, 1991 - 2005

Source: Ed Yardeni, www.yardeni.com
So far so good! But let us now look at the details of these worldwide sales.
For one, while sales have recovered - well understood after 5 years - to the
previous highs, the earnings of semiconductor companies have not and hover
around the level they were at in 1997 - 8 years earlier. In addition, while
global semiconductor sales have recovered, we can see from figure 2, that in
the US they have hardly moved up following the 2000/2001 slump.
Figure 2: US and European Semiconductor Sales, 1991 - 2005

Source: Ed Yardeni, www.yardeni.com
Maybe the US super-bulls should take a closer look at figure 2, and if their
senses have not been too blurred by their most recent euphoria, also notice
that US semiconductor sales are no higher than they were in 1994!
But nor to worry, we know by now that the US economy is a service economy
and does not need to produce anything to prosper except printing machines to
keep increasing the supply of money (most printing machines are probably imported
too). Needless to say that the quality of US services is "the envy of the world",
as Mr. Bush, Rumsfeld, Cheney & Co. might articulate and - according to
the Census Bureau's Economic Census - with the fastest growth being registered
not in "mundane" businesses such as biotechnology, nanotechnology and high
tech industries but in high value added and intellectually highly demanding
sectors such as lawn care, childcare providers, janitorial services and nail
and hair salons!
If global semiconductor sales are up worldwide but down in the US and flat
in Europe, where did they rise? Obviously in Asia ex Japan! From figure 3,
we can see that Asian Pacific semiconductor sales have doubled to annually
almost $ 100 billion since 2001.
Figure 3: Asian Pacific and Japanese Semiconductor Sales, 1991 - 2005

Source: Ed Yardeni, www.yardeni.com
And while we are at it, for the proponents of the "Great American Empire and
Economic Supremacy of the US" we should point out that Asian semiconductor
sales, well understood ex Japan, are not only twice as large as US sales but
also larger than US and European semiconductor sales combined.
Now, I am not suggesting that semiconductor sales are a perfect economic indicator
- although I would rather rely on them than on some forecasts by confused economists.
Still, the composition of global semiconductor sales tells us something about
the state of the current global economic recovery.
Following the economic contraction and stock market slump in year 2000, the
Fed pursued an extremely accommodative monetary policy. Money supply rose rapidly
and credit market debt exploded (see figure 4). As can be seen from figure
4, in late 2001 and in early 2002, money supply was growing at annual rates
of more than 20%.
Easy money policies and artificially low interest rates led to a credit bubble
with the result that since year 2000, total credit market debt has been growing
at more than 4-time GDP growth and financed a gigantic boom in home prices,
which in turn allowed households to extract equity from their homes through
refinancing activity and spend it on excessive and conspicuous consumption.
Figure 4: MZM annual growth, 1984 - 2005

Source: Ed Yardeni, www.yardeni.com
I am well aware that some observers dispute the fact that there is a housing
bubble in the US. These observers contend that for the nation as, a whole,
home prices did not rise all that much and that the excesses only exist in
selected markets. This is to some extend true but then these observers should
also recognize the fact that one of the principal common features of every
investment mania or bubble is that the object of speculation is very concentrated.
Take the 2000 stock market bubble. The excesses occurred in telecom, media
and high tech whereas the rest of the market and in particular the old economy
stocks such as home builders, basic and resource shares were inexpensive (as
was the entire Asian region with exception of the TMT sector). So, because
in a bubble some or - as I would argue - most sectors of the market do remain
depressed, this does by no means alter the fact that in some narrow sector
a gigantic bubble can exist.
Looking at figure 5, courtesy of Goldman Sachs, the uneven distribution of
housing price gains in the US is visible. The biggest price gains occurred
on the east and west coast and in particular in California, Florida and New
England.
Figure 5: Home price Changes since Year 2000

Source: Goldman Sachs and Freddie Mac
The US housing bulls also take comfort from the fact that since 1952, the
value of household real estate holdings has never declined. Again, this may
be true, although we must take into account that every year the stock of homes
is increasing. Consequently it is only natural that the value of household
real estate has a rising tendency (see figure 6).
Figure 6: Market Value of Household Real Estate

Source: www.thechartstore.com
Still, whereas the value of household real estate has never declined in nominal
terms, it has declined in teal terms and for selected markets on numerous occasions.
Figure 7, shows that following strong real price gains in 1971/72, 1979/80,
1986/87, inflation adjusted prices declined in 1971, 1974, 1981/82 and in 1990/91.
Therefore, following the extended period of real price gains we had since 1997,
it is more than likely that prices will decline at least in real terms at some
point in the future.
Figure 7: Inflation-adjusted Annualized Home Price Gains

Source: Bridgewater Associates
In addition, whereas it is possible that for the entire nation, household
real estate assets never declined in nominal terms, in selected markets we
had numerous vicious real estate slumps. In the early 1980s Texas properties
totally collapsed. In the early 1990s New England properties went through an
unpleasant slump. And even the Golden State of California, with all the pluses
that the bulls are now advancing in its favor, had three years of declining
prices between 1991 and 1994. In fact it took until 1998 for prices to recover
to the 1990s highs (see figure 8). In Asia, we know all too well that property
prices can decline violently something that seems to escape the perma housing
bulls in the US!
Figure 8: Annual Home Price Changes, California vs US, 1976 -2004

Source: Goldman Sachs and Freddie Mac
The point, however, is this. Ultra easy monetary policies after 2001 fueled
in the US an asset boom, which was particularly noticeable in the housing industry.
This housing boom created wealth, illusionary wealth I might add, which allowed
American households to boost their consumption at a faster rate than their
personal income gains. What ultra easy monetary policies failed to boost was
capital spending in terms of net capital formation (capital spending that exceed
depreciation) and "real" industrial production, as I have demonstrated in the
case of the semiconductor industry (see figure 2). To what extend the US economy
can continue to expand based on inflating home prices remain to be seen, but
as Hayek would say, faced with a misdirection of production in the late 1990s,
the Fed created further misdirection in the housing industry between 2000 and
today, which will eventually lead to a much more severe crisis as soon as the
credit expansion comes to an end.
Turning our attention to figure to figure 4, once again, we can actually see
that following the burst in money supply growth in 2001 and 2002, MZM growth
has recently almost come to a standstill. In fact, MZM is expanding at the
slowest rate in ten years, which would suggest to me that money has already
become much tighter. Certainly, dollar strength and some weakness in commodities
as well as slower growth in foreign official dollar reserves do all support
the notion that money has become tighter. Therefore, unless the Fed starts
to print money once again, the housing market may shortly begin to weaken somewhat,
as has already happened in Australia, and in the United Kingdom, where following
some unease in the property market retail sales disappointed.
But would printing money by the Fed help this time around? Hardly! Long term
US government bonds have rallied while the Fed pushed short term interest rates
up, because the bond market loves nothing more than tight money which would
deflate the economy and asset prices. Conversely, another round of ultra easy
monetary policies would lead to renewed dollar weakness, some inflationary
pressures for consumer prices and weaker bond prices. So, it is likely that
nationwide home price increases will shortly moderate and that in some areas
(California and Florida - see figure 4) prices will even come down regardless
of the Fed's monetary policies.
The stock market rally I expected for April unfolded in May but now the oversold
position we had in late April has been replaced by an overbought condition.
In addition, the market faces significant resistance between 1200 and 1230.
Therefore, the upside potential seems rather limited at this point.
Bonds are now also grossly overbought and are likely to weaken in the period
directly ahead. In the meantime, the Euro has broken down, whereby bearish
sentiment on the Euro is now almost as high as bearish sentiment was for the
US dollar in late 2004. Therefore, I would expect at least some stabilization
of the Euro around current levels. Moreover, if investors begin to discount
that the Fed may refrain from further increasing rates, a strong rebound in
the Euro and renewed dollar weakness should not be ruled out.
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