|
The Weight Of Trade...Although the ever struggling consensus missed the actual number by about 10%
to the downside, it certainly wasn't that big a surprise that the November
trade deficit hit yet another record number. As you know, by now the financial
markets barely give this statistic a second glance. Ho-hum. It's simply another
in place imbalance that continues to widen over time. In looking ahead, based
on recent Port of Long Beach activity, we fully expect the upcoming December
trade report to hit yet another record reading in spite of the fact that November
was a pretty substantial gap to the downside. On a year over year rate of change
basis, the number of empty containers departing the Port of Long Beach for
strange and exotic global ports of call was the largest seen in the 15 year
history of Long Beach container stat records.

And it's also really no surprise that the US trade gap is being driven by
greater and greater import activity from Asian goods manufacturing sources.
Almost one quarter of the entire November increase in the aggregate trade figure
was the result of a sharp increase in the singular deficit with China. Quite
telling is the fact that the trade gaps with Western Europe, Canada and Mexico
narrowed for the month. It's no secret that China is increasingly becoming
the destination location of choice for the global manufacturing community in
terms of new and replacement capacity build out. Although certainly not in
whole, the answer to America's lack of macro capital spending strength can
in part be explained by looking at what is happening in China. Simply stated,
global fixed investment is moving to the East. It's all part of the evolution
of the global economy. Nothing more and nothing less.
What is a bit of a twist in terms of trade for this cycle can be seen in the
following chart:

We began the above chart with data from the early 1970's as this is really
the initial period in recent US economic history where the trade deficit was
noticeable statistically (especially relative to domestic GDP). As you can
see in the chart, during some point in every recession over the period shown
US import and export activity was in balance. Until this recession, that is.
The US trade deficit was in balance in 1974, the early 1980's, and came close
enough in the early 1990's to call it even. At the moment, at least in dollar
terms, the US trade deficit has widened to the greatest extent ever seen. Unlike
prior recessionary periods, during our most recent academic recession our import
activity dropped, but export activity likewise experienced a synchronous decline.
For now, the message is relatively clear. The efforts to globalize trade over
the past few decades have succeeded wonderfully in aligning global economic
movement as almost never before.
Given that we have been unable to close the trade gap during this period of
recent domestic economic softness, does this experience suggest that we are
facing an uncontrollable trade deficit quagmire ahead? Have we passed the point
of no return economically in terms of our ability to reconcile this deficit
without some type of corresponding watershed domestic economic dislocation?
Our goods related trade deficit now leaves the US with a total current account
deficit approaching 5% of GDP. A demarcation line of historical importance
where currencies usually sit up and take notice of the imbalance.
Although the US is clearly currently favoring the foreign community as a source
for manufactured goods, this trend isn't exactly new. In fact it has been evolving
for decades. The history of industrial production is crystal clear on the subject:

As is literally plain as day in the above chart, over the last 60 years industrial
production has been less and less meaningful as a contributor to the cyclical
swings in macro US GDP. The highs and lows in terms of rate of change in industrial
production have become increasingly muted as the decades have passed. Over
this same period we have witnessed the rise and subsequent softening of activity
in differing global centers of manufacturing strength with each passing cycle.
Japan, Mexico and South America have all had their turn at bat in what has
been the "shifting" of global manufacturing intensity seen over time.
And now it's China as the growing center of importance for manufacturing intensive
goods production. Coincident with the recent industrial production cycle in
the US is the fact that manufacturing employment stateside rests at its lowest
level in four decades.
At Your Service...As the US in particular has continued to export its
manufacturing base over the past half century, the services portion of the
economy in the US has taken on increasingly greater meaning to total domestic
GDP growth over time. Hidden inside of the overall trade deficit figure is
the fact that the US enjoys a services related trade surplus and has for some
time. Admittedly, this services export surplus condition in terms of absolute
dollars is clearly exceeded by the value of the goods import deficit balance.
Our dollar based exports of services are about one-quarter of the value of
our dollar based imports of goods.
In our minds, the immediate reconciliation of the absolute dollar trade deficit
may not be as meaningful to near term prospects for our economy as will be
the ability of the US to move further out on the economic value added curve
relative to the entire global economy. With each passing decade as the US has
watched significant portions of its manufacturing base be exported, advances
in services and technology have allowed the domestic economy to push forward.
The broad tech driven expansion of the 1990's was a clear example of the US
economy moving outward on this global value added curve. It was immaterial
to total GDP that we had lost manufacturing of commodity consumer electronics
such as TV's and VCR's when we began designing, producing, and selling higher
margined routers, switches, and servers, etc. during the last decade. The unknown
at this point for both the domestic economy and financial markets is when and
if this next value added shift will occur.
In the meantime, it's a darn good bet that the next significant near term
trade related issue the US will face is the increasing transfer of our services
economy abroad. Especially high end (wage) IT related services. Although we
are only now beginning to see this issue addressed quite sporadically in the
mainstream, like goods manufacturing, subtle shifts in the service economy
have been slowly taking place for decades. We'd suggest that the domestic tech
boom of the last decade that spawned advancement in global telecommunications,
information processing and internet based service applications will accelerate
the potential for transfer of high end service functions to lower cost and
well educated global centers such as India, China and Eastern Europe. Already
we have recently witnessed the export of increasing amounts of data processing,
call center, IT, software and hardware design, as well as architectural design
work to these areas. As you may know, our home base is the San Francisco Bay
Area. A number of our contacts in the Silicon Valley have told us that they
have not witnessed conditions like we now experience in the Valley in three
decades at least. They are referring to both business conditions and the increasing
global outsourcing of the engineering function. In our book, this will be the
next big trade related hot button. Especially as it ultimately translates into
US employment and wage statistics in the not too distant future.
What we suggest bears serious monitoring ahead is the following chart. Quite
simply it is the year over year rate of change in US exports of "services" over
the last four decades:

Much as the chart of industrial production change tells the story of a less
manufacturing intensive US economy over time, so too does the above chart reveal
that the export market for US services is becoming less and less robust on
a rate of change basis with each passing cycle. As you can see, the recent
negative year over year experience in this indicator was the first significant
negative dip in four decades. Moreover, since 1981, every cyclical year over
year peak in this reading shows us a consistently lower peak growth rate. The
classic declining tops line, if you will. Could the US really become a net
importer of "services" say over the next five to ten years? As always,
anything can happen, but the in place rate of change trend is moving disturbingly
in that direction with each passing cycle. We may not have to wait five to
ten years.
Also well worth monitoring, and in almost mirror image to the chart above,
is the history of domestic US services employment over the last four decades.
Once again, the declining tops line tells the story:

At the moment, maybe the most important question domestic investors face is
whether the US economy can move out on the fabled global value added curve
at a rate of change greater than the rate at which it is now beginning to export
relatively high wage portions of its service based economy. For now, the domestic
US economy finds itself in a post-bubble aftermath environment. Availability
of R&D and venture related capital has shrunk incredibly relative to what
was considered normal just a few years ago. In like manner, other significant
economies such as Japan and Germany are at best lethargic, and at worst sliding
back towards outright recession as we speak. Together, the US, Japan and German
economies simply dwarf the remaining economies of the planet and are clearly
acting as a current drag. At latest count, the largest six economies in nominal
terms are as follows:

Emerging economies and markets such as China, India, Eastern Europe and Russia
simply do not have the nominal girth necessary to act as a significant growth
catalyst for the broader macro global economy over a short period of time,
despite the fact that they will be direct beneficiaries of this global outsourcing
of services functions (not strictly a US phenomenon). The simple comparison
of nominal country by country economic weight suggests that a continuing slow
growth global environment will necessarily mean further large economy corporate
focus on costs as a means to hold up and possible enhance earnings performance.
And certainly the 800 pound gorilla in the cost structure of labor is wages
and salaries. This is where the repositioning of global services battle will
be fought. As you can see, in weighing a potential global services outsourcing
decision for a domestic corporation, within the context of the current economic
environment, the decision largely begins and ends with the following table:
| US Domestic Civilian Worker Cost of Compensation |
| Wages & Salaries |
72.2% |
| Legal Benefits |
7.9 |
| Insurance |
7.1 |
| Paid Leave |
6.8 |
| Retirement |
3.4 |
| Supplemental Pay |
2.4 |
| Other |
0.1 |
For years we have watched companies such as Wal-Mart squeeze their suppliers
on price. And then squeeze again. This has pushed their suppliers to continuously
rationalize cost of production over time, necessarily involving orienting more
and more manufacturing to offshore locations. Just how much of the current
trade deficit is directly related to Wal-Mart? Will we now witness the tech
and some broader services industries go through the same conceptual exercise?
It's a darn good bet. In a slow growth environment, it's simply a matter of
survival. There is no question that certain services can never be outsourced
to the global community, but those that can are almost by nature what have
been the higher wage domestic service industries of the recent past few decades.
Largely IT related. It is quite telling to note that in the most recent downturn,
year over year rate of change in a tech centric city such as San Jose literally
fell off a cliff. A world of differential from the tech downturn of the late
1980's/early 1990's.

What we fully expect to be the changing nature of the domestic service industry
in the US in the years ahead is going to present investors with both challenges
and opportunities.
Although we expect the outsourcing of portions of the domestic white-collar
service industries to be a phenomenon that plays out over time, two themes
come to mind when addressing this issue. The first is what we expect to be
the continuing moderation in domestic consumer spending. Outsourcing of high
wage service jobs will pressure domestic personal income in the aggregate.
Combined with other significant consumer related issues such as household leverage,
personal savings, etc., the changing nature of the services landscape will
add to the changing complexion of domestic consumption patterns ahead. Employment
concerns will move up the political agenda sharply. The rate at which domestic
services are outsourced ahead will directly impact the near term ability of
the US economy to grow given its highly dependent consumer orientation.
Secondly, and more importantly, looking abroad for investment opportunities
may once again become a very important exercise for domestic investors. Investors
who for good reason need not have looked any further than the US over the past
20 years. We're not saying global investing has lost current importance, but
rather the synchronous nature of directional change we have witnessed in global
markets over the recent past may once again become less synchronous, as certainly
was the case a number of decades ago. We can remember sitting in the St. Regis
Hotel in Manhattan maybe 15 years ago listening to futurist Alvin Toffler speak
to the fact that technology would recast global standards of living in the
decades to come. The recasting of those standards has begun, both for better
and for worse, dependent of course on the country in which one makes a living.
It just may be that the best growth investment opportunities of the next few
decades lie outside of the large, developed economies and financial markets.
The January Defect...As goes January, so goes the remainder of the
year? Well, maybe. We'll just have to see what the market has to say about
that as we move ahead. There are a ton of statistics and studies regarding
the "meaning" of January to potential market movement in the remaining
months of any one year. Studies of all years. All years ending in an odd number.
All third years of a Presidential cycle. And so on. Although we try to always
be open to any point of view, there is one set of January data that we have
our eye on at the moment. It's this one:

January domestic equity fund flows are certainly no dramatic change in trend
of the last half year. But relative to prior year singular January experiences
its a big switch. In the most recent ICI (investment Company Institute) data,
it can be seen that domestic equity mutual funds ended 2002 with 4.4% of their
assets in cash. Just maybe, the chart above and the data on cash availability
in aggregate equity funds are the most important January indicators, do you
think?
|