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Strangers Bearing Gifts From Afar...Every quarter in the subscriber portion of the site we try to take a little
peek at total money flows supporting Treasury securities, government agency
paper, US corporate paper and US common stocks. In its Flow of Funds report,
the Fed is kind enough to treat us to this data. Although there are certainly
a fair number of revisions each quarter, we believe watching these numbers
is important in trying to get a sense of capital flow trends as they pertain
to US financial asset prices. Moreover, a birds eye view of these numbers allows
us to see just who has been responsible for strength in purchasing each asset
class at the margin. What we hope to do each quarter is get ourselves thinking
about the possibilities for why recent patterns of asset purchases have taken
place and what potential for change may lie ahead.
Particularly important in this data over the past half decade has been the
growing purchases of US financial assets by the foreign community. At least
in absolute dollar terms, the following chart of net foreign capital flows
into US financial assets simply stands as testimony.

As we have written about in prior discussions, there is no mystery as to why
this has happened. Suffice it to say that the existing US trade imbalance has
put a lot of paper dollars in the hands of the foreign community. Moreover,
with a global economy fairly dangerously dependent on the US consumer, inflows
of foreign capital to US financial markets over the recent past has helped
keep domestic financing costs low (higher domestic bond prices and lower yields)
and the dollar relatively strong against foreign currencies (at least up until
the last eighteen months or so). As we have mentioned a number of times, foreign
countries are in effect doing a bit of vendor financing when it comes to the
US trade imbalance and the global recycling of trade related dollars (global
savings) back into US financial assets. At least for the moment, it seems pretty
hard to identify just who does not have a vested interest in continuing this
great recycling operation.
Again, many a foreign economy is extremely dependent on the US consumer import
market. Quid pro quo, of course, being the reinvestment of trade dollars back
into US financial assets in support of further US consumption. The US monetary
authorities love the help they receive in enhancing domestic liquidity prospects
via the enticement of cheap financing costs in part driven by foreign purchases
of US fixed income assets. The Administration simply points to the data and
characterizes the trade imbalance as proof in the pudding that the US is a
great place in which to invest, hence their rather benign reaction to a weakening
of the dollar relative to foreign currencies. We all know that this significant
imbalance is simply that - a significant imbalance. How and when it is ultimately
reconciled remains open to question. The fact that it will be reconciled is
much less open to question.
Let's have a quick look at each financial asset class and just who has been
doing the buying over the last few years:
US Treasury Market
According
to the folks at the Fed, the largest buyers by far of US Treasury paper over
the last two years has been the foreign community. As of the close of the first
quarter, foreigners owned close to 33% of total US Treasury securities. As
you will see in the chart below, this is up substantially from the middle part
of the last decade. As a quick tangent, it's somewhat ironic that certain members
of the foreign community were at odds with US involvement in Iraq while simultaneously
they weren't at all at odds with the financing of that activity, now were they?
As you can see in the table below, over the last two years, no one was even
close to the foreign community in terms of Treasury purchases. In absolute
dollar terms, foreigners purchased four times more Treasury securities than
all other classes of buyers combined.
| Quarterly Net Purchases Of US Treasuries ($billions) |
| Sector |
2Q 01 |
3Q 01 |
4Q 01 |
1Q 02 |
2Q 02 |
3Q 02 |
4Q 02 |
1Q 03 |
TOTAL |
| Household |
$(45.6) |
$17.3 |
$(19.0) |
$13.2 |
$36.6 |
$23.8 |
$(74.5) |
$(28.6) |
$(76.8) |
| NonFinl Corp. |
1.1 |
(0.2) |
1.8 |
3.1 |
1.5 |
(0.3) |
(0.3) |
(1.2) |
5.7 |
| State&Local Govt |
4.2 |
11.3 |
7.7 |
3.9 |
7.0 |
1.8 |
5.0 |
(1.6) |
39.3 |
| Foreign |
(35.4) |
0.4 |
44.0 |
(7.9) |
21.8 |
54.3 |
40.3 |
35.4 |
152.9 |
| Comml. Bank |
5.8 |
4.2 |
(12.1) |
(3.2) |
21.3 |
9.5 |
15.4 |
0.8 |
41.3 |
| Savings Institutions |
(0.5) |
(0.9) |
4.8 |
2.7 |
(1.4) |
(2.4) |
(1.1) |
0 |
1.2 |
| Credit Unions |
(1.4) |
(0.1) |
1.0 |
0.2 |
0.2 |
0.4 |
(0.3) |
(0.3) |
(0.3) |
| Trusts |
(1.2) |
(1.2) |
(1.2) |
(0.1) |
(0.1) |
(0.1) |
(0.1) |
(0.1) |
(4.1) |
| Life Cos. |
(1.0) |
(1.0) |
(1.5) |
4.0 |
3.4 |
5.4 |
3.9 |
4.1 |
17.3 |
| Other Ins. Cos. |
0 |
(0.3) |
0.5 |
2.7 |
2.7 |
2.4 |
3.2 |
2.3 |
13.5 |
| Private Pensions |
1.5 |
(2.6) |
1.0 |
2.1 |
2.5 |
2.1 |
2.8 |
2.7 |
12.1 |
| Public Pensions |
9.1 |
(16.7) |
(10.3) |
9.6 |
(9.8) |
(3.1) |
2.2 |
2.0 |
(13.9) |
| Money Mkt Funds |
11.4 |
16.7 |
9.9 |
3.3 |
0.8 |
(7.6) |
7.8 |
7.8 |
50.1 |
| Mutual Funds |
(0.5) |
(6.0) |
2.8 |
5.0 |
2.0 |
7.3 |
4.1 |
14.4 |
29.1 |
| Closed End Funds |
(0.5) |
0 |
0.9 |
0.4 |
(2.3) |
0 |
(1.2) |
(0.7) |
(2.8) |
| GSE's |
10.2 |
(4.5) |
(5.4) |
0.9 |
(16.5) |
(0.7) |
(8.5) |
0.8 |
(23.7) |
| Brokers & Dealers |
(16.9) |
34.0 |
(34.9) |
(49.9) |
59.2 |
(44.6) |
21.5 |
(20.0) |
(51.6) |
| ETF's |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2.1 |
(0.1) |
(0.5) |
1.5 |
Government Agency Market
To
suggest that the foreign community has been a meaningful supporter of the balance
sheet expansion of the federal government agency entities over the recent past
is an understatement. As you can see in the following chart, foreign ownership
of US government agency paper has been steadily increasing as a percentage
of total agency paper outstanding over each and every year of the last eight
(at least).
It just so happens that this is the one segment of the US financial asset
spectrum where the foreign community has not been the top gun purchaser of
assets over the last two years, but darn close. Agencies purchasing the paper
of other agencies has topped the scales. We know that current controversy surrounds
Freddie Mac. But given the fact that the FHLB (Federal Home Loan Bank) has
purchased gobs of Freddie paper over the last "x" years, if Freddie
has a problem, then so does the Home Loan Bank. And the crossholdings of GSE
paper don't stop there. In a sense, the GSE's are involved in their own little
debt instrument version of keiretsu.
The other significant non-foreign buyer of government agency paper over the
last few years has been the US commercial banking system. And it's no wonder.
As you know, government agency paper offers yields greater than like maturity
Treasuries while being accompanied by the assumed perception of safety. Given
that bank lending to corporations has literally nose dived over the last three
years, now at absolute dollar levels not seen since 1998, putting capital to
work in alternatives such as government agency paper is no surprise at all.
But ultimately, banks will be fair weather friends to vehicles such as agency
paper. Here are the numbers for the last eight quarters:
| US Govt. Agency Securities Quarterly Net Purchases
($billions) |
| Sector |
2Q 01 |
3Q 01 |
4Q 01 |
1Q 02 |
2Q 02 |
3Q 02 |
4Q 02 |
1Q 03 |
TOTAL |
|
| Household |
$0.1 |
$25.7 |
$(21.5) |
$(26.7) |
$(14.0) |
$(67.6) |
$(12.9) |
$(60.9) |
$(177.8) |
| NonFinl Corp |
1.7 |
0.6 |
3.5 |
1.2 |
0 |
(1.9) |
(1.8) |
3.0 |
6.3 |
| State&Local Govt |
10.7 |
8.2 |
1.5 |
2.0 |
3.3 |
(1.5) |
0.3 |
(11.1) |
13.4 |
| Foreign |
23.7 |
19.1 |
35.7 |
10.0 |
38.9 |
32.8 |
16.5 |
34.7 |
211.4 |
| Comml. Bank |
(15.1) |
35.5 |
41.7 |
30.9 |
48.6 |
33.0 |
28.0 |
45.3 |
247.9 |
| Savings Institutions |
5.4 |
(1.9) |
12.6 |
12.2 |
(1.0) |
(4.1) |
7.6 |
10.0 |
40.8 |
| Credit Unions |
(2.6) |
(9.7) |
7.8 |
7.2 |
(1.7) |
5.6 |
5.7 |
6.8 |
19.1 |
| Trusts |
(2.6) |
(2.6) |
(2.6) |
(0.2) |
(0.2) |
(0.2) |
(0.2) |
(1.2) |
(9.8) |
| Life Cos. |
4.7 |
5.5 |
3.0 |
14.4 |
12.9 |
17.5 |
14.6 |
4.1 |
76.7 |
| Other Ins. Cos. |
0 |
4.5 |
3.4 |
1.9 |
1.9 |
1.2 |
2.5 |
2.6 |
18.1 |
| Private Pensions |
3.8 |
(1.1) |
1.8 |
1.5 |
0.9 |
3.1 |
(2.4) |
(1.1) |
6.5 |
| Public Pensions |
14.4 |
(20.4) |
(1.7) |
(2.9) |
0.2 |
0.4 |
1.9 |
(1.7) |
(9.8) |
| Money Mkt Funds |
19.6 |
44.1 |
(15.4) |
7.3 |
(12.8) |
8.0 |
(4.8) |
9.5 |
55.5 |
| Mutual Funds |
34.1 |
23.6 |
8.8 |
15.5 |
6.1 |
22.8 |
12.7 |
7.8 |
131.4 |
| GSE's |
38.8 |
50.4 |
35.0 |
78.6 |
7.2 |
25.6 |
66.7 |
15.5 |
317.8 |
| ABS Issuers |
3.7 |
9.4 |
17.1 |
17.5 |
10.6 |
22.0 |
19.6 |
17.0 |
116.9 |
| Brokers & Dealers |
21.1 |
(15.9) |
(2.7) |
(6.0) |
18.1 |
(1.1) |
3.0 |
36.3 |
52.8 |
| REIT's |
3.6 |
0.9 |
2.0 |
5.7 |
3.4 |
1.9 |
(2.9) |
(3.7) |
10.9 |
Corporate Debt
Simply
put, foreign buyers of US corporate paper have dominated the space over the
last few years. And much like the experience with government agency paper,
they have become progressively larger owners of total US corporate paper outstanding
since the middle part of the last decade. For now, the foreign community owns
approximately 21% of total US corporate debt. Where the US commercial banking
system has had increasingly less to do with financing corporate debt over the
last three years, the capital markets have filled the void. And the foreign
community has been a big buyer.
It's certainly clear that the scramble for yield is really global in nature
these days. Foreign investors in US corporate paper have lived through the
Enron's, Worldcom's, KMart's, UAL's, a record number of bond rating agency
downgrades, etc. and have barely even blinked. Foreign purchases of US corporate
debt in 1Q was near top quarterly absolute dollar purchase levels of the last
few years. But as you will see in the table below, the scramble for yield is
not confined to the foreign community. Much like their Japanese brethren a
decade back, insurance companies are seeking out higher rates of return with
relative vigor. Although still meaningful, they were not dominant players in
terms of the purchasing of UST's and government agency debt, preferring yet
higher yielding corporate debt securities to increase yield in their investment
portfolios over the last few years. Lastly, households and mutual funds have
increasingly been notable buyers of corporate debt during the last eight quarters.
Not surprising given the record inflow to bond mutual funds in the US over
the last three years.
| Quarterly Net Purchases of US Corporate Debt ($billions) |
| Sector |
2Q 01 |
3Q 01 |
4Q 01 |
1Q 02 |
2Q 02 |
3Q 02 |
4Q 02 |
1Q 03 |
TOTAL |
| Household |
$(3.3) |
$(37.8) |
$24.4 |
$16.1 |
$25.9 |
$(28.6) |
$97.5 |
$46.2 |
$140.4 |
| State&Local Govt |
1.8 |
3.7 |
1.0 |
3.8 |
3.3 |
(2.1) |
(0.8) |
(5.2) |
5.5 |
| Foreign |
66.2 |
33.8 |
39.9 |
45.4 |
62.1 |
18.1 |
41.0 |
61.7 |
365.5 |
| Comml. Bank |
29.2 |
18.7 |
36.1 |
(2.7) |
(15.0) |
10.2 |
10.2 |
13.8 |
100.6 |
| Savings Institutions |
(2.8) |
(5.1) |
(4.3) |
(0.5) |
1.9 |
0.6 |
(6.0) |
2.0 |
(14.3) |
| Trusts |
(1.7) |
(1.7) |
(1.7) |
(0.7) |
(0.7) |
(0.7) |
(0.7) |
(1.7) |
(9.6) |
| Life Cos. |
30.8 |
35.6 |
21.5 |
35.3 |
21.6 |
34.7 |
17.8 |
24.5 |
221.8 |
| Other Ins. Cos. |
0 |
3.3 |
4.1 |
0.6 |
0.4 |
(1.0) |
2.4 |
1.7 |
11.5 |
| Private Pensions |
4.4 |
2.4 |
(0.5) |
4.3 |
2.2 |
0.6 |
2.8 |
3.7 |
19.9 |
| Public Pensions |
(9.1) |
19.4 |
10.2 |
10.5 |
(3.6) |
(1.1) |
6.2 |
(3.2) |
29.3 |
| Money Mkt Funds |
(1.7) |
(5.5) |
8.5 |
(10.6) |
(11.1) |
12.1 |
17.3 |
12.2 |
21.2 |
| Mutual Funds |
16.1 |
8.0 |
19.2 |
21.3 |
18.0 |
6.7 |
4.7 |
21.2 |
115.2 |
| Closed End Funds |
(1.6) |
(0.6) |
1.4 |
2.6 |
1.3 |
(2.4) |
0.6 |
(0.9) |
0.4 |
| GSE's |
10.1 |
(1.5) |
0.5 |
6.5 |
15.2 |
(5.1) |
(9.6) |
10.3 |
17.4 |
| Brokers & Dealers |
8.0 |
19.7 |
9.6 |
6.9 |
16.4 |
(2.8) |
10.2 |
(13.1) |
54.9 |
| REIT's |
(2.3) |
0.8 |
1.4 |
0.4 |
1.2 |
1.6 |
1.5 |
(0.8) |
3.8 |
| Funding Cos. |
9.7 |
10.9 |
10.6 |
11.7 |
11.7 |
(7.7) |
(0.8) |
11.3 |
57.4 |
We've lead off this view of capital flows with fixed income securities for
a reason. The tables you see above are in good part reflective of not just
investment activity, but of the expansion in the US credit cycle over the last
few years. Financed, of course, by the fine participants you see above. Record
foreign inflows into US fixed income securities has been accompanied by record
domestic bond mutual fund purchases and significant increases in bank and insurance
company buying over the last eight quarters. All of these buyers moving increasingly
in the same direction. Overlay the activities of the leveraged speculating
community (hedge funds, etc.) in this country and it's easy to understand why
credit quality has really taken a back seat to yield and sheer momentum driven
price performance in recent years.
If
we had to single out one reason as to why our economy has slowly trudged forward
over the last few years despite the once in a generation bursting of a financial
asset bubble, that reason is broader system wide cost of capital. Cost of residential
mortgage financing. Cost of consumer credit. The cost of Federal debt. And
cost of corporate capital, especially in what have been the very accommodative
capital markets of the last half year or so. And in virtually ranked order,
here are the folks we need to thank for their capital lending generosity. Their
generosity in parting with their own precious capital for stated coupon rates
of return that in many cases are as low as anything seen in three to four decades.
In
terms of US fixed income instrument yields that ultimately set the cost of
capital in this country, just what would our economy look like today had it
not been for strangers bearing gifts from afar over the last two to three years
(let alone the last decade)? But this does point up a question about "tomorrow".
As we mentioned, the confluence of US fixed income buyers, domestic and foreign,
acting in similar manner has helped create the following multi-decade round
trip.
But what happens as the secular bull market in US fixed income vehicles ultimately
comes to a conclusion? As you can see from the graphs and tables above, a lot
of folks are lined up on the same side of the trade right here. Recently encouraged
by the Fed's jawboning campaign on deflation and implied promises to buy longer
term debt securities if need be. But at least over the last few weeks, global
debt markets have been sending signals that change may be in the wind.
To us, the global bond markets are suggesting one of two things. They are
potentially trying to tell us that the global campaign to reinflate is either
beginning to head in the right direction, or that global credit risk is building
in a very unacceptable manner given that liquidity is literally being force
fed into the system, regardless of sound credit risk characteristics among
a good number of borrowers. After all, how else could a company like a Yahoo
finance convertible debt on a zero coupon basis? If either of these two thoughts
regading reinflation or credit risk are correct, this one way directional buying
of US fixed income assets may have seen its best days (although we're sure
the Fed has yet to attempt to have the last word in terms of unconventional
monetary warfare). Although we have long described the ultimate balancing act
as characterizing the US trade imbalance, maybe the more important balancing
act to come relates to whether foreign buyers of US fixed income assets will
continue their push forward in supporting US debt markets to theoretically
further the cause of their export industries, in spite of what may turn out
to be a secular conclusion to the US bond and interest rate bull market.
Could the US financial markets tolerate a slowdown in foreign purchases of
US debt instruments? Would that complicate the best laid plans of the Fed?
Now that the Fed has largely used up its conventional monetary weaponry against
a slowing economy, would they possibly be forced to move toward unconventional
means of accommodation, such as pegging longer term yields, if the foreign
community choose to take a few steps back from their as of late US financial
asset purchasing leadership role? It just so happens that in April (post the
1Q Fed Flow of Funds data), foreign buying of US Treasuries dropped significantly
relative to what had been happening year-to-date. Of course this is only one
month's data.
We may be getting close to the time when the Fed may either have to put up
or shut up. The warning shot in the bond market of the last few weeks just
may be the market's way of suggesting to the Fed that they get on with supposed
unconventional action as opposed to continued promises, threats and jawboning.
And if a scenario like this comes to pass, monitoring foreign flows of capital
may be more critical than ever since potential change at the margin in the
buying habits of the single largest buyer of US debt instruments over the last
few years would be more than meaningful. Unconventional Fed monetary warfare
would necessarily mean a big expansion in the monetary aggregates (M3, M2,
MZM, etc.). In essence, this type of activity would be an open and outright "dilution" of
the dollar, especially in the eyes of foreign holders of dollar denominated
assets. Would foreign money continue to be lavished so generously upon the
US fixed income markets if a scenario like this were to occur? It may be well
worth pondering because if the economy does not experience the fables second
half recovery, election concerns on the part of the Administration may mean
that the Fed is allowed leeway to move on to Plan B in relatively short order
- the unconventional weaponry espoused by Greenspan, Bernanke, et al.
Alternatively, if some type of recovery does transpire, the talk of deflation
will have proven to be an illusion. Either way, we have a lot of long bond
players potentially looking to be less long in simultaneous fashion. As per
the 1Q Flow of Funds data, the foreign community just may be leading the pack
of big US debt holders pondering asset allocation, in spite of the fact that
US trade related dollars continue to swell their holdings of foreign reserves.
Remember, we're not suggesting that foreigners will sell their dollar denominated
financial assets en masse. That's probably not realistic under any scenario
except an outright panic. It's the potential slowing of foreign purchases of
US fixed income assets that carries the most weight with us. Especially because
it would probably occur within the context of the leveraged speculating community
being forced into a bit of liquidation.
Common Stocks
Finally, here's a little look at purchases of US common stocks by sector over
the last two years. It is clear that despite the foreign community having cumulatively
been the largest buyer of US common stocks over the last eight quarters, the
peak in quarterly buying by the foreign community happened a good number of
quarters back. Purchases of US equities by the foreign community has been incredibly
subdued over the last four quarters. And, in the scramble in terms of hoped
for rate of return, insurance companies have been one of the most significant
buyers at the margin recently.
| Quarterly Net Purchases Of US Equities ($billions) |
| Sector |
2Q 01 |
3Q 01 |
4Q 01 |
1Q 02 |
2Q 02 |
3Q 02 |
4Q 02 |
1Q03 |
TOTAL |
| Household |
$(30.7) |
$(52.3) |
$(71.3) |
$(38.8) |
$(19.2) |
$(44.5) |
$(7.4) |
$9.2 |
$(255.0) |
| State&Local Govt |
5.1 |
5.4 |
5.8 |
3.2 |
6.8 |
0.9 |
(1.7) |
3.1 |
28.6 |
| Foreign |
34.7 |
13.7 |
33.2 |
23.7 |
10.9 |
7.3 |
12.0 |
(2.0) |
133.5 |
| Comml. Bank |
(0.1) |
1.5 |
(0.8) |
(1.0) |
0.1 |
(0.1) |
0.4 |
0.2 |
0.2 |
| Savings Institutions |
0.8 |
0.6 |
0.7 |
0.3 |
0.5 |
0.5 |
0.7 |
(0.4) |
3.7 |
| Trusts |
(8.1) |
(8.1) |
(8.0) |
(0.5) |
(0.5) |
(0.5) |
(0.2) |
(5.8) |
(31.8) |
| Life Cos. |
16.0 |
17.7 |
13.2 |
13.2 |
10.4 |
17.9 |
12.5 |
13.5 |
114.4 |
| Private Pensions |
(11.3) |
(16.7) |
2.4 |
(18.2) |
(22.4) |
(15.9) |
(9.3) |
(7.1) |
(98.5) |
| Public Pensions |
(21.9) |
16.3 |
13.9 |
1.2 |
10.5 |
19.2 |
(8.7) |
9.1 |
39.6 |
| Mutual Funds |
30.2 |
21.4 |
32.2 |
24.9 |
19.0 |
(26.6) |
14.2 |
(9.6) |
105.7 |
| Closed End Funds |
(1.0) |
1.7 |
(0.9) |
(0.1) |
4.3 |
5.3 |
0 |
2.7 |
12.0 |
| Brokers & Dealers |
8.1 |
(12.0) |
12.9 |
0.4 |
7.2 |
(0.6) |
(3.0) |
(3.3) |
16.3 |
| ETF's |
2.8 |
7.0 |
6.7 |
6.0 |
16.3 |
7.1 |
12.2 |
1.8 |
59.9 |
For
now, the foreign community owns a little over 11% of the total US equity market.
Since the bear in equities began in March of 2000, the foreign community has
literally been the largest buyers of domestic equities. Again, we have to believe
that the incredible amount of trade related dollars being pushed into global
economies made this possible. Much like the secular implications embedded in
the fifty year chart of the ten year US Treasury yield we showed above, foreign
support of the US equity market has been occurring against the backdrop of
the following historical context. (The chart uses data provided by Bob Shiller,
of "Irrational Exuberance" fame.)
It
seems a bit odd to us that in the day to day cacophony of news, data, facts
and rumors spewing forth from Wall Street that there isn't more appreciation
for the fact that the foreign community has played a huge role in shaping US
financial markets and prices of the last two to three years, let alone the
last decade. We suggest that watching the action of foreign capital ahead may
be one of the more important exercises in macro investment analysis given their
asset purchasing leadership position of the recent past. Clearly, foreign support
of US financial markets has indirectly been a support of their own export manufacturing
industries. But is the time approaching when the foreign community may be forced
to choose between the value of their significant investments in US financial
assets and their implicit support of the current status quo imbalance that
characterizes global trade? In our eyes, and importantly for US financial markets,
it may be the ultimate decision making balancing act yet to come.
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