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BullionVault's Paul Tustain explains
the current attraction of gold.
The number of zeros on formal statistics sometimes disguises their real meaning.
The US government currently borrows $5,000 a year on behalf of each US family,
which it dares not tax for electoral reasons. This is the source of the budget
deficit. That uncollected money remains in the hands of the family, which currently
prefers buying foreign goods and spends $5,000 on them, producing the trade
deficit. The foreign supplier sends the $5,000 back to the US by buying government
bonds and American businesses. This money from abroad is the source of the
fine-sounding US capital inflow.
Give or take $1,000 this same $5,000 deficit triangle is completed for each
of about 100 million US households every year, and that is why there is a $500
billion budget deficit, and similar trade deficit and US capital inflow. It
is tempting to assume that this is the way it has always been and that somehow
it must be stable, but that is wrong. This is a wholly new way of arranging
things.
The last four-year administration ended having increased the average US family's
gross future tax debt by about $19,000. The family's total accumulated uncollected
tax - i.e. its share of the country's public debt - grew by that $19,000 to
about $74,000, three quarters of which has been built up since 1985. The demand
which has sustained growth for twenty years has arisen from this money being
spent twice, and this duplicated spending is the only explanation that is needed
to understand the remarkable strength of the USA's economy. But the legacy
of it is this $74,000 tax debt for each of just over 100 million families.
How serious is a $74,000 tax debt? We don't know because it has never happened
before, but we do know that in Argentina in 2001 their sovereign public debt
was about $12,000 per family, and at that level it triggered the capital flight
which was the direct cause of their debt default and subsequent economic crunch.
It is both extraordinary confidence in underlying USA economic robustness and
an apparent lack of alternate options which appears to be preventing a similar
US setback. But the confidence rests on the demand strength, which itself arises
from the scale of the deficit triangle.
To resolve the US public debt problem safely is very difficult. Raising taxes
to the required level is unthinkable - both electorally and because it would
hurt domestic spending and feed back into a deflationary spiral of declining
output and demand. Trade protectionism was tried before and it triggered tit-for-tat
trade restrictions and global depression. Meanwhile formal debt default is
unnecessarily dramatic, but it seems it can be effected without the same national
loss of face by a policy which allows the dollar to bleed value: so serious
inflation seems much the most likely result.
Assessing how severe the coming inflation might be is also difficult, but
it is possible to get an idea by looking at the bond market. For twenty five
years the bond market has been growing fast, to about 40 times what it was
in the early eighties. Through most of that time interest rates and inflation
were falling, so fixing a rate of return with a bond was an attractive option
for a saver. As a result while borrowers were spending savers were diverting
their cash out of the economy and freezing it in bond portfolios, until eventually
US dollar bond markets have grown to contain 50 times all the dollars in current
circulation.
This frozen money is up for redemption over the coming years so it will turn
back into cash, and little of it can sensibly be re-invested in bonds with
inflation threatening and rates turning up from long cycle lows. In any event
much of it must be returned as consumable cash to the retiring boomer generation.
This suggests a possible cash glut in the medium term, and that indicates
inflation too. Aggressive inflations do tend to follow an accumulation of official
indebtedness. It would be unusual if the current US situation did not result
in something similar.
Fear of this should have already caused a downwards dollar correction, but
this has not happened because the alternate currencies have similar problems.
The Yen is afflicted by an equally difficult sovereign debt problem, while
the Euro looks politically unstable and can agree neither a constitution nor
an ongoing budget. Commodities on the other hand have been rising in price
- and gold particularly so.
Gold is famously useless in almost everything except that it cannot be
made, and is reliably difficult to find. Even now if all the gold ever
produced on Earth were formed into a single cube its edge would be less than
20 metres - 2 metres shorter than a tennis court. Annually mined production
grows that cube by about 12 centimetres a year, and more than each year's
production is used up by jewellers such that now 75% of that cube is fabricated
in an art form worth several times its bullion value. Meanwhile after 15
years of consistent selling into private demand central bank ownership is
now down to about 20% of the world's gold.
That 20 metre cube of gold would weigh about 140,000 tonnes and each tonne
is worth about 16,000,000 dollars. So all the gold in the world is currently
valued at $2.2 trillion, which compares to a US public debt of $8 trillion,
and an unreserved US generational debt of $44 trillion. By contrast the US
has the biggest gold reserve in the world which at 8,000 tonnes is worth only
$0.12 trillion, enough, were it all sold, to stop the deficits growing for
about 10 weeks.
Arising from this there are are powerful fundamental forces at work on the
gold price which cautious savers understand intuitively - even if some cannot
put their finger on what those forces are. The value of anything reflects its
utility at the margin, which means it only needs a slight shortage to
create price surges and a slight surplus to create price slumps. The utility
of gold is simply that it is rare, and for 5,000 years people have used reliably
rare stuff to store value for the future.
Often because of a local shortage of gold (which they might prefer because
of its natural and unimpeachable rarity) most human societies have been able
to arrange and enforce a respectable rarity of artificial forms of money, and
so long as savers have been able to trust in this artificially created rarity
the marginal utility of gold's natural rarity stays low. Paradoxically rarity
is in surplus wherever artificial money is being reasonably well managed, and
this makes gold's natural rarity less valued in those times.
But what savers are now realising is that official money is not being well
managed and cannot in future be relied upon for rarity, and they believe their
governments will soon be forced to create money in large quantities. Even if
the underlying demand for the rare stuff required to store value stays the
same then the value of the few naturally scarce things will go up. Much more
likely is that the underlying demand for natural rarity will increase, and
it's utility at the margin, where diminishing supply of rarity meets increasing
demand, will continue to force up the price.
This is what is starting to happen to gold now. Arising from the scale of
public debt the forced monetary issue which is being anticipated by savers
is causing them to value the unimpeachable rarity of gold higher. More and
more people no longer believe that the artificial rarity of bonds, or bank-notes,
shares, or even houses are offering that same assurance of future scarcity,
and until responsible fiscal and monetary management returns to government
the outlook for gold is likely to remain resolutely positive.
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