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Given a current
account deficit in excess of 6% of gross domestic product (GDP), many
fear the US dollar must decline. At the World Economic Forum in Davos, policy
makers disagreed as to the severity of the risk, its causes and cures. In
a nutshell, the United States does not export enough to the rest of the world
to balance its own appetite for cheap Asian imports. The American consumer
spends too much and saves too little. As a result, dollars are leaving the
US in return for goods and services. Unless those dollars are reinvested
in US denominated assets at a rate in excess of $2 billion a day, the dollar
will decline.
According to the Financial Times, the top international affairs official at
the US Treasury warned that if the US were to instigate policies to rein in
the consumer, it would plunge the US into a deep depression; fallout to other
countries would also be severe. While we have explained
in the past why the US has no interest in a consumer slowdown, this is
the first time we hear the US Treasury warn about the risk of a depression.
To adjust the current account deficit without a severe adjustment in the value
of the dollar, the rest of the world could also spend more and save less. While
China's savings rate of 30%-40% of disposable income is likely to come down
at some point, we doubt that the rest of the world can or even wants to adopt
American spending habits; Americans now have a negative savings rate. Not only
is much of the world economy dependent on the US economy, the US economy also
dwarfs many of the emerging economies where a pickup in consumption could be
expected.
In many of our analyses we traditionally focus on the fundamental pressures
on the dollar, including the current account deficit described above. While
fundamentals may drive the long-term view, short-term moves tend to be influenced
by psychological factors and perceptions on supply and demand. From time to
time, we see an argument why the current account deficit does not matter, but
most of these "fundamental" arguments are about as good as explanations in
1999 of why the economy had entered a new era.
One reason why so many do not pay attention to fundamentals is that the daily
flow of information makes it difficult to see the big picture; instead, analysts
revert to trend analysis. Why bother about the dollar when it has "always" been "cyclical"?
The US consumer has "always" spent too much, why worry now? Why bother about
the dollar if your expenses are also in dollars? And why bother about it given
that it is in the world's interest that the US consumes what the world produces.
First, and this may surprise many "dollar bears", American consumers are,
generally speaking, far more rational than they are given credit for. Increased
debt burdens have come with gradually lower interest rates since the early
1980s. American consumers react to monetary and fiscal policies, as well as
to cheap Asian imports. There are side effects that policy makers may not have
intended. For example, while in the 1950s, fewer Americans owned their homes,
they truly owned them; now, banks are the true 'owners'.
Most importantly, while we agree that it is in the world's interest to keep
the dollar strong, it may be fatal for the government to base its policies
on that presumption. The US dollar had enjoyed the confidence of the world
as a reserve currency for many decades because of relatively prudent management.
One cannot turn the world upside down and blackmail the world into producing
cheap goods because it is in their interest to build their infrastructure and
create employment. While we expect policymakers in Asia to fight tooth and
nail before letting their currencies appreciate significantly, history has
shown that the markets are more powerful than policy makers. This does not
mean we should purchase the currencies of countries backed by unpredictable
leadership. However, it does mean that the markets may punish the holders of
US dollar cash. We believe that the currencies of countries backed by what
we call sound monetary policy will be the beneficiary of any fallout. We refer
to countries that are less likely to intervene in the currencies markets and
are less likely to engage in competitive devaluation.
The currencies of many Asian countries have speculative potential, but it
is one thing to try to shield yourself from a decline in the dollar by diversifying
to a basket of hard currencies; it is another to speculate on the unpredictable
behavior of e.g. the central banks in Japan. Japan has made it clear over and
over again that it is in their interest to keep the yen weak to push exports.
The Japanese market is swimming in liquidity; the Bank of Japan is yielding
to political pressure and does not mop up this added liquidity; instead it
has agreed to allow the consumer price index to be re-defined, so that they
can stay by their promise to keep rates low while inflation is low. In the
US, we argue whether government statistics have a bias to show too little inflation;
in Japan, there is no debate, we know the statistics cannot be trusted.
Some believe higher interest rates may save the dollar as higher rates attract
more investments. This analysis ignores that as of the end of last year, the
US pays more in interest to overseas creditors than it receives from overseas
investment. This phenomenon is more typically associated with third world countries;
as interest rates rise, obligations to foreigners increase. Foreigners mostly
hold short-term denominated debt securities, those most affected by interest
rate increases. As the Treasury suspended the sale of 30-year bonds in October
2001, government debt has become much more interest rate sensitive as the duration of
outstanding debt declined. Just as consumers took out adjustable rate mortgages
(ARMs) to finance their spending, so in effect did the federal government.
More importantly whether we have reached the peak in US interest rates is
the perception that we do not have many more rate hikes, if any, in the pipeline.
At the same time, the perception is that e.g. the European Central Bank (ECB)
is going to raise rates further. It does not really matter that the ECB may
be reluctant to raise rates and the new Federal Reserve (Fed) chairman Ben
Bernanke may end up raising rates more than some expect. In our assessment,
in the coming months, the perception is going to influence the dollar more
than the absolute level of interest rates.
It does not help the dollar that Bernanke has not yet established his credibility.
Bernanke has indicated during his hearings that any crisis can be responded
to by providing liquidity to the banking system. Adding liquidity is helpful
to avoid panics as it allows the free market to set prices, but it may not
prevent a decline in the dollar. We have talked about the "Bernanke-Test" in
the past: transitions at the helm of the Fed are frequently accompanied by
a crisis; we would not be surprised if a sharp decline in the dollar was Bernanke's
test. We believe policy makers may welcome a weaker dollar. Many have warned
that a weaker dollar would substantially increase inflationary pressures as
it makes imports more expensive. However, policy makers may try to force Asia
to become even more competitive and sell at even lower profits margins.
We have also argued that a weaker dollar is politically desirable in the absence
on a consensus on reforms in Medicare, Medicaid and Social Security. By devaluing
the purchasing power of the dollar, nominal promises can be kept without alienating
voters.
Is the tide shifting against the dollar? Is the decline that lasted until
late 2004 going to resume? If one takes the early action in 2006, it looks
like it. Precious metals have been soaring in recent weeks - to any policy
maker, this should be a warning. We do not know what is going to happen to
the dollar for the remainder of the year. But we see the fundamentals further
deteriorating. We also believe that dollar sentiment is turning more negative.
We see an increasing number of investors taking steps to diversify out of the
dollar "just in case". Similarly, while Asia will try to keep their currencies
weak, they want to diversify their dollar holdings. Just as much of Asia has
been "subsidizing" sales to the US through a weak exchange rate, they may well
be inclined to subsidize sales to Europe in the future. I was invited to host
a panel at a conference in China last fall: the focus of the conference was
on how to increase sales to Europe. With its "best client", the US consumer,
in jeopardy, it is only prudent for Asia to foster new distribution channels
for its products.
Speculative money has no loyalty and is merely looking for the next trend.
More and more speculators are pursuing the same strategies. In the end, these "professional" investors
can influence the markets for a couple of months. We are more concerned about
corporate money from overseas seeking better opportunities outside of the US
as consumer spending slows.
What does it mean for you as an investor? If you sympathize with these arguments,
but believe a weaker dollar does not affect you, think again. The reason we
do not have significant "core inflation" is because that measure focuses on
goods we can import from Asia. At some point, the market is likely to force
an adjustment, and there will be few places to hide. Maybe precious metals
provide some refuge. We believe investors should consider adding a basket of
hard currency element to their portfolio.
On a final note, while the media is celebrating Greenspan's departure: during
his tenure, the purchasing power of the dollar has been cut in half. That was
during "good times." Rather than hope that "bad times" never come, consider
acting to seek protection against a further decline in the dollar.
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