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The drama on Tuesday around 2:15 pm EST won't be that the Fed raised the funds
rate by 25 basis points for the fifteenth consecutive time to 4-3/4%. If there
is any drama, it will lie in the accompanying announcement as it relates to
the upcoming May 10 monetary policy decision. The announcement is likely to
be anticlimactic inasmuch as I suspect that the FOMC really does not know what
it is going to do with the funds rate on May 10 - leave it at 4-3/4% or bump
it up to 5%. If I am correct about the Fed's uncertainty, then the FOMC is
likely to communicate that both options are on the table - pause at 4-3/4%
or forge ahead to 5%. As of last Friday, the betting in the fed funds futures
market was that there was about a 74% probability that the FOMC would move
the funds rate to 5% at the May 10 meeting. I put the odds considerably lower
for the following reasons.
A move to 4.75% on the fed funds rate would put it well above its long-run
relationship to core PCE inflation. In January, the year-over-year change in
the core PCE price index was 1.8%. Based on the 0.1% month-to-month increase
in the February core CPI and other factors, the February year-over-year change
in the core PCE price index is expected to be up only 1.7%. Let's split the
difference and say that the March year-over-year change in the core PCE price
index turns out to be 1.75%. A 4.75% fed funds rate, then, would represent
a 300 basis point spread over core PCE infla tion. The median spread from January
1960 through January 2006 is 2.49%. Thus, a move to 4.75% on the fed funds
rate puts the spread over core inflation well above its long-run relationship.
And bear in mind what Bernanke hypothesized to the Economic Club of New York
on March 20: "About a year ago, I offered the thesis that a "global saving
glut"--an excess, at historically normal real interest rates, of desired global
saving over desired global investment--was contributing to the decline in interest
rates ... So long as these factors persist, global equilibrium interest rates
(and, consequently, the neutral policy rate) will be lower than they otherwise
would be." If Bernanke thinks that there is some risk that the neutral
policy rate is lower than it would otherwise be, why would he want to continue
to push the real fed funds rate above some longterm average?
From the January 31 FOMC minutes: "In some areas, home price appreciation
reportedly had slowed noticeably, highlighting the risks to aggregate demand
of a pullback in the housing sector. For instance, the effects of a leveling
out of housing wealth on the saving rate were difficult to predict, but,
in the view of some, potentially sizable." And from Bernanke's prepared
remarks to Congress in February: "Some cooling of the housing market is
to be expected and would not be inconsistent with continued solid growth
of overall economic activity. However, given the substantial gains in house
prices and the high levels of home construction activity over the past several
years, prices and construction could decelerate more rapidly than currently
seems likely. Slower growth in home equity, in turn, might lead households
to boost their saving and trim their spending relative to current income
by more than is now anticipated." So, the Fed's economic downside-risk
concerns relate to the housing market. Housing affordability is at its lowest
level since 1991. New home sales have fallen in five of the past seven months.
On a yearover- year basis, new home sales in February were down 15.6%. At
the same time, new homes for sale were up 24%. New home prices have fallen
for four consecutive months and are down 2.9% vs. year-ago. Existing home
sales have fallen in six of the past eight months and are a fraction under
unchanged vs. year-ago. Existing home prices are down in six of the past
eight months. I think any reasonable observer would characterize these statistics
as "some cooling of the housing market." If the Fed keeps pushing up short-term
interest rates, what is the greatest risk for the housing market - toward
freezing or heating up again?
Also from the January 31 FOMC minutes: "Rising debt service costs, owing
in part to the repricing of variable -rate mortgages, were also mentioned
as possibly restraining the discretionary spending of consumers." In
2005, the households devoted a record 13.71% of their after-tax income to
servicing their debt. This was a 54 basis point increase over 2004 and the
largest basis point increase since 1995 (up 62 basis points). Merrill Lynch's
David Rosenberg has estimated that approximately $2-1/2 trillion of
household debt (21% of outstanding household liabilities) will reprice in
2006. If the Fed is worried about rising debt service costs slowing consumer
spending, why would it keep operating in a way to guarantee that those debt
service costs keep rising?
Well, of course, one reason it might keep pushing up debt service costs would
be to fight rising inflation. Is inflation rising? Let's assume that the consensus
forecast for the February month-to-month change in the PCE price index is right
- up 0.1% all items, up 0.1% for core items. This would put the year-over-year
change for the all-items PCE price index up 2.9%, which is down from January's
3.1% and down from the cyclical peak of 3.8% set back in September 2005. So,
the overall rate of consumer inflation is trending lower as energy prices level
off. The Fed frets about the pass-through of energy prices. Is there much evidence
of that? If the consensus is right, as mentioned earlier, the year-over-year
change in the core PCE price index in February will be 1.7%, down from 1.8%
in January and down from its cyclical peak of 2.3% in November 2004. Keep in
mind inflation is a lagging economic process. So, if core inflation already
is trending lower, chances are it will continue to do so.
Labor expenses account for about two-thirds of total production costs in the
U.S. Any sign that inflationary pressures are bubbling up from this source?
When controlling for the kinds of jobs being created (e.g. health-care professionals
vs. health-care non-professionals), the partial answer is "no." The Employment
Cost Index (ECI) for private sector employees, which includes total compensation
but adjusts for the kinds of jobs being created, on a year-over-year basis
was up only 3.0% in Q4:2005 - down from 3.8% in Q4:2004. Looking at this ECI
on a Q4/Q4 basis, you would have to go back to the 2.6% in Q4:1995 to find
a change less than the 3.0% in Q4:2005.
What about inflation expectations? As of Friday, the market's CPI expectations
over the next ten years was 2.47% -- down from 2.53% at the time of the January
31 FOMC meeting and down from 2.52% at the time of the June 30, 2004 FOMC meeting.
By the way, the price of a barrel of crude oil on June 30, 2004, the day the
FOMC embarked on its measured tightening campaign, was almost $27 a barrel
cheaper than it was last Friday. Yet, inflation expectations are marginally
lower.
I don't know what leading indicators the FOMC puts any faith in, but
based on past performance, it could do worse than putting some faith in the
Conference Board's LEI index. Based on the January-February average, the year-over-year
change in the LEI in Q1:2005 is 1.8%. This is down from a cyclical peak growth
of 9.0% in Q1:2004. Chances are that if the FOMC keeps pushing up the fed funds
rate, LEI growth will keep falling. Gosh, it sure would be embarrassing to
the new Fed chairman if he nudged the economy into a recession with inflation
trending lower and the LEI having given him a clear "pause" signal at 4-3/4%.
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