Gary and Margaret Hwang Smith spend a lot of time musing about real estate.
It is not just that the couple, economics professors at Pomona College,
have put so much of their money in the game, having bought a home in Claremont,
a college town in Southern California, a real estate market that has been
described as overpriced by most and a bubble by some.
Rather, they said, applying economic tools to buy a five-bedroom 1922 Craftsman
home sharpened their thinking and guided two years of research into whether
there is a bubble. They concluded that not only was the Los Angeles region
not in a bubble, but many markets that others were calling overpriced, like
Chicago or Boston, were probably under priced.
Their findings are at odds with other surveys that use the relationship
of home prices to income to determine whether home buyers are overreaching.
Homes in Orange County, Calif., were fairly priced, the Smiths found. Some
cities like Dallas, Indianapolis and Atlanta were screaming bargains. Homes
they surveyed in San Mateo County, south of San Francisco, were, however,
overpriced by about 54 percent.
In a paper the two presented at the Brookings Institution this week, "Bubble,
Bubble, Where's the Housing Bubble?" they said that even though prices had
risen rapidly and some buyers unrealistically expected the trend to continue, "the
bubble is not, in fact, a bubble in most of these areas."
They argued that the value of a home is determined by the rent it could
fetch. Calculate the future rents, subtract mortgage payments, taxes and
other costs, factor in a good annual rate of return of 6 percent or more,
and one should be looking at the proper price of a house or condo.
Their bottom line was: "Buying a house at current market prices still appears
to be an attractive long-term investment."
Richard Peach, a vice president at the Federal Reserve Bank in New York
who studies home prices and their relation to income, echoed that view, saying, "This
is an important paper."
The value of the Smiths' research may be its practicality. It concentrates
on the how, more than the why, in laying out a method to determine the underlying
value of a home. They offer a way for real estate agents, financial planners
and prospective homeowners to understand how much is too much to pay for
a house.
Karl E. Case, a Wellesley College economics professor who has been studying
real estate prices for more than 25 years, calls the paper's method "absolutely
the correct way to think about it."
The Smiths say a prospective homeowner needs to ask, Should I buy or should
I rent? That the value of a house is tied to the rent it can command is not
a new idea. Other economists have advanced the idea and some have advanced
the notion that a bubble can be measured with price-to-rent ratios that correspond
to price-to-earnings ratios for stock.
But a price-to-rent ratio does not go far enough, according to the Smiths.
Investors like Warren E. Buffett value a stock by looking at its intrinsic
value -- that is, how much return one would get on the stock over time. For
stocks, that is the cash the company generates and, in some cases, gives
back to shareholders in the form of dividends.
The intrinsic value of a house is the rent that it can generate. "It's not
that houses are like stock," Mr. Smith said, "but if you think about them
as you do stocks, you start thinking about it correctly."
The problem is that there has not been a good way to compare rents with
homes. Indexes that try often end up comparing apartment rent with prices
of a single-family home. A result, the Smiths said, is inflated price-to-rent
ratios that are displayed as evidence of a bubble when one may not exist.
The Smiths solution was to look for "matched pairs" of similar houses, one
rented, one owned, but both in the same neighborhood. They did this in 10
cities in which they could find enough real estate data and matched pairs.
Once they had established what rent was for a certain house, they used software
they created to compute the flow of rents over time, factoring in the outflow
of mortgage payments, maintenance costs and taxes. Then they had to determine
what those future payments would be worth today, which economists call the
net present value. If the net present value is a positive number, the house
is worth the price. If the result is a negative number, the buyer would be
better off renting it.
Several economists, like Mr. Case and Mr. Shiller, quibble about the assumptions
the Smiths make in doing their calculations -- for example, homeowners spending
only about 2 percent of the house price a year on maintenance or that everyone
can obtain a mortgage interest deduction.
I find it interesting the number of complete fools hopping on the "no bubble
bandwagon". The 2% maintenance figure is of course questionable, but I am very
surprised that no one questioned the key assumption that house prices will
rise 6% a year from now until eternity.
It simply does not wash. Here is something that does. Long term prices of
houses simply can not rise above people's means to pay for them. That is a
simple economic fact. Here is another simple economic fact: Family
incomes are falling. The negative savings rate and rising foreclosures
are more proof of stress in the system. Real wages have fallen for 4 consecutive
years and that includes some pretty fat bonuses of the Wall Street fat cats
at the top end.
The fact is that home prices are several standard deviations above norm in
terms of affordability in many locations. Gary and Margaret Smith are simply
making the classic mistake of projecting into the future what has happened
over the last 10-20 years as if it that period is the norm. That is the same
type of mentality used to justify the Nasdaq bubble in Spring of 2000.
At 6% appreciation a year home prices would double again in 12 years. That
nifty 3 bedroom shack in California now priced at $800,000 would supposedly
go for $1.6 million in 12 short years. That $750,000 condo in Florida supposedly
would be going for $1.5 million 12 years from now. Sorry, I do not think so.
Who could afford to buy them? Buyers are already stretched.
Did the Smith's factor in property taxes? Did they factor in the possibility
of rising federal taxes? Did they factor in the possibility of a ball breaking
recession? Did they factor in global wage arbitrage that is working to suppress
wages in the US? Did they factor in possible effects of a baby boomer retirement?
What did they factor in other than an absurd and unfounded belief that home
price will continue to appreciate at a 6% clip from now until eternity?
The Smith's are in fantasy land. There is no economic justification for their
key assumption. Proof will be coming up shortly when bubble area prices drop
40% or more, and the non bubble areas stagnate at best.
People are always looking for reasons to justify their purchase. It happened
with the Nasdaq bubble and it is happening again in the echo bubble in housing. Their
study, a 60 page PDF, is impressive in length but unfortunately their key
assumption is as flawed as dot com "click count" analysis was in 1999.