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The following is an excerpt from our 12 June Latest Letter.
...meanwhile the brazilian girls are dancing in the Berlin streets - Brazil
plays Croatia today and its in the 90s (33 °c) today - must be a cooker
down on the pitch - playing in the refurbished Olympic Stadium. I just went
to buy Barron's newspaper and the turkish kiosk seller is wearing a Brazil
T-shirt ... he said he likes the dancing girls...
The markets are dancing too - but they've lost their pants while doing the
samba! It doesn't matter where one looks - a sea of red on the monitor - been
like that for weeks now. At first we heard "Me worry? - it's a needed correction" ...
now we're hearing "Maybe it's more - where's the exit?" Somebody told
me that markets, on average, drop seven times (7x) faster than it takes to
rise. This year we're close : from Dec 31 to now, markets have risen and given
back near everything in 3 weeks, since 18 May.



We don't want to kick a beaten down dog any longer and complain as many have
about the recent market corrections everywhere - emerging, precious metals,
major indices worldwide, etc. Often pleasure and pain are very close to one
another - gold bugs can attest to that right now (gold is down $40 today to
$567) just as those invested in the big markets can. Fear works its way quickly
around in a globalized world - it ain't a one-way street out there. A non-investing
friend from Germany once asked me why everybody follows the US markets when
they are not in the US - damn good question: LINKAGE. Other world markets have
become more and more zombies of the US markets - all these charts look EXACTLY
the same. Oversupply of USDollars and the increased usage of technology / telecommuncations
/ computer-aided trading enables more linkage and the usage of rule-based computing.
Have you ever looked at the closing charts of major world markets (as shown
above) - it's like looking at twins but instead of 2 its 7 or 8 (septuplets)
...that's why - US sets the die and others cast themselves to them.
What has been the prevailing die? Easy liquidity. The entire western world
along with Japan have been the leading "producers" of easy money the last 4-5
years after the dot.com blowout. In the simplest of terms, monetary investment
will expand to fill the amount of liquidity alloted to it. That is to say,
the recent run up in many sectors and markets have been feeding on the "easy" money
which has been injected into world economies over the last years - as we have
always talked about, feed-through times, or lag times, can take anywhere from
6 to 18 months to trickle through the financial system. Housing and asset prices,
stock prices, energy prices, food prices, etc. have all been on a good run
over this time period. We all have seen it. Now the central banks are saying
they see too much "inflation" in the pipeline (which they created) and directly
infers that we need to "hunker down" and fight inflation - the oddest of things
is this - the banks may now have brought about a situation where the battle
they say they are fighting against may now only become worse than they intended,
but later.
By raising both the rhetoric and rates, the Fed and other central banks (CB)
around the world have been increasing the market tension and the result has
been a world-wide selloff in the markets, gold included has gotten sucked up
in a psychological battle even as the stupidity of media has been explaining
for years that gold is a HEDGE in an inflationary environment - sorry, but
gold has been rising for 6 years and the talk of inflation is a "phenomena" of
the last 6 months! Obviously gold has been rising on other factors than just
inflation. But getting back to the core, if the Fed and ECB are now worried
about inflation then they surely must be playing a high-stakes game of poker:
IF the world economy on their CB "we need to be vigilant on inflation" mantra
should fall into a protracted stagflation, or dread, deflationary cycle, then
can this be good for their respective economies? Clearly no. Hence they ought
not be wishing for such and surely should not be beating the raise-rate drums
too loud. So just as asset prices (a consumption driver) in the US, and possibly
elsewhere in Europe are falling, the CBs are raising rates. The truth of where
rates should be, lies below the rhetoric and above historical lows.
Where's the irony? The irony is that Bernanke at the Fed is some economic
history buff who studied(s) the history of DEFLATION. Could Bernanke be ushering
in a deflationary type recession where his "man-handling" of the rates spooks
the world markets MORE than they already are these last weeks? And do we think
that the near-perfect raising of interest rates by CBs throughout the world
is some sort of coincidence? Again, if Bernanke and Trichet get too damn enthralled
with "fighting inflation" then we may well see a protracted economic
downturn.
The bottomline is this: The western nations may be facing a recessionary
or slowing down but if the economic data starts to turn sour then our conjecture
is that Bernanke will need to again raise liquidity (lower rates) because that
is in fact one of their core mandates - maintain price stability and growth via
managing inflation expectations. In fact, the Fed's core targeted inflation
is always around 2%. Our estimation of this from January this year was that
by Q4/2006 the FFR (baseline Fed interest rate) would be 5.25 or 5.5% (2 more
25bp hikes). We are sticking by this figure. In fact, we see an easing off
of rates by December as this current ferocious market pullback has probably
caused sufficent fear in the FOMC committee that the message has been
taken and price stability is falling back into line. The lag time for this
stablization should last into Q2 of 2007. A final note: We have read
economic reports that the targeted inflation rate of 1 to 2% has been missed
to the upside and hence all wheels are in motion at the Fed to "bring that
sucker" down into "normal channels". The problem with a rule and data based
monetary policy is that a) rules don't always work (give the desired results)
given the parameters at hand, and b) macro data is always backward looking
not forward looking. Here's something from NBER to ponder:
Recent empirical research shows that a reasonable characterization of
federal-funds-rate targeting behavior is that the change in the target
rate depends on the maturity structure of interest rates and exhibits little
dependence on lagged target rates. See, for example, Cochrane and Piazzesi
(2002). The result echoes the policy rule used by McCallum (1994) to rationalize
the empirical failure of the `expectations hypothesis' applied to the term-
structure of interest rates. That is, rather than forward rates acting
as unbiased predictors of future short rates, the historical evidence suggests
that the correlation between forward rates and future short rates is surprisingly
low. McCallum showed that a desire by the monetary authority to adjust
short rates in response to exogenous shocks to the term premiums imbedded
in long rates (i.e. "yield-curve smoothing"), along with a desire for smoothing interest
rates across time, can generate term structures that account for the puzzling
regression results of Fama and Bliss (1987). McCallum also clearly
pointed out that this reduced-form approach to the policy rule, although
naturally forward looking, needed to be studied further in the context
of other response functions such as the now standard Taylor (1993) rule.
We explore both the robustness of McCallum's result to endogenous models
of the term premium and also its connections to the Taylor Rule. We model
the term premium endogenously using two different models in the class of
affine term structure models studied in Duffie and Kan (1996): a stochastic
volatility model and a stochastic price-of- risk model. We then solve for
equilibrium term structures in environments in which interest rate targeting
follows a rule such as the one suggested by McCallum (i.e., the "McCallum
Rule"). We demonstrate that McCallum's original result generalizes in a
natural way to this broader class of models. To understand the connection
to the Taylor Rule, we then consider two structural macroeconomic models
which have reduced forms that correspond to the two affine models and provide
a macroeconomic interpretation of abstract state variables (as in Ang and
Piazzesi (2003)). Moreover, such structural models allow us to interpret
the parameters of the term-structure model in terms of the parameters governing
preferences, technologies, and policy rules. We show how a monetary policy
rule will manifest itself in the equilibrium asset-pricing kernel and,
hence, the equilibrium term structure. We then show how this policy can
be implemented with an interest-rate targeting rule. This provides us with
a set of restrictions under which the Taylor and McCallum Rules are equivalent
in the sense if implementing the same monetary policy. We conclude with
some numerical examples that explore the quantitative link between these
two models of monetary policy.
The upshot being: based on current targeted inflation rates and where "inflation" is
now, Bernanke could theoretically, using macroeconomic rules of Taylor/McCallum
entailing a 150bp move, be heading for 6.5%. We currently think this
is too aggressive. The markets have corrected heavily (and psychologically)
and market-makers have seemingly baked the next rate hike into the upcoming
June cake supporting USD holders. IF Bernanke and Co. are reading the tea-leaves "correctly" then
we feel an easing or halting at the June meeting is in order such to digest
the commodity and broad market pullbacks along with housing. Were this to happen
we would see a strong rebound in the markets and more weakness in the US Dollar.
Right now, the USD is being supported in a "flight" to cash - but maybe it
would be more prudent, if holding cash, to do it in something other than USDs.
Cash is still cash and risk is risk.
Of course, being a Professor of Economics, and data-driven, we should not
preclude a modicum of common sense on his part, for if he doesn't grasp the
psychology aspect of markets, the US consumer, and the world along with him,
may start to feel a bit more nervous than the recent market pullback has shown,
and God forbid, a deflationary triggering. That would be irony, Ben.
*World Cup 2006 is a registered Trademark of FIFA
World Glut 2006 is a market reality.
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Randolph Buss
Berlin, Germany
www.dinl.net
Randolph Buss, currently works in portfolio & asset
management | commodity fund advisory & management | macro investment research
as editor and publisher of his newsletter read in over 45 countries.
The full GMR and portfolio entries can be read at the
homepage www.dinl.net along with the full
disclaimer. For those new readers, the Global Macro Roundtable (GMR)
is conceived as a "real world" newsletter written by market analysts and not
by unknown editors doing research for others. The GMR provides up-to-date
analysis and gives the reader a variety of opinions on the investment markets
and sectors. We are not here to massage our egos rather we are here to
provide our readers with real-world research and investment opportunities.
The markets know more than any body - we remain humble but alert.
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