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NEW YORK (KWR) --Sitting astride key sea lanes on the Red Sea
and the Indian Ocean and not far from the Arabian Peninsula's oilfields, Somalia
is not an obscure piece of real estate. This "country" of roughly nine million
people represents an increasingly dangerous problem to its neighbors in the
form of international piracy and the potential for outside forces to meddle.
Lacking an effective central government since the downfall of the Siad Barre
regime in 1991, it appears Somalia could be hitting another turning point as
the Council of Islamic Courts of Somalia (CICS) has gained control over much
of the south, including the capital Mogadishu. Considering probable past linkages
to Osama bin-Laden and a clear sympathy to the objective of creating a society
built around Sharia or Islamic law, the CICS has prompted the return of international
attention to Somalia, with concerns this war-torn land could be following the
same path as Afghanistan did under the Taliban.
Afghanistan and Somalia share something - both have undergone long periods
of lawlessness, a reflection of weak or nonexistent central governments. For
the vast majority of people living in Afghanistan and Somalia, personal safety
depended on the guns of the local warlord, hardly a satisfactory arrangement.
Consequently, when a group like the Taliban in Afghanistan came along in the
1990s, offering law and order and an easy to understand ideology (radical Islam),
there was a strong appeal. The Taliban were able to take over most of Afghanistan
in a relatively short period of time, including the capital, Kabul, because
they offered something beyond the localized interest of a handful of thug-like
warlords - at least initially. The same is occurring in Somalia, though a similar
outcome is hardly cast in stone.
Located on the eastern horn of Africa, Somalia has a sad history. Since 1991,
it has been badly fragmented and has earned the moniker of being Africa's "most
failed state". The northern part of the country has spun off into the self-proclaimed
Republic of Somaliland and semi-autonomous Puntland, with the largest part
of the country in the south long being a war zone, with various warlords and
clans slugging it out for control over the former capital of Mogadishu. There
is a weak transitional government (backed by other African countries), independent
warlords, and the CICS. The CICS has gained ground in June and July, including
taking control of Mogadishu, something of symbolic value.
The CICS is a relatively broad-based Islamic movement, seeking to impose Sharia
(Islamic) law on the areas under its control, hence its heavy reliance on courts,
backed by Muslim militias. It also marks a sharp contrast thus far from the
arbitrary nature of local warlords, who are motivated by individual and clan
interests. For a long-embattled population of roughly nine million, this is
a positive departure. The country has a life expectancy of 48.45 years, one
of the lowest in the world, infectious diseases are widespread (including malaria,
bacterial diarrhea, and typhoid fever), and it has one of the world's highest
birth rates (close to 3%). It is estimated that literacy is around 37 percent,
low by even African standards. Economic life is rudimentary, considering the
breakdown in infrastructure.
Somalia, however, does have economic potential. The country is known to have
supplies of uranium, iron ore, bauxite, copper, natural gas, and probable oil
reserves. Considering the charged nature of international energy and commodity
markets, Somalia could benefit from commercial exploitation of its natural
resources. Moreover, the country has a certain entrepreneurial spirit, reflected
by the creation and maintenance of a wireless telecommunications system and
a system of remittances banks that handle an estimated $500 million from Somalis
living aboard.
While warlords have created lawlessness on land, they have used piracy to
finance their operations, making the Somali coast one of the most dangerous
stretches of water in the world according to the International Maritime Bureau
and United Nations. International shipping is subject to both raids for cargo
and the holding of ships' crews for ransom. Consequently, it is little wonder
that the CICS offering of law and order has an appeal, especially considering
the weakness of the transitory government and the power of warlords, much along
the same lines as the Taliban did in Afghanistan.
Yet the rise of the CICS is problematic. Members of the CICS have indicated
support for al-Qaeda, and it is suspected that a number of international terrorists
involved in the 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in East Africa have taken refuge
in the country. Questions are also being raised about the possible flow of
funds to radicals there from Saudi Arabia and Yemen. In addition, Osama Bin-Laden
recently warned he would help the CICS fight any foreigners that enter Somalia,
a comment aimed at Ethiopia (which probably has small numbers of troops across
the border on behalf of the transition government) and the United States.
Heightening concerns about the hard-line Islamic angle, the CICS recently
replaced a relatively moderate cleric as leader for Sheik Hassan Dahir Aweys,
who is on the U.S. terrorist watch list as a suspected al-Qaeda collaborator.
Aweys is the founder of Al-Itihad, a radical Islamic group founded in the 1990s.
The organization adheres to a strict reading of the Koran (similar to Wahabi
interpretation used by the Taliban in Afghanistan), has developed a beneficial
relationship with major traders and remittance banks, and has courted support
from Somalia's poorest urban population with offers of welfare services. It
has also been credited with several attacks in Ethiopia, which has been concerned
about Somali claims over territory. Aweys himself had admitted past contact
with Osama bin-Laden, though no recent links.
The danger in Somalia is if the CICS becomes the dominant force pushed along
by external opposition and support, it could create a Taliban-like state on
a strategic crossroads. While adding one more potential headache in calculating
international oil prices, it could only add to the country's problems. A more
successful and radical CICS could be one result of stepped-up U.S. involvement
- Washington has already allegedly provided financial support for warlords
to eliminate radical Islamic terrorists.
In looking ahead to Somalia's future and its impact on the world, three points
must be considered. First and foremost, most Somalis are probably not inclined
to support a new Taliban regime. In those areas under CICS control, the clerics
banned World Cup soccer "watching parties", cutting off electricity to theaters
showing the games. In one case this resulted in the shooting of two demonstrators.
They also have ordered women to wear veils. Both moves have not gone over well
with the majority of Somalis. In addition, most Somalis are aware the Taliban
brought in al-Qaeda and even more violence.
Second, Somalia has been down this road before - during the 1970s the Horn
of Africa became a proxy war zone in the Cold War and with disastrous effects.
Somalia's bid to win its claim on a slice of Ethiopia ended up in a massive
Soviet and Cuban intervention against Somalia, from which the Barre regime
never fully recovered. Another round of external intervention could reinforce
the current fragmentation. Along these lines, Ethiopia is already deeply involved
in Somalia's affairs, considering the troop build-up along the border, probable
support of its troops inside of the territory held by the transitional government,
and ongoing suspicion of the CICS as an instrument of Eritrea, with which it
has a border dispute. Considering that foreign radical Islamists are probably
also involved, as well as U.S. special forces operating out of Djibouti, foreign
involvement involving assassinations and military strikes is not likely to
be the glue needed to pull things together again.
Third, Somalia does have a framework for creating a broad-based government,
the Nairobi accords. Other African governments have a clear reason to provide
greater support to making a new government work in Somalia as the creation
of a Taliban-like state in the Horn of Africa would not be a positive development,
especially considering the weak nature of many governments. Such a development
would be dangerous on many levels - stirring up radical Islam in countries
with multi-religious populations (like Kenya, Tanzania and Nigeria) or in places
where moderate Islam has long ruled.
Somalia also represents a tough challenge for the United States. The 1993
U.S. military intervention (along with other United Nations forces) was best
remembered by the "Black Hawk Down" experience in which eighteen special forces
soldiers were killed in a failed attempt to capture the warlord Mohammad Farrah
Aidid and restore order. The consequent U.S. withdrawal was taken by al-Qaeda
as a sign the U.S. had little staying power when circumstances turned tough
- a fatal miscalculation. All the same, U.S. policy since 2004 of supporting
along with the U.N. the ineffectual transitional government has generated few
rewards. Now, a more radical form of Islam could be rising.
Somalis have reached yet another fork in the road of their "national" development.
One road leads to radical Islam and the very real potential for greater outside
intervention --most likely by neighbors afraid of a Taliban-like regime on
their doorstep. The other road is equally challenging, but the end game may
have something Somalis badly desire - peace and stability. That road is to
work harder at creating a broad-gauged government, with room for moderate Islam
as well as secular forces. This road requires the country's clans to surrender
some power, the CICS to be flexible in dealing with the concerns of the international
community (in particular in regard to terrorism), and external forces to be
helpful where possible and show restraint when necessary. None of this will
be easy, but the danger of a Somalia becoming increasingly embroiled in the
war against terrorism is not in anyone's interest.
While the information and opinions contained within have been compiled from
sources believed to be reliable, KWR does not represent that it is accurate
or complete and it should be relied on as such. Accordingly, nothing in this
article shall be construed as offering a guarantee of the accuracy or completeness
of the information contained herein, or as an offer or solicitation with respect
to the purchase or sale of any security. All opinions and estimates are subject
to change without notice. KWR staff, consultants and contributors to the KWR
International Advisor may at any time have a long or short position in any
security or option mentioned.
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Dr. Scott B. MacDonald,
KWR International, Inc.
Scott MacDonald is a Senior Consultant at KWR International.
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are subject to change without notice. KWR staff, consultants, authors and contributors
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