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At last the National Review Online has published an article attacking
the dangerous idea that "the Federal Reserve should set the fed funds rate" (Stop
Targeting the Fed Funds Rate). Paul Hoffmeister, chief economist at
Bretton Woods Research, argues that price pressures ought to force supply-siders
to reconsider their belief that the Fed needs to lift short term rates to halt
the rise in the price of gold. It's his opinion that current trends in the
US economy suggest that targeting the funds rate "has wholly failed in effectively
restraining money-supply growth in relation to money demand".
In Hoffmeister's view the Fed should use open market operations to hall back
the price of gold to "$400 an ounce". In other words, the Fed should deflate.
He observes that though the funds rate rose from 1 per cent in June to 5.25
per cent today the monetary base appears unaffected. This is where it gets
interesting. As I never tire of pointing out the real problem is not the monetary
base (cash) but credit expansion.
He draws attention to the fact that since June 2004 the Fed's balance sheet
reveals "reserve bank credit" has been growing at a rate of 4 to 7 per cent.
(Readers may recall that I have previously stressed the Reserve Bank of Australia's
monthly assets and liabilities as an indicator of monetary growth). Hoffmeister
further observes that currently "loans and investments by commercial banks,
is currently growing at a 9.5 percent year-over-year rate, an increase from
6.2 percent during June 2004".
Although his conclusion that the growth in credit demonstrates that the Fed
has not been draining funds from the banking system is correct we are still
left with the problem of defining the money supply. It logically follows that
this cannot be successfully done without first properly defining money itself.
Fortunately this was done more than 200 years ago by Walter Boyd. In his Letter
to Pitt the Younger (1801) he made clear with admirable clarity the distinction
between "ready money" and so-called money substitutes:
By the words 'Means of Circulation, 'Circulating Medium', and 'Currency',
which are used almost as synonymous terms in this letter, I understand always ready
money, whether consisting of Bank Notes or specie, in contradistinction
to Bills of Exhange, Navy Bills, Exchequer Bills, or any other negotiable paper,
which form no part of the circulating medium, as I have always understood
that term. The latter is the Circulator; the former are merely objects
of circulation.
Unfortunately Boyd's monetary insight has been all but lost, which helps account
for the current confusion between 'money' and 'money substitutes'. This brings
me back to Hoffmeister. His observation about the amount of "loans and investments" by
commercial banks is only suggestive with respect to monetary growth.
Accepting Boyd's sensible definition of money leads to the conclusion that
credit instruments like certificates of deposits, travellers' cheques and other
credit transactions are not part of the money supply -- being "merely objects
of circulation". On the other hand, demand deposits with commercial banks
and thrift institutions plus saving deposits plus government deposits with
banks and the central bank are money. (In this respect the banking school was
right and the currency school egregiously wrong).
The question of money and credit instruments is a vital point at which the
great majority of economists, including Hoffmeister, seriously err. He, like
most economists, calls MZM (money of zero maturity) "the most liquid form of
money". Let's take a closer look at MZM. An MZM asset is one that can be immediately
redeemed without suffering a penalty or a capital loss.
It is this 'liquidity' that is supposed to make MZM part of the money supply.
But it ought to be self-evident that in order to obtain money we must first
offer something for it. This is why MZM, irrespective of the prevailing monetary
view, cannot be part of the money supply. Anything that has to be exchanged
for money cannot be money. Something that Walter Boyd made exceptionally
clear.
Hoffmeister compounded this error with the another one. According to the prevailing
view, which he shares, a "slower economy requires less money". It follows that
a growing economy requires more money. Therefore monetary policy should reflect
changes in GDP. This is a very dangerous fallacy and one the classical economists
thought they had permanently put to rest. They understood that increasing the
quantity of money did nothing to raise living standards. This could be done
only by accumulating more capital. Moreover, the idea that the money supply
should be expanded in line with economic growth smacks of the buy-back-the-product
fallacy.
He finished by "calling for the Fed to directly target a $400 gold price by
selling bonds to immediately drain the excess liquidity flooding the economy".
This, as I already said, is a deflationary policy and would probably cause
a deep recession. It also misses the vital point that there is no purpose in
the Fed targeting a gold price. If you want to link gold to monetary policy
then go the whole hog and recommend a gold standard.
The gold price argument reveals the inconsistency of Hoffmeister's argument.
Any policy that recommends monetary expansion in line with GDP, which is what
the great majority of economists mean by economic growth, must eventually cause
the price of gold to rise relative to the dollar. (This situation reminds me
of the highly instructive gold bullion controversy that started in 1801).
Despite his opening round it is clear that Hoffmeister does not understand,
any more than most other economists do, that the problem is a four-fold one
of (a) failure to properly define money, (b) failure to grasp the fact that
credit expansion is the root cause of the boom bust cycle, (c) failure to understand
the nature of capital and (d) failure to comprehend the fact that money is
not neutral.
Until mainstream economists adopt Walter Boyd's definition of money and the
reality that money is not neutral the US economy will continue to be plagued
with recurring recessions.
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