|
For those of us who like to focus on global economic numbers as they are released,
statistics relating to the Chinese economy have of late been attention-grabbing.
On August 30th China's National Bureau of Statistics revised upward the country's
2005 gross domestic product (GDP) growth to 10.2 percent reflecting faster
expansion than first reported. For the second quarter 2006 China's GDP grew
11.3 percent over the year earlier, while industrial output clocked in at a
record 19.5 percent rate in June. At the same time investment and exports have
catapulted China's economy to the world's fourth largest in the 28 years since
free-market reforms began.
It is worthy to note that the China boom is hurtling along at its fastest
pace since 1994 when its economy was one-fourth its current size.
The situation in China reflects a global economic landscape that has undergone
a seismic shift in the last decade, and is echoed by the fact that the combined
economies of China and India are now greater than the United States. According
to the Bank of Nova Scotia emerging and newly industrialized Asian nations,
excluding Japan, now account for 30 percent of the world's economic growth
when GDP is adjusted to reflect purchasing power parity. Meanwhile, the countries
that make up the G7 (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Britain and the
United States) currently represent 41 percent of global GDP, down 6 percent
from a decade ago.
Asia's ascendance as an economic superpower has been augmented by robust regional
dynamics. Trade within the Asian region centered around China is now nearly
twice as large as the trade that takes place within the NAFTA zone. As a result
of the boom, infrastructure projects in the area are undergoing a massive expansion,
and the furious pace has spurred a migration of people from the country to
cities and led to rapidly rising income levels, which has in turn boosted consumer
spending.
The problem is that this level of growth in China is not sustainable as it
leads to rampant inflation, inefficiencies in capital allocation, margin compression
and increased banking instability. The Chinese government recognizes this and
has embarked on a series of steps to try and rebalance the economy. These steps
include an increase in the banks' reserve requirements, a cut in tax rebates
from exports, tighter controls on land development and a range of other "administrative
measures." However, while there are signs these actions are starting to have
some impact, most are far from optimal.
Administrative measures are blunt instruments that create distortions elsewhere
in the economy. They are also hard to enforce. It is reported that the majority
of recent land transactions in some provinces are illegal because local governments
have defied Beijing's directives to restrain property investment. By the time
orders do get implemented, there is a risk that it will be too little too late.
In the meantime the interest-rate hike which took effect on August 19 has not
had the same impact as the one in October 2004. Unless the People's Bank of
China initiates more rate hikes, monetary policy is set to remain over-stimulative
for the time-being.
In their defense, China's central bank's caution to use monetary policy may
partly be because the effectiveness of such tools in China's economy is limited.
But that point reveals a central issue -- that China is NOT YET a mature free
market country, and in fact has a primitive financial system which is still
centralized and steered by politicians who act primarily to benefit their political
interests first.
Given decisions to date China's policymakers are more concerned with denting
growth. China needs GDP growth north of 7% a year just to stay even with its
massive population and new job seekers. Reducing unemployment and underemployment
requires even faster growth. In fact just recently "an official" at China's
National Bureau of Statistics stated that high-speed economic growth will not
solve the country's unemployment problem. While attributing the phenomenon
to numerous factors, including the migration of rural labor forces to urban
areas, structural adjustments to the economy, the impact of reforms and the
bankruptcy of some state-owned enterprises, this same official expressed confidence
about the employment situation, saying the Communist Party of China and the
government is very focused on the issue and has made job creation a priority.
At the same time, the government is alarmed by runaway real estate prices
because unaffordable housing has become a major political flashpoint for the
majority of urban Chinese.
This poses a real conundrum for the Chinese government. As long as China is
fueled by cheap money, slowing down one sector through "administrative measures" only
means that the money will flow into other sectors and create an asset bubble
somewhere else. In any case, Beijing is for now reluctant to effectively tackle
the growing domestic imbalances in its economy by implementing "modern" fiscal
and monetary policies.
With that in mind we can attempt, by looking at the interests of the political
elite, to make an educated guess as to the timing of when China may be forced
to face the ramifications of its extreme growth.
In two years China will host the largest international event: the 2008 Olympics.
This will be the perfect showcase for the new China, a country which knows
well that for the first time in its modern history it has an opportunity to
position itself as a global economic and political superpower. As it stands
the idea that American hegemony is overstretched and fatigued represents thinking
advocated/ believed by many, Russia's economy under its "oily curtain" is
too reliant on the vagaries of international commodities markets, India remains
the acknowledged tortoise in the economic race between the two Asian giants,
while "old" Europe - too busy figuring out the meaning of life - shuffles from
one crisis of confidence to another.
So until 2008, notwithstanding any uncontrollable economic tsunami occurring,
China will continue to aggressively build up its infrastructure and secure
more raw materials and energy supplies at any cost whatsoever. This factor
has already been evident in the magnitude of increased demand many commodity
markets have already experienced. If China follows this script then Chinese
economic growth and supply-side demand will be prolonged for at least the next
two years. Therefore, as a general trading framework, we should look to take
advantage of any short term technical weakness in commodities, keeping in mind
the summer of 2008.
What about after the 2008 Olympics? I think China (and the world) will have
to come face-to-face with its enormous portfolio of non-performing loans which
will cripple China's banking system. The ramifications are potentially scary
when one thinks about the fact that China is the second biggest holder of U.S.
Treasuries and together with Japan accounts for more than half of world reserve
accumulation between 2002 and 2005. In fact, the United States now needs to
attract about $2.5 billion a day to fund the trade gap and keep the value of
the dollar steady.
The build up of reserves and a growing trade deficit with China has given
U.S. politicians fodder to demand change. The U.S. has been pushing China to
let its currency trade more in line with market forces. Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke
also chimed in saying "I don't think that we can continue to finance the current
account deficit at 6 percent or 7 percent of GDP indefinitely, and it's desirable
for us to bring down that ratio over a period of time."
Yet others argue that the squeals in Washington at the yawning U.S. trade
deficit with China are overblown. The basis for the viewpoint is that the wide
difference between both sides' data is overstated. After ironing out data discrepancies,
Oxford Economics found that China's share has hovered at about a fifth of the
total U.S. merchandise deficit since 1995. By most measures, the U.S. is still
the top manufacturing nation producing almost a quarter of global output, the
same as in 1994. If U.S. manufacturing is stronger than many Americans believe,
China poses a weaker challenge than is often supposed as its output is still
less than half that of the U.S. and many of its industries are suffering a
severe profits squeeze. According to the Institute for International Economics
and the Center for Strategic and International Studies, on average two-thirds
of the value of Chinese products is imported. Further many big-ticket Chinese
exports are of things no longer made in the U.S. or that have never been made
here. Therefore a large renminbi revaluation would merely shift Chinese production
to lower-cost locations elsewhere.
When push comes to shove recent tumults such as the Lebanon-Israeli war, which
instigated a reflexive "flight-to-quality" into U.S. Treasuries, regularly
reminds us that for the time-being the greenback's status is still "the" world
currency reserve. And when all is said and done, those who would fear China
imposing a new economic world order should think back to when the same was
said of Japan.
However things evolve economically and/or politically, the Chinese proverb "may
you live in interesting times" seems appropriate at this juncture in our world's
history.
|