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In their election oratory politicians usually stress their love of fiscal discipline
and balanced budgets. But as soon as they are elected they tend to discover
a great number of exceptions that require more funding. President Bush clearly
made the election pledge to avoid budget deficits, but, ever since September
11, 2001, his budget proposals built on exceptions project a deficit of more
than $300 billion for each of the next few years. Yet, he also argues for prompt
tax reduction, which signals a brand-new course of action in the annals of
fiscal policy.
The prospect of soaring deficits and simultaneous tax reductions alarms a
few economists. On this new fiscal road they foresee deficits of $500 billion
or even $600 billion annually, which in time may cast doubt on the credibility
of the federal government as debtor. Every few months the Congressional debt
ceiling needs to be lifted by a few hundred billion dollars. Congress last
raised it by $450 billion to $6.4 trillion on June 30, 2002; it needs to be
lifted right now as the official Treasury debt again has reached the ceiling.
At the present rate of spending it will need to be lifted in June or July of
this year and, in case of war with Iraq, even earlier.
The federal deficits are compounded by the budget shortfalls of most state
governments, estimated at some $105 billion in 1992-1993. State governments
are required legally to balance their budgets, which forces them either to
raise taxes or cut expenditures. Undoubtedly, most prefer to boost their fees
and exactions; the proposed federal tax reduction, if and when it finally passes
the U.S. Congress, may even compound their problems as many state systems are
based on the federal tax structure.
Both deficits, the federal and the state, constitute a heavy burden on the
capital market which keeps no idle savings amounting to hundreds of billions
of dollars. They force the Federal Reserve System to come to the rescue; it
can print any amount of money and create any volume of credit. The Fed is
the financier of last resort, the ultimate source of funds that enables the
federal government to finance any conceivable expenditure and cover any possible
deficit. Without the Fed, fiscal deficits of such magnitude would soon
depress the American economy and cause serious political repercussions. Its
ability to create dollars that enjoy world-wide acceptability enables it to
distribute the burden of U.S. Government deficits to countless millions of
dollar holders all over the globe. They pay for the deficits through depreciation
of the dollars in their pockets. Japanese and Chinese, Arabs and Hindus, French
and Germans, and all others with dollar savings join Americans in bearing the
burden of federal deficits.
This ability to place the economic cost of government spending on millions
of trusting victims rests on the extraordinary position of the U.S. dollar
as the world's primary reserve currency. The dollar acquired this distinction
by international agreement reached at Bretton Woods in New Hampshire in 1944
which committed the United States to provide an anchor for world prices by
pegging the dollar at $35 per ounce of gold and envisioned a world economy
linked by fixed dollar exchange rates. When the United States suffered chronic
gold losses and finally faced inability to make payments in gold, President
Nixon severed the dollar's gold link in August 1971, devalued the dollar against
major foreign currencies in December 1971, and finally floated it in March
1973. The world has been on a floating dollar standard ever since. It is a
fiat standard, unbacked and irredeemable, which can be inflated and depreciated
at will. Managed by the Federal Reserve System, it is a useful standard in
the financial service of the U.S. Government.
Other countries are narrowly limited in their ability to inflate and create
credit; if they indulge in expansion rates greater than those of their neighbors
and trade partners, they would soon face payment difficulties as imports increase
and exports decline. They would have to reduce the expansion rates and fall
in line with their neighbors and partners. The Federal Reserve System as the
manager of the world dollar standard has no such narrow limits. It can inflate
and create credit as long as its expansion does not exceed the world-wide demand
for its currency. It may generate trade deficits year after year and aggravate
its maladjustments as long as foreign banks and investors hoard the dollars
or invest them in American obligations. It is bound to cause world-wide financial
upheavals, however, when it depreciates the dollar at excessive rates and thereby
inflicts painful losses on those foreign investors.
The floating system based on the U.S. dollar has been a precarious structure
ever since its inception. During the 1970s the country suffered the worst inflation
in decades. By the end of the decade the inflation rate stood at 13 percent,
the Federal Reserve discount rate at 12 percent, and the prime lending rate
at 15.75 percent, the highest of the century. The dollar had fallen notably
in relation to the currencies of other trading countries and especially to
gold.
The 1980s saw some economic recovery but also brought new difficulties and
more maladjustments. They led to an explosion of personal, business, and government
debt which cast a shadow on the future of the financial structure. Federal
government debt soared from approximately $950 billion to nearly $3 trillion.
A growing share of this debt was acquired by foreign banks and investors who
used the widening imbalance of American imports over exports to invest their
earnings in the United States.
The 1990s, finally, seemed to defy all rules of economic behavior. Easy money
and credit spurred the most explosive stock market boom in U.S. history, creating
enormous speculative wealth and spawning new companies. With financial markets
booming, the federal government even reported a budget surplus, borrowing from
Social Security trust accounts. The balance-of-payment deficit became a major
concern as imports soared and exports stagnated, which further raised the mountain
of debt.
Toward the end of the decade, in 1998, the floating dollar standard suffered
a number of financial shocks that began in Asia and eventually struck fragile
economies around the world. American equity markets continued to surge until
2000 when an economic slowdown became evident also in the United States. In
2001, finally, the American economy slipped into recession for the first time
in ten years. The Federal Reserve immediately cut interest rates, a record
eleven times in one year; the U.S. Congress passed a large multi-year tax cut,
and the U.S. Treasury even sent out tax rebates to boost consumer spending.
Yet, the markets continued to plunge following the terrorist attacks on September
11, 2001.
According to various market analyses, foreign investors now own some $7 trillion
of U.S. assets, 13 percent of American corporate stock, 35 percent of U.S.
Treasury obligations, 23 percent of corporate bonds, and 14 percent of ownership
in American companies. They obviously do not take kindly to Federal Reserve
policies that depreciate the dollar and depress its exchange rate. Last year
alone, European investors in the S&P 500 lost 38 percent on their property
compared to just 24 percent suffered by U.S. investors because of the fall
of the dollar versus the euro. Suffering such losses, their interest in American
investments is bound to decline. They may even liquidate and withdraw their
holdings, which could lead to a crushing stampede to the exits.
We now face a situation that resembles the late 1970s when the world began
to abandon the dollar and liquidate American investments. It took two years
of Federal Reserve inactivity and 20 percent interest rates to restore foreign
confidence and lure foreigner investors and creditors back. Today, the Fed
is doing the opposite; it is making every effort to stimulate the economy by
flooding the money market while the U.S. Treasury is accelerating its deficit
spending. Both point towards monetary upheavals and deep global recession straight
ahead, and both cast a shadow on the future of the floating dollar standard.
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