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Over the past decade, lenders dramatically loosened underwriting standards
and aggressively marketed an assortment of exotic mortgage products designed
to make home ownership more "affordable." In the end, they helped to create
a now-bursting real estate bubble that increased the costs of shelter for most
Americans and left many of those who shouldn't have taken the plunge in the
first place unable to afford rising mortgage payments -- or anything else.
By communicating more openly and adopting a measured pace of interest rate
rises in the two-year period that began in June 2004, the Federal Reserve sought
to restore a measure of economic equilibrium while reducing market uncertainty.
In reality, their approach helped bolster a quantum leap in risk-taking on
Wall Street and elsewhere and added to ever-growing imbalances that have destabilized
the U.S. economy and made the outlook as uncertain as ever.
Designed to facilitate risk-sharing and mitigate the cyclical downside of
traditional banking practices, the widespread use of securitization in recent
years has been seen as a boon. Instead, it has transformed plain-vanilla credit
exposure into a dangerous concoction of credit, interest rate, prepayment,
counterparty, timing, and operational risk. The gold rush of modern financial
alchemy virtually ensures that all facets of the economy will be adversely
affected when circumstances take a turn for the worse.
Historically, policymakers have viewed over-the-counter derivatives as the
province of sophisticated financial operators who are capable of looking after
their own interests. Yet by seemingly encouraging those who are actively involved
with these often highly-leveraged securities to focus on profitability without
any real oversight or incentives to take stock of the bigger picture, it is
likely that the eventual violent unraveling will be in no one's interests.
Similarly, by allowing hedge funds relatively free rein, regulatory overseers
in Washington and elsewhere have essentially facilitated the spectacular growth
of an industry with a voracious appetite for taking on risk. With limited liability
and an asymmetric compensation structure that encourages many such operators
to go for broke, regulatory arbitrage and intense competitive pressures means
it won't just be sophisticated investors who feel the pain.
To help investors stay better informed and to minimize the potential for Enron-like
chicanery, policymakers introduced measures like the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, which mandated a host of costly accounting and reporting requirements,
and Regulation Full Disclosure, which limited when and how executives could
discuss business prospects. Many companies are now delisting from U.S. exchanges
or shifting activities to more lightly regulated regimes, while most people
seem to know less about what is going on in corporate America than before.
In theory, incentive compensation stock options ensure that the interests
of investors and managers of publicly-traded companies are aligned. In practice,
inadequate accounting rules, poor regulatory oversight, a distorted tax code,
and the lopsidedly pro-business government policy orientation of recent years
has meant otherwise. One result has been a growing scandal involving executives
at more than 150 companies who allegedly manipulated options prices for personal
gain, while another has been a ramp-up in borrowing to fund stock buybacks
at inflated prices.
"Sooner or later," as Robert Louis Stevenson once remarked, "everyone sits
down to a banquet of consequences." Unfortunately, the cumulative effect of
a wide range of unintended consequences such as these means that Americans
as a group will be forced to take the Scottish author's words to heart in the
not too distant future. It will not be a pretty sight.
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