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"The economy has entered a new era", wrote one financial journalist while
another exclaimed that a "new epoch in economics" had arrived. Needless to
say, these Pollyanna statements were typical of the economic slop that was
served up during the Clinton boom. However, just because the same ideologically
motivated commentators cannot find anything good say about the Bush boom this
should not lead Republicans into wrongfully thinking that President Bush's
tax cuts -- vital as they are for economic growth -- have created an economic
nirvana.
I've said on numerous occasions that history does not repeat itself: it's
just that people keep making the same mistakes because they deliberately ignore
the lessons of history. This also goes for most economists -- especially so
in Australia. It is true that during the Clinton boom a few economic commentators
made a comparison between it and the "Roaring Twenties", warning that history
might repeat itself. Even so, they still could not get a handle on the problem.
The great American boom of the 1920s was also hailed as a "New Era", one,
so it was thought, that heralded permanent prosperity for the American people.
A stable price level and booming output convinced the likes of Keynes and Professor
Fisher that a new era had indeed arrived, with Keynes describing Federal Reserve
Board's monetary management as a "triumph" -- a triumph whose economic and
political denouement was the Great Depression. (Though Fisher was later ridiculed
for his optimism, Keynes was praised for his 'wisdom'.)
Investment in the capital structure of about 6.4 per cent a year caused manufacturing
productivity per worker to rise by 43 per cent while prices remained relatively
stable. By 1929 America was producing virtually as many cars as in 1953, the
sale of electrical products tripled, spending on radios rose from about $10.7
million dollars in 1920 to more than $411 million by 1929, a prolonged building
boom provided millions of Americans with their first house.
That the period was marked by rapidly rising consumption was not disputed.
There was, however, a dark side to this success story. Despite the rise in
productivity many workers found it difficult to maintain their purchasing power.
The increasing movement of married women into the workforce at this time tends
to lend support to this view.
Although the 1920s is considered by some to be the greatest boom period in
US history the greatly neglected boom of 1896-1903 exceeded it, certainly in
terms of physical production though not in financial folly. Statistics show
that nearly half of the rise in productivity during the 1920s took place from
1921 to 1923. US Bureau of Labor Statistics reveal that average real wages
(excluding agriculture) rose by just over 6 per cent from 1921 to 1929. Needless
to say, this average concealed considerable differences in pay rates.
What happened was that the attempt at price stabilisation skewed consumption
and created an imbalance in production. (What the Austrian school would call
misdirected production or malinvestments.) The rapid progress in productivity
should have seen the price level gently decline. Convinced by the likes of
Fisher, Gustav Cassel and Sir Ralph Hawtrey that allowing prices to fall was
a bad thing, the Federal Reserve engaged upon massive credit expansion by forcing
down the discount rate.
The result was that though the number of dollar bills remained comparatively
stable ($3.68 billion in 1920 compared with $3.64 billion in 1929) credit grew
from $45.3 billion in June 1921 to $73 billion in July 1929, a 61 per cent
rise. It was this rapid expansion that fuelled the stock market frenzy and
created malinvestments by discoordinating the market process. However, by the
end of 1928 the inflation was over. Total money supply stood at $73 billion
on December 31, 1928 and $73.26 billion on the 29 June 1929.
One argument advanced in support of the price stabilisation doctrine is based
on the fallacy that any general fall in prices is by definition deflationary
and will thus depress business activity and raise unemployment. This view makes
no distinction between a money induced fall in prices caused by a monetary
contraction and falling prices caused by rising productivity. Nonetheless,
economic commentators argue that the period 1870-90 was a deflationary one
in the US and that it was "excess capacity" that drove prices down while "production
boomed. (This kind of nonsense is to be found in the Australian media along
with silly comments about the gold standard and "robber barons").
The Australian Financial Review seriously argued (14 September 1998,
p. 38) the case for the "excess capacity" thesis. It evidently did not occur
to the author that booming output is incompatible with 'excess capacity'. Moreover,
he admitted that falling prices were caused not by a monetary contraction,
i.e., genuine deflation, but by increasing investment -- thus demonstrating
how rife confusion is on this subject. I think that we can largely blame the
monetarists for this situation, despite the fact that Milton Friedman could
writh:
[T]he price level fell to half its initial level in the course of less than
fifteen years and, at the same time, economic growth proceeded at a rapid
rate. The one phenomenon was the seedbed of controversy about monetary arrangements
that was destined to plague the following decades; the other was a vigorous
stage in the continued economic expansion that was destined to raise the
United states to the first rank among the nations of the world. And their
coincidence casts serious doubts on the validity of the now widely held view
that secular price deflation and rapid economic growth are incompatible.
(Milton Friedman and Anna J. Schwartz, A Monetary History of the United
States 1867-1960, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971).
What is obviously not understood is that falling prices due to increased productivity
benefits everyone by spreading the fruits of increased investment. Attempts
to stabilise purchasing power of the monetary unit blocks this process, denying
to many rises in real income they would have otherwise enjoyed. And this is
precisely what happened during the 1920s boom. Credit expansion caused wage
rates in the capital goods industries to significantly outstrip those in the
consumer goods industries.
By expanding credit capitalists were encouraged to invest in lengthier and
more complex stages of production causing them to bid up wage rates at the
expense of those in the consumer goods industries. In addition, because the
means (capital goods, i.e., savings) were not available to finish these stages1
they eventually revealed themselves as malinvestments, misnamed 'excess capacity'.
Put another way, labour employed in the capital goods industries had the value
of its services inflated by credit expansion, which in turn allowed it to bid
more goods away from other workers. It should also be clear that the credit
expansion imposed forced savings which kept real wages below the level that
a genuine free-market saving/consumption ratio would have dictated. And all
for the sake of stable prices. No wonder Phillips, McManus and Nelson were
driven to charge that "the end-result of what was probably the greatest price
stabilisation experiment in history proved to be, simply, the greatest depression" (Banking
and the Business Cycle, New York: The MacMillan Company, 1937).
Unfortunately it was the stock market frenzy that marked out the 1920s and
became the culprit for the depression instead of credit expansion. It is also
in the current stock market boom that we see shadows lurking from the financial
follies of the Roaring Twenties. By 1929 the average stock had tripled its
value in only 7 years. Alarmed at the apparent inexorable rise of the market
and the accompanying reckless speculation, Roger Babson, a Boston financial
adviser, was warning investors in September 1929 of an imminent crash. (Babson
was far from being a lone voice. Sound money men like Benjamin M. Anderson
and E. C. Harwood also warned that a crash was inevitable).
In early 1929 Hayek published a number of articles in the monthly reports
of the Austrian Institute of Economic Research, of which he was director, arguing
that the boom only had months to run. Felix Somary, another economist in the
Austrian school and a Swiss banker, even warned Keynes against buying stock
and predicted an impending crash. Keynes replied: "There will be no more crashes
in our lifetime".
Convinced that the price level proved there was no inflation, Irving Fisher
argued that "stock prices have reached what looks like a permanently high plateau".
In his paper Is There Inflation in the United States?, 1 September 1928,
Keynes endorsed Fisher's hopeless optimism, only to admit in 1930 that he had
been mistaken about inflation.
It is therefore only a matter of time before the current boom also collapses.
Unfortunately the "culture of corruption" that runs through every layer of
the American media will see to it that the Republicans will be held entirely
responsible for any downturn. These politically bigoted hacks will be the same
ones who told us that the Clinton boom heralded a "New Era", and who tried
to pin the blame for the Clinton crash on Bush.
So who or what is really to blame for the boom-bust 'cycle'? Answer: bad economics.
The sort of economics that dominates most economics faculties and central banks.
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