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A student sent me this little gem that an economics lecturer had written on
the blackboard: "Modern economic theory no longer assumes that consumers are
rational -- that is they have perfect knowledge of the market, fixed preferences
and the markets they operate in are efficient". The source for the lecturers'
wisdom, according to the student, is Professor Frank of Cornell University.
To support this contention the lecturer referred the students to an article
by Ross Gittins called Why economists predictably err on the side of human (The
Age, January 2003) in which he supported Frank's view.
Let us start with the fact that it is fundamental axiom in economics is that
people are rational. They act with purpose, regardless of the nature or morality
of that purpose. Even this self-evident truth escapes some people and that
is why Ross Gittins told his readers that Professor Frank of Cornell University
had demonstrated that consumers are frequently irrational in the choices they
make*
To prove his point, Gittins gave us the example of a radio that sells for
$25 dollars in one shop but $20 in another several blocks away. Predictably
we are told that most people will choose to save the $5 by walking to the other
shop. However, when the same situation emerges regarding two televisions priced
at $500 and $495 most people will choose to pay the $500. This action, according
to Frank, is irrational because consumers are weighing the $5 dollars against
the price of the product instead of against the benefit of saving $5. Mr Gittins
agrees with Frank, even calling this kind of behaviour crazy though he admits
to doing it himself.
This kind of consumer behaviour is neither irrational nor crazy, quite the
opposite. Frank and Gittins' error is to confuse the $5 with the marginal purchase
when it is in fact part of it. The costs to the consumer regarding the two
radios in terms of money is not $5 but $25 or $20. The real cost, however,
is what the consumer forgoes in buying one of these radios, i.e., the alternative
goods he would otherwise have bought, what economists call opportunity costs.
Therefore, when choosing between the two radios the consumer is really choosing
between the values of the goods he must sacrifice to obtain the radio.
If the inconvenience (cost) of travelling to the other shop is less than $5
thus keeping the radio below the $25 price he will buy it. But it must be made
clear that the consumer is weighing up the relative values of two possible
purchases, not the $5 dollars difference. This explains the apparent paradox
of the television set. When dealing with comparatively large purchases of substitute
goods where the difference in prices is quite small the inconvenience of seeking
a slightly cheaper substitute is usually considered not worth the effort.
The consumer has a scale of preferences on which goods are ordinally ranked.
At that particular time a TV occupied top ranking and the next ranking is what
is sacrificed to buy the TV, perhaps a stereo system. Now the consumer finds
that an identical TV can be had for $5 less if he is prepared to travel a few
blocks. Most won't. Why? Because the real difference between the purchase is,
once again, not $5 dollars but the value of the goods that must be sacrificed
to buy the TV. In this case, $500 and $495 respectively. In other words, the
opportunity cost to this consumer of the $500 TV is still less than opportunity
cost of the $495 TV plus the cost of travelling to get it.
Although consumers rarely use per centages to express price differences between
similar goods I think it would pay us to do so in this case. The per centage
difference for the radios is 25 per cent: for the TVs it is 1 per cent. This
not to suggest that every consumer will consider that in this case the 1 per
cent is insignificant, only that those who do are still acting rationally.
To suggest that the forgoing behaviour is "crazy" is to reveal a misunderstanding
of marginalism and the true nature of cost. Even worse, for any economist to
suggest that this behaviour is irrational is to impose his value scales on
the consumer. All that Frank and Gittins can legitimately say about these consumers'
behaviour is that their value scales differ from theirs. No more than that.
But perhaps the last word for now should be left to the German Dominican Johannes
Nider who wrote in about 1430:
The proper value of a thing [and it is values we are really talking about]
depends on the way buyers or sellers may think about prices.
To Nider individuals assign utility to goods and on the basis of that make
their choices. But maybe Nider would be considered simple-minded in today's
world.
*Microeconomics and Behaviour, McGraw Hill
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