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Introduction
The Inaugural Session of Gold Standard University was successfully completed
at the Martineum Academy in Szombathely, Hungary, in February, 2007. By unanimous
request the original program Gold and Interest was extended to include Basis as
well. As those who follow my writings on the Internet well know, basis is the
difference between the nearest futures price and the spot price. The gold basis
is one of the most sensitive economic indicators with a seismographic predictive
power. In particular, if taken in conjunction with other indicators such as
the silver basis, volume, open interest, and the lease rates for the monetary
metals, it is capable of predicting the beginning of the disintegration of
the world's payments system. No other scientific method of early warning can
come close. Moreover, basis could also be used as the guiding star of bimetallic
arbitrage between the gold and silver market. If you have a program to accumulate
monetary metals, then the basis will tell you which account you should increase
at any particular moment in time, in order to maximize the efficiency of accumulation.
You always buy the metal with the wider basis. By the same token,
you always sell the one with the narrower basis.
It is nothing short of amazing that all the websites which concern themselves
with the analysis of gold and silver, with the remarkable exception of www.silveraxis.com,
ignore the basis in spite of my repeated prodding to start tracking and reporting
it. I have now proof that this is not due to lack of demand. Accordingly, I
have made the announcement that at the next session of Gold Standard University
scheduled at the Martineum for August 15-31, 2007, we present a blue-ribbon
panel discussion with the title Last Contango: First Sign of Disintegration
of the World's Payments System. The present essay is a primer for prospective
participants.
The Janus-face of marketability
Gold, interest, and basis are strongly inter-related. At the Inaugural Session
we have covered the concept of marketability. Gold and silver have become
money through an evolution as the most marketable goods. In more details, gold
is most marketable in the large. This can also be expressed by saying
that gold is more saleable than any other commodity. Silver is most
marketable in the small. This can also be expressed by sayingthat silver,
along with gold, is more hoardable than any other commodity. The Janus-face
of marketability can be observed if we contemplate that gold is the preferred
agent when one has to transfer value over space. The preferred agent
in transferring value over time is silver followed by gold. We may clearly
recognize the dual nature of money throughout history. In the ancient world
money was cattle and salt. Cattle was most marketable in the large, while salt
was most marketable in the small. Later two other commodities, far more similar
to one another, took over these functions, but the dual nature of money has
been maintained to this day, in spite of the silver and gold demonetization
farce. This is no accident. Duality has to do with the paramount fact that
space and time are absolute categories of human thought.
A new theory of interest
Hoardability leads directly to the concept of interest, which arises
out of the desideratum to optimize conversion of income into wealth and wealth
into income. In choosing the conversion problem as our point of departure to
develop a new theory of interest we have deliberately discarded the old-line
theory based on the exchange of present for future goods that assumes, wrongly,
that without exception a present good is valued more highly than an
equivalent quantity and quality of future good. A more careful analysis shows
that this is true only if the delivery of the various factors to the site of
production or consumption is dove-tailed. Early delivery may result in a loss.
The solution to our optimization problem answers two of the greatest of human
needs: providing for one's old age, and planning for the education of one's
offspring. If the conversion of income into wealth is done through hoarding,
and the reverse conversion through dishoarding -- a process also known as direct
conversion, -- then optimum is achieved by choosing the most hoardable
commodity as agent of conversion. However, direct conversion can be further
improved upon, by passing to indirect conversion, through the agency
of exchange. Typically, a younger man will give up part of his income in exchange
for part of the wealth of an older, as the former is anxious to go into business
for himself for which the latter puts up the capital. Then interest appears
as the value of improvement in efficiency through the exchange over direct
conversion. In particular, direct conversion means zero interest. By contrast,
interest becomes positive if social arrangements admit indirect conversion.
The following point is important. The nexus between gold and interest is established
by the fact that if indirect conversion is hampered by secular or canonical
proscriptions (e.g., usury laws), the economizing individual is not helpless.
He can still achieve his goals by falling back on direct conversion through
hoarding or dishoarding gold. He will do that even in the absence of proscription.
In case interest is suppressed by the banks or the government, he will hoard
gold in protest, and dishoard it as the rate of interest is subsequently allowed
to rise. Thus gold is the agent to validate one's time preference. This
aspect of gold is almost always ignored by authors, including Ludwig von Mises
to whom gold hoarding is a "deus ex machina". He failed to see that
time preference would hardly amount to more than a pious wish if gold hoarding
did not give it teeth. Moreover, this is true whether on a gold standard
or off. When on, gold hoarding means withdrawal of bank reserves whereby
the individual forces the banks to adjust their lending rate to the rate of
marginal time preference. The main excellence of the gold standard is that
it makes the adjustment crisis-free. When off, hoarding makes the gold price
soar, leading to a monetary crisis. The upshot is the same: higher interest
rates. The difference is that adjustment is made in a crisis-prone environment.
Moreover, it generates a swinging interest rate structure that is most damaging
to savers and producers.
Gold hoarding provides an escape for the individual from the harsh consequences
of the predatory monetary and credit policies of the banks and the government
as they plunge society into debt slavery. In the absence of the safeguards
of a gold standard debt slavery is inevitable for those who fail to use the
only prophylactic available: gold.
Paper boat on uncharted waters
Let us turn from the nexus between gold and interest to the nexus between
interest and basis. Mainstream economics made a fatal mistake when it failed
to study the consequences of the emergence of the futures markets in monetary
metals. It was not a spontaneous failure. It was inspired by the banks and
the government that have taken upon themselves the "burden" of financing research.
They have a hidden agenda: to keep the public in deep ignorance and stupor.
Recall that there are no futures markets in monetary metals under a gold standard
for lack of volatility, without which speculation cannot be profitable. But
no sooner had volatility appeared than futures markets in silver and gold sprang
up. As they did, a whole new field of tantalizing research opened up for investigation.
Unfortunately, what it shows is an appalling and scary prospect for the Brave
New World of global irredeemable currency. It shows dissipation and destruction
of capital on a large scale through falling interest rates, and the
drying up of new savings through rising interest rates. This is the
first time ever in history that irredeemable currency has been foisted upon
the entire world, causing the rate of interest to gyrate. Humanity was
herded aboard a paper boat named "Dollar" and tossed onto a stormy sea with
no anchor on hand. No wonder that the powers that be are anxious to put research
under taboo. It is in their interest that the public stay in blissful ignorance
about the fact that the captain of their paper boat has no navigational instruments
while sailing on uncharted waters. Gold Standard University is the first to
defy that taboo.
Primer on basis
The condition that obtains when the futures price is above the spot, or the
more distant futures price is above the nearby, is called contango and,
the opposite, backwardation. Thus the basis is positive or negative
according as the spot market is in contango or in backwardation. The prevalence
of contango is a necessary condition for the warehousing business. Unless there
is an expectation for contango to return after sporadic and temporary backwardation,
warehousemen would go out of business and supplies for future delivery would
be all but unavailable.
The question arises what determines the basis. On the upside it is limited
by carrying charges including freight, storage, insurance, and interest. In
the case of gold and silver the lion's share is interest. On the downside there
is no limit: theoretically the basis can go negative and keep falling indefinitely.
It indicates that a tightening supply is facing increasing demand. Ever larger
number of sellers withdraw their offer to sell. This is the basis risk:
the risk of hedging inventory in the futures market. The cash price may start
going up faster than futures prices forcing hedgers to take an opportunity
loss on inventory. A contemporary example is Barrick Gold Company with
a phony hedge plan losing tons of shareholder money. Note that price risk behaves
the other way round. It is limited in the downside (as the price cannot fall
below zero) but is unlimited in the upside (as there is no theoretical limit
above which the price may not rise).
Interest and marginal utility
The monetary metals are characterized by great stores above ground. The stock-to-flows
ratio is a large multiple for gold. Silver analysts deny that the same holds
for silver. They are at a loss to account for the disappearance of huge stockpiles
of U.S. official silver in any other way but assuming that it has been dissipated
through consumption. There is no hard evidence that this is indeed the case.
We can account for the disappearance of monetary silver through a more plausible
hypothesis, namely, that most of it has gone into hiding. It shall resurface
at the right time and right price, as indeed some of it already has after the
silver price hit a high of 15 dollars per ounce.
The case is different for non-monetary commodities. Here the stock-to-flows
ratio is a small fraction. The reason is declining marginal utility in
contrast with monetary metals with near-constant marginal utility. Mises argues
that constant marginal utility is contradictory because it implies infinite
demand. He is plainly in the wrong. He ignores the nexus between gold and interest.
In more details, interest acts as obstruction to gold hoarding. Demand for
non-monetary commodities is limited by declining marginal utility. By contrast,
demand for monetary commodities can indeed become arbitrarily large, but only
if interest is suppressed by the banks and the government. Thus interest is
an exclusive characteristic of monetary commodities. John Maynard Keynes made
a colossal blunder when he kept talking about the "wheat-rate of interest", "coal-rate
of interest", etc. Interest can only exist in relation to a monetary metal
with constant marginal utility. The marginal utility of wheat and coal declines
very fast indeed.
"It takes three to contango"
Keynes made another terrible blunder when he talked about what he called normal
backwardation. To him backwardation was the natural state of the markets,
and contango, the aberration. He argued that speculators "charge an insurance
premium" for shouldering the price risk while carrying the commodity for
future delivery. It is this premium that shows up in the futures price as
backwardation. This shallow theorizing faithfully reflects the Keynesian
mindset that is haunted by visions of overproduction, market gluts, deflations,
depressions, unemployment, in one word: the "curse of capitalism". The fact,
however, is that ours is a world of scarce resources. Man is engaged in a
constant struggle to overcome the niggardliness of nature. In particular,
he has to have foresight to provide for future needs. If he succeeds, then
future goods will be available to meet future demand in adequate quantities
at the right time. This would not be possible without the services of the
warehouseman and without contango in the futures market. We express this
by saying that "it takes three to contango": the producer, the warehouseman,
and the speculator. Keynes got it all wrong when he blithely ignored the
second member of the troika.
Hoarding is not a dirty word, least of all gold hoarding, in spite of dark
hints to that effect dropped by Keynes. The essential services of the warehouseman
must be studied seriously and without prejudice on the same footing as those
of the producer. The marginal bondholder who decides to sell his bonds in protest
against low interest rates, and to invest the proceeds in gold, must not be
depicted as Scrooge. He is a legitimate warehouseman who carries the hard core
of social savings at a time when banks behave like drunken sailors on leave
at the waterfront, and governments engage in compulsive overspending as if
there was no tomorrow. The resulting capital destruction is appalling. After
Armageddon no one but the warehouseman, alias gold investor, will be
in the position to supply capital for reconstruction. Thank heaven for goldbugs.
Without them we would have to go back and start from scratch as cavemen.
Backwardation can certainly occur, in particular, when supplies are drawn
down just before the new crop of agricultural goods is ready to be brought
in. However, backwardation for monetary metals is a gross anomaly, a red alert
indicating potential breakdown of the payments system in the not-too-distant
future. Gold Standard University has championed the cause of researching this
vital topic. It proposes to study the basis in conjunction with other market
indicators such as lease rates and the yield curve with its various types of
inversion. This research should help people escape the worst when catastrophe
strikes. Forewarned is forearmed.
Lysenkoism -- American style
The reason why mainstream economics is silent on the subject of gold, interest,
and basis is that the interplay of these reveals the incredible mismanagement
of the economy in the twentieth century, as well as the corruption of the monetary
and credit system by the banks and by the government in the twenty-first. Universities
no longer serve the cause of search for and dissemination of truth. Instead,
they provide refuge for a reactionary conspiracy trying to cover up mismanagement
and corruption reinforced by seventy years of Keynesian and thirty-five years
of Friedmanite brainwashing. No university in the entire world, save Gold Standard
University, is prepared to study in a detached manner the subject of gold,
interest, basis, and the theory of warehousing as it applies to the hoarding
of monetary metals. Universities betrayed people anxious to secure their economic
survival in the face of untold dangers, as indicated by the Babeldom of runaway
debt and exploding derivatives markets. Rather, they are serving the interest
of their paymasters.
History will not be kind to mainstream economists. Keynes, Friedman, and their
followers will be lumped together with Soviet biologist Lysenko, stooge and
sycophant of Stalin. Lysenko sent his fellow biologists to the Gulag, never
to be heard from again, for opposing his hare-brained theories of genetics.
Lysenko betrayed science as he betrayed humanity. He was, no less than Stalin,
a monster.
The Quantity Theory of Money
I have never subscribed to the Quantity Theory of Money, nor have I ever believed
that the downfall of the regime of irredeemable currency must necessarily take
the form of hyperinflation. It could, of course, in the wake of wars and revolutions
destroying supplies of goods and facilities of production. But the Quantity
Theory of Money is a linear model that is wholly inapplicable to our highly
non-linear world, now at the peak of its productive powers. The dénouement
of the present global experiment with irredeemable currency is not likely to
involve hyperinflation (assuming that the world will not be plunged into another
World War). Unfortunately, a lot of innocent people will be led astray and
ruined financially by the nearly unanimous propaganda predicated upon the Quantity
Theory prophesying hyperinflation.
In order to see what is happening to our money a more sophisticated theory
is needed. The new theory must assume a thorough understanding of bothmonetary
metals, warehousing, futures markets, basis. We must also have a new theory
of interest that takes gold into full account. We must develop a non-linear
model for the global world economy. This is what the Gold Standard University
has set out to do. It exposes the central fallacy of mainstrean economics in
assuming that producers will forever put up with the plundering of capital
accounts through falling interest rates while meekly accepting irredeemable
promises to pay in exchange for real goods and real services, and that savers
will forever put up with the pilfering of savings accounts through rising interest
rates while meekly turning over their right pocket when the banks and the government
finished picking clean the left. Producers and savers will rise in protest.
They will unite in demanding a stable interest-rate structure. Only a gold
standard can eliminate the plundering of capital accounts and the pilfering
of savings accounts, thus securing social peace.
In the same order of ideas, it is a grave mistake to explain rising gold and
silver prices in terms of the supply/demand equilibrium model. There is simply
no scientific way to define speculative supply and demand applicable to the
monetary metals. This being the case, the model is meaningless. Speculators
jump back and forth between the supply and demand side of the market on a moment's
notice and, when they do, they are likely to act en bloc. The only thing
that the supply/demand equilibrium model can predict is the ever increasing
volatility of the price of monetary metals.
Bull in bear's skin
We must also exorcise the boogeyman of silver analysts: the naked short seller
of monetary metals. The inordinate short interest in the futures markets is
better explained in terms of the activities of a market maker whom I call "bull
in bear's skin". Typically, he is a super-wealthy individual who has learned
the trick how to derive an income in gold on gold -- even while retaining
physical control over his holdings. He is not a naked seller by any stretch
of the imagination. He does have the gold and silver, but keeps them at a safe
distance from the commodity exchange and its predatory policies favoring the
shorts at the expense of the longs. To his mind it pays to pose as a short.
He hides his full armour underneath a mask showing him naked.
The proposition that it is possible to earn an income in silver on silver
without relinquishing physical control of the stuff may sound like gaining
something out of nothing, contradicting the Principle of Conservation of Matter
and Energy. Yet we should not be too hasty in dismissing this possibility.
It is true that income and risk go hand-in-hand. Income is the reward for consistently
successful risk-taking. Show me a man who can generate an income without taking
risks, and I show you one who has invented perpetual motion.
Yet there is no contradiction here. Paradoxically, it was mainstream economists
themselves who made this black art possible. They promoted the regime of irredeemable
currency with the result that the gold price fluctuates. The upshot of it all
was that those intelligent enough to keep their book in terms of gold units
rather than units representing irredeemable promises can indeed earn an income
in gold on gold, even without relinquishing the metal thereby incurring the
risk of losing it. To understand this we only need to refer to the possibility
of harnessing the energy represented by the flow and ebb of water in the oceans.
Likewise, it is possible to harness the energy represented by the fluctuating
price of gold and silver. The best way of doing this is to keep accumulating both monetary
metals while maximizing the efficiency of hoarding. This means that one always
buys the metal the hoarding of which is more efficient at the given price.
But how to determine the relative efficiency of warehousing different goods
as a function of price? This is the same dilemma facing the elevator operator
when he buys grain at harvest time. Should he buy more wheat or more corn?
Should he sell one in order to make more room for the other? The price could
easily mislead him. The basis would not. He solves the problem by always buying
the grain with the wider and selling the one with the narrower basis. In this
way he maximizes the efficiency of his warehousing operation.
What to silver analysts appears as naked short selling is more likely the
activities of bulls in bear's skin. It is the tip of the iceberg that can be
seen. What is not seen, the bulk of the iceberg, is dynamic hedging of ever
increasing gold and silver hoards, and covered option writing, where the principal
wants to stay anonymous. Needless to say the bull in bear's skin is actually
very happy that analyts believe, and spread the belief, that he is naked short.
The longer he can keep his "cover" as being "naked", the better it is for his
operations.
It is futile and puerile to wait for the naked shorts to cover in a panic,
sending the price through the roof. Cover yes, panic no. Make no mistake, this
does not mean that the price may not go through the roof, but if it does, then
it is also likely to go through the floor next time around when the pendulum
swings back. It means that volatility is increasing. The get-rich-quick crowd,
those who are "insanely bullish on silver" waiting for the miracle of the silver
price going to four digits overnight, will be frustrated. Rewards will go to
the patient and industrious observer taking pains to study the market, and
who has the right strategy that can handle the ever-increasing swings in the
price both ways. He will not be dislodged from his long position when
the pendulum swings back. He doesn't subscribe to linear models. His guiding
star is the non-linear model of the variation of basis.
Gold Standard University is working out a strategy following these principles,
one applicable to small and big investors alike. It will be unveiled during
the next session in August, 2007. At this point let's just say that the strategy
is essentially bimetallic arbitrage, but it uses the basis rather than the
bimetallic ratio for clues.
Conservation of matter and energy
But how do we answer the objection that our proposed scheme contradicts the
Principle of Conservation of Matter and Energy? Simple. We don't. We might
as well admit up front that the contradiction is real. Chalk it up as an unintended
gift from the managers of the regime of irredeemable currency. Helicopter Ben
has air-dropped manna to the enemy camp by mistake. Nor can he help but keep
doing it. His navigation system is all screwed up.
The gold standard, when in force, is an instant reward/penalty system that
rules out income generated without risk. Were our schools allowed to teach
economics properly, the electorate would know this and it would demand the
immediate scrapping of irredeemable currency as the most wasteful and iniquitous
monetary system imaginable. It would also demand the immediate reinstatement
of the gold standard as the only monetary system serving even-handed economic
justice. Under a gold standard foreign exchange and interest rates are stable.
So is the price of monetary commodities. There is no profit in gold, silver,
and bond speculation. Interest rate derivatives and bond futures are unknown.
Debt is reined in by the ability to service it. Banks cannot lend long while
borrowing short with impunity. When they lend short, they are limited by their
quick assets. There is no free lunch. Under the gold standard Helicopter Ben
belongs to fairy tales, not to banking, let alone central banking. Under the
gold standard all economic risks are created by nature, none by man. Risks
created by nature are clearly demarcated by the fact that they are addressed
on the floor of the commodity exchange. By contrast, risks created by
man are addressed in the gambling casino. The regime of irredeemable
currency strives for obfuscation and for spreading the lie, eagerly propagated
my mainstream economists, that the risks involved in gold and bond as well
as in interest and foreign exchange rate futures trading are created by nature,
not by man. They conclude that speculation has a dampening effect on these
prices and rates. In fact, just the opposite is true. As in the casino where
an increase in the number of gamblers will heighten the gambling spirit, more
speculation will increase volatility in the gold and bond markets.
The regime of irredeemable currency builds on ignorance. As it defies natural
law, it is digging its own grave. This is the true explanation of the coming
crack-up boom, not the "overissuing" of the currency. The currency was overissued
already a hundred years ago. What needs to be explained is the lag.
References:
A.E.Fekete, What Gold and Silver Analysts Overlook, www.safehaven.com,
May 4, 2004
Bull in Bear's Skin?, www.safehaven.com,
May 5, 2006
Ultracrepidarian Musings, www.safehaven.com,
May 11, 2006
The Rise and Fall of the Gold Basis, www.safehaven.com,
June 23, 2006
Monetary versus Non-Monetary Commodities, www.safehaven.com,
May 25, 2006
The Last Contango in Washington, www.safehaven.com,
June 3, 2006
Tom Szabo, The Silver Basis, www.silveraxis.com/explain_basis.html
Further information on Gold Standard University can be obtained by writing
to: GSUL@t-online.hu
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