|
by Doug Wakefield with Ben Hill
On January 2nd of 1900, the Dow Jones Industrial Average closed at 68. If
you had told those living at that time that in one generation Americans would
be driving automobiles and that the world would be looking back on a war in
which the Allied Forces consumed 12,000 barrels of oil a day, who would have
believed you? On September 3rd of 1929, the Dow closed at 381. If you had told
those living at that time that on July 6th of 1932, the Dow would close at
44 - lower than its value on January 2nd of 1900 - who would have believed
you?
After hitting 991 in January of 1966, thirteen years later, in August of 1979,
the Dow closed at 885, and Business Week wrote a piece titled, "The Death of
Equities." If you had told those living at that time that the next generation
would be surfing the web from their personal computers, who would have believed
you? Who would have believed that median US home prices would go from $64,000,
in 1979, to $257,000, in March of 2006?
On February 20th, 2007, the Dow closed at an all time high of 12,786. One
week later, the Dow saw its worst one-day loss in 7 years (outside of 9/11).
So, was February 27th a worldwide wakeup call for investors or just one more
bump on the road to higher markets? While we wait to see what happens, we must
contend with the fact that, collectively, we have a poor track record of foreseeing
substantial changes in the future. Time and again, history shows the circumstances
that have led to manias and the attendant aftermath of these episodes. In fact,
the record is so replete, that we must consider how large of a role denial
has played in financial history. The headlines and media coverage after Tuesday,
February 27th, only serve to exemplify this trend.
In 2005, I dedicated five months to a topic that I think will be a historically
significant in the near future and in generations to come. Though it has been
around since the 1640s, little has been written on this topic. And, while many
institutional players have had access to this tool through the hedge fund world,
few people actually understand its value to investors. The topic? Short selling.
As recent events have caused some to consider the possibility that markets
have a downside, I've decided to take this opportunity to revisit one of the
managers that I interviewed for Riders
on the Storm: Short Selling in Contrary Winds. As attested to by the Strunk
Short Index, Robert B. Lang, Chairman and CEO of Lang
Asset Management, is one of seven dedicated short-only managers in the
US at this time.
I recently had the opportunity to ask Mr. Lang the following three questions:
Doug - Bob, dedicated short-sellers are extremely rare in our financial markets.
Can you share some of your background and perhaps some of the experiences that
led you to establish a short-only strategy?
Bob - I started in the business in 1959, have managed portfolios since 1964,
and started my own firm in 1980.
I remember when the markets were bottoming in the mid 70s... I remember calling
prospects and telling them P/E (price-to-earnings) ratios were down to 7 or
8, dividend yields were better than 6 percent, and that the market had likely
bottomed so I thought it was a good time to start buying. There was absolutely
no interest. Most people responded with something to the effect of, "I
don't want to touch the stock market. All its good for is losing people money." Well,
times have certainly changed.
Though, I have historically operated on the long side of the markets, during
the latter part of the 1990s, I could tell that the activities on Wall Street
were becoming much more speculative. Security analysts were no longer performing
their traditional roles as independent thinkers. They would just take the information
given to them by the companies they covered and parrot it. Also, since they
had been given a boatload of options, many corporate executives were primarily
interested in hyping their stock by making overly-optimistic predictions. To
boost performances, mutual funds acted in ways that were not in the best interest
of their fundholders. In short, Wall Street lost its way in a bullish tsunami.
Since I had experienced multiple investment cycles and had witnessed how investors
swing from greed to fear, it became apparent that a significant opportunity
was developing for contrarians. That is, it was time to move to the short side
of the markets.
Of course, since we are all products of our experience, and since most participants
have only experienced stocks going up, a bearish view was, and is, extremely
unpopular. Only a handful of investors understand the bigger picture. Stocks
are subject to cycles. That is why long-term cycles occur. That is, one generation
grows up with the understanding that stocks always rise. Finally, the market
declines and a lot of people get hurt and the next generation look at stocks
with contempt. So unless an individual investor is made aware of this pattern,
they are inclined to go along with the current prevailing opinion. After the
fact, that is once a decline unfolds, that decline becomes obvious in hindsight.
But until then, most find it extremely difficult to "fight the crowd."
Doug - Since most investors have no experience with short selling, can you
give us some basic lessons on how short selling works?
Bob - Most investors buy stocks hoping that the price will rise. But short
sellers, like Lang Asset Management, Inc,
anticipate making a profit from declining prices. Expecting a drop in price,
we sell the stock, and buy it back later at a lower price. The difference is
our profit.
The natural question is: how can you sell a stock that you do not own? When
you sell a stock short, the broker lends you the shares from a buyer, who previously
approved such an arrangement. Later, when you buy the stock back (otherwise
called covering), the broker returns the shares to the buyer, and all is settled.
For example, you believe XYZ Corporation stock price is too high, so you instruct
your broker to sell short 100 shares at $50. The broker borrows 100 shares
from another account and "delivers" them to you, the short seller. As a short
seller, you immediately sell the borrowed 100 shares at $50 per share, and
$5,000, the proceeds from the sale, is credited to your account. If the stock
were to fall to $30 a share, you might then decide to buy the 100 shares you
borrowed back for a total of $3,000. You return the borrowed shares to the
broker, and you make a $2,000 profit.
Of course the stock may go up instead of down. Suppose it goes to $60, and
you decide to purchase in order to minimize your losses. You buy the shares
back, and you have lost $1,000 ($5000-$6000). The net result is not all that
different from a situation where you had bought the stock at $60 and watched
it decline to $50.
Unless the broker "calls" the stock back because he must return the borrowed
shares to the owner for some reason, there is no limit on the amount of time
you may remain short. But, having a stock called away is a highly unusual situation
which usually only occurs with stocks that have a low level of liquidity. There
are a few stocks that the broker cannot obtain, and in such cases, you may
not short that particular stock.
There are only a very few pure short sellers, probably measured in the single
digits, versus many thousands of mutual funds and hedge funds. In my opinion,
this endeavor requires a special aptitude, which is not easily transferable
from the long side (without considerable experience).
Doug - How does the client benefit?
Bob - The same way one benefits if a stock rises. Most investors buy stocks
hoping they will increase. The short seller makes a profit when the stock declines.
When an overvalued market turns down, by definition most stocks decline, and
portfolios that are short, increase in value. So, not only does the client
not lose money, but by implementing this "hedging" strategy, he or she actually
profits. Typically, as a measure of diversification, short selling is only
done with a portion of a client's total assets.
Doug - Bob, I'd just like to thank you for taking the time to share your experience
and knowledge with us today.
Unfortunately, millions of investors will never heed the words of Bob Lang
or an article like this one. They continue to see warnings in their everyday
lives, but take comfort in the fact that their friends and advisors are all
doing the same thing. They ignore reality and trust theories that have worked
well (for the last 3 decades) in an ever-expanding sea of credit. So why do
most individuals, maybe even those reading this article, never take steps to
protect their capital from a bear market?
In answering this question, I turn to a professor of geology at UCLA. As an
evolutionary biologist, biogeographer, and Pulitzer Prize winning author, Dr.
Jared Diamond addresses the "it can't break" mindset in a story about individuals
who live below a dam.
According to Diamond, attitude pollsters ask people who live downstream from
the dam how concerned they are about the possibility of the dam bursting. Naturally,
those that live further away from the dam are less concerned about the dam
breaking that those that live closer to it. But shockingly, from a few miles
below the dam, where one would assume the fear would be the greatest, as we
approach the dam, the concern about the dam breaking falls off to zero. Why?
Diamond notes that those that live closest to the dam, who are sure to drown
if the dam breaks, must believe that the dam couldn't break in order to preserve
their own sanity. This ability to suppress or deny thoughts that cause us great
pain is known as psychological denial. Diamond suggests that this behavior,
common to individuals, could apply to groups as well.
The only way that investors will be able to take constructive financial steps
before this credit cycle contracts, is to step outside of the powerful forces
of the herd. From here, they can begin to address the unpleasant reality of
that which is currently unfolding and how we got here. Denial will only lead
to unnecessary losses and increased pain.
To read some of our other postings and learn about our educational
services, we encourage you to visit our website.
Our industry research paper on short selling, Riders
on the Storm: Short Selling in Contrary Winds, is available to those
who subscribe to our monthly newsletter, The
Investors Mind: Anticipating Trends through the Lens of History
Disclaimer - Best Minds Inc. has clients who are using the investment management
services of Lang Asset Management.
|