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Asset Inflation Nation...For any of you living the in SF Bay Area or
familiar with NFL football in general, we're quite sure you've heard the term "Raider
Nation" as it applies to the silver and black of the Oakland Raiders. For those
quite enamored with political satire at its finest, you are certainly more
than familiar with the Colbert Nation. But we suggest that probably the most
important "nation" character description of the moment applies directly to
the broad US economy itself, otherwise known as the Asset Inflation Nation!
Don't believe us, Nation? Well, just have a little glimpse at the chart directly
below. As is described in the chart, we're looking at the annual increase in
household real estate and equity holdings as a percentage of the annual change
in household net worth. Clearly, real estate and equity price inflation has
driven two thirds of the increase in household net worth in the current decade.
The largest number we've seen in six decades at least. Move over Steven Colbert.
Move over Raiders fans everywhere. People, we are the Asset Inflation Nation!
And at this point, clearly in numbers too big to ignore.

Without belaboring the point, this change in character of household net worth
creation over the last three decades has indeed influenced household consumer
behavior as is clearly depicted in the chart below. Quite simplistically, have
the drivers of household asset inflation beginning in the early 1980's influenced
consumption patterns and the character of the US economy since that time? If
the following graphical view of life doesn't answer that question, then we
just don't know what does.

To be honest, we know asset inflation has been a huge macro force for some
time. So just why is this all of a sudden important now? It's important because,
as we all know, in very large part the character of continued household asset
inflation over the last three decades has been accomplished by the macro theme
of accelerated leveraging of household assets. We're not going to go into some
long discussion regarding household leverage. You've seen it all before and
we've discussed it far too many times. The following chart really says it all
and ties directly back into the breakout periods of the prior two charts shown.
In very large measure, all of these charts reflect baby boomer demographics.
So, as we look ahead, we can ask a few very simple questions. We already know
that the baby boom generation has been more than willing to lever up their
personal balance sheets over the last quarter century without so much as batting
an eye. As is clear, since 1980, household leverage as a percentage of GDP
has doubled, after remaining relatively constant in the prior quarter century.
Questions being, as this baby boom generation pushes ever closer to retirement
years where income and liquidity will most certainly be two primary concerns,
just how much more leverage requiring long term cash flow servicing will they
be willing to accept? How many more assets do they have left at the household
level that are both appreciating in price and can be further levered? At this
point, for all intents and purposes, it's clear that the process of leveraging
has had a profound influence on both household net worth growth as well as
the character of the real consumer driven US economy.

We're an asset inflation dependent nation that has been brought here on the
horse called leverage. And over the recent past, leveraging household real
estate assets has been the ticket to continued net worth acceleration and GDP
growth dependent household consumption patterns. So far, its been delightful.
So far, its been delovely. But up to now, let's face it, it has really been
driven primarily by deleverage. So as we look ahead, it's the character of
the macro credit cycle that we believe is THE most important area to monitor.
If households balk at further levering their own balance sheets ahead, what
happens to real estate prices? What happens to consumption? Although these
sound cliché at this point, with the change now occurring in the US
mortgage credit markets, we believe it's of central focus. Willingness to lever
has been a key aspect of the household asset inflation phenomenon for decades
now, and the ripple effects of this phenomenon in terms of shaping and driving
the broad US consumption based economy have been more than quite meaningful.
No arguments. But the important corollary to this willingness has been the
availability of credit at ever lower prices for really over two decades now.
We humbly suggest that anything acting to upset this symbiotic willingness
and availability relationship changes the game. And although it's more than
obvious at the moment, a credit contraction in the land of widespread mortgage
credit availability would do the trick in about five seconds in terms of being
a marker of important change.
Overextension of credit in the mortgage markets has now come home to roost.
Deterioration in sub prime is self obvious. The spillover is already being
seen on the edges of the Alt-A paper world. And although so many talking heads
have put forth the premise recently that the "worst is already behind us" or
that "sub prime credit deterioration is contained", events in the mortgage
credit markets as of late are EXACTLY how broad credit contractions begin.
They always begin at the margin. Initial problems are always contained, until
they spill into other areas, of course. Moreover, in our current circumstances,
what absolutely lies ahead are credit rating downgrades for CDO vehicles (credit
default optons). With so many sub prime blow ups and with surely more to come,
the downgrades in CDO ratings may indeed come fast and furious in the months
ahead. We expect this to commence after 1Q period end. Moody's already has
a black eye for its recent ratings changes involving the large global banks.
Many investors have already commented that their credibility has been seriously
wounded as of late. To maintain some semblance of integrity, they are going
to have to hustle to get ahead of the credit erosion in the CDO markets. And,
as you know, many an institutional investor is precluded from holding below
investment grade paper. So to suggest that the worst is already behind us in
sub prime and other questionable mortgage credits is lunacy.
And during the current cycle, we believe the thought that the Fed will ride
to the rescue is a good bit misplaced (although they will surely try). Why?
Because in the current cycle, as we have explained in past discussions, so
much credit creation has taken place outside of the banking system. The Fed
is no longer large and in charge when it comes to the total credit cycle, and
especially mortgage credit in our current circumstances. Private credit markets
have absolutely no incentive whatsoever to "accommodate" or "provide liquidity" to
ease the pain once a credit cycle turns dark. And it is private credit markets
that have largely funded mortgage credit creation for years now, not the Fed
or the US banking system. For a direct example of this characterization, just
think back to how quickly funding was pulled from New Century Financial. Does
blink of an eye sum it up? Asset Inflation Nation, you are on notice sir!
Its Delightful, Its Delovely, Its Deleverage!...We want to switch gears
a bit. As explained above in very simplified form, there is no question in
our minds that leverage is the horse that brung us to the US household asset
inflation party of the last quarter century. The character of household leverage
acceptance ahead is of critical importance to both real asset markets and the
broad economy as a whole. But what we suggest we also need to importantly keep
in mind is that leverage has increasingly been a keynote of the acceleration
in financial asset prices, especially during the current decade. One of the
important premises of hedge investing is the ability to use leverage. The carry
trade is about nothing but leverage. The derivatives markets, as we have written
about so many times, do nothing but support leverage. And new age wrinkles
such as CDO vehicles (credit default options) center directly on insuring against
leverage gone bad. Of course, many of these are themselves leveraged in the
almighty attempt to generate ever greater rates of investment return. You get
the picture. Much like the household sector dependent on leverage for household
asset inflation, the financial asset markets have likewise become quite the
animals dependent on the ever greater use of leverage in the investment process.
One of the clear results of so much leverage being employed in the financial
asset markets of today is that on a global basis, so many markets and asset
classes really trade as one directionally. Our recent swoon in February and
March certainly proves that out. Where the US financial markets travel ahead
is as much a function of the character of the global financial market as it
is specific to the current attributes of the US markets. And you know that
the credit/liquidity cycle we have spoken of so many times is really global
in nature. Again, if we had to simplify and characterize the most important
events of the last few months, it's the relatively abrupt and coincidental
breaks in the global equity markets in addition to the simultaneous rapid deterioration
in the sub prime corner of the US credit markets. Both of which, again in our
minds, go directly back to the central issue of leverage. Without sounding
too philosophical or conceptual, as we move forward we believe we need to watch
for evidence of change in the character of leverage. And this goes well beyond
the US equity markets specifically. After all, at least as we see it, directional
change in leverage has been responsible for real world economic outcomes for
years now. Same really goes for financial market outcomes. So as we move forward,
we need to ask the question, is macro leverage accelerating or decelerating
in both the real economy and the financial markets? At any point in time, are
we releveraging or deleveraging? Simple enough? Recent events simply force
us to at least think about the process of deleveraging. And that has implications
for both the real economy and financial markets. So here comes the big question,
what do we watch if deleveraging is to take hold at some point?
First, the real world. We all know at this point that the blow-ups in the
world of sub prime mortgage credit will act to close off what has been an important
avenue of credit creation in the US economy, clearly influencing real world
outcomes for the economy as translated through the housing cycle. We need to
remember that funding this corner of the credit market world in years past
has been the hedge fund community, institutional investors such as insurance
companies, pension funds, the large investment banks, other assorted carry
trade players, etc. As the credit environment has turned so abruptly in sub
prime, former sub prime lender after lender has been cut off from further "funding" in
recent weeks. This is credit contraction in action. Unless the Fed is going
to fund the sub prime lenders directly (although they've been pumping money
at the NY Fed window recently), former sub prime loan funding benefactors aren't
walking away from the game, they are running. It's a process of contraction
in credit availability that, as you know, has been quite absent from the markets
and real economy in recent years.
But maybe more importantly, many in the fast money community are finding,
and some to their surprise believe it or not, that they are exposed to sub
prime problems via investments in CDO's, other structured products, etc. As
leveraged investors begin to feel pain in their portfolios, not only do they
begin to question broader risk exposure in a much more meaningful manner, but
many are both forced to and many choose to deleverage, at least for a period,
to stop the short term hemorrhaging. You know that macro growth of credit has
been a one way street for many a moon. So now we've hit our first important
credit market speed bump that in our hearts we all knew was coming. Important
question number one. If the problems in sub prime spread (which we believe
they will), and/or investors begin to reprice risk vis-à-vis credit
spreads in alternative credit market asset classes, will investors as a whole
relever anew or begin a process of deleveraging (that we believe has just begun)?
In a world and global financial marketplace grown accustomed to ongoing acceleration
in leverage that has been supporting asset prices, any change in the process
of what has been ongoing acceleration in leverage is wildly important. Remember,
as we discuss this, we're referring to deleveraging in the investment process
now, not homeowners, for instance, paying down debt. This is all about the
dynamics of structured/leveraged finance that has come to characterize the
US, and in good part global, financial markets. That's the issue.
Below is a quick look at the current credit spread between the 10 year UST
and seasoned Moodys Baa yields. The key watch point is cyclical reversion.

We all know that credit spreads in the land of sub prime and now Alt-A mortgage
paper have widened meaningfully. We've also seen like widening activity in
recent weeks in high yield (the Merrill high yield index). Not only is there
clearly heightened attention and questioning of investment risk implicit in
this action, but also surely the influence of deleveraging somewhere in the
investment community. Without sounding melodramatic here, we believe one of
the key watch points and actual risks for the financial markets ahead is reversion
to the mean in any number of credit market asset class credit spreads. Remember,
in many senses, the private credit markets are the ones to watch. If spread
widening continues in mortgage and high yield paper, and ultimately spreads
more broadly in the fixed income markets, credit spread widening will beget
acceleration in the process of deleveraging in what is the very highly levered
hedge, prop desk, etc. community. And this has direct implications for real
world interest rates and the broader direction of financial asset prices.
Not only will it be important to monitor credit spreads in the weeks and months
ahead, but we believe the potential process of accelerated deleveraging, if
it is to come, will be directly observable in what have been some of the best
asset class performers of the last few years at least. Remember, investment
leverage has not been employed to invest in GE stock, per se, but rather in
emerging market debt, emerging equities, etc. as well as high yielding sub
prime and junk debt paper. The following is the chart of the Templeton Emerging
Markets Income fund. By no means are we trying to single out Templeton/Franklin
as a fund provider. This is just an example of a fund that invests in an asset
class that has been the beneficiary of levered investing really globally. Moreover,
this is a theoretical indicator of emerging market debt freely available to
most investors who do not have access to global credit market data as provided
by a Bloomberg for instance. As is clear, this is up 100% from late 2001, and
this return does not account for any distributions from the fund along the
way.

It just so happens that this fund is invested in the heartland of assets clearly
benefiting from leveraged global investing. As of September first of last year
(the latest available data), here are this fund's tops holdings:
| Issuer |
% Of Portfolio |
| Govt. Of Argentina |
9.94% |
| Govt. Of Brazil |
9.77 |
| Govt. Of Iraq (144A) |
4.73 |
| Govt. Of Venezuela |
4.71 |
| Indonesia Recapital Bonds |
7.12 |
| Govt. Of Peru |
5.96 |
| Govt. Of Russia |
2.64 |
You get the picture.
So our first watch point of importance in terms of the potential for macro
investment deleveraging is credit spreads of all types and the direction of
emerging market debt specifically. Again, trying to keep it simple and focusing
on the singularly large issues of the moment, the potential for the blow up
in sub prime to mark a change in the global fixed income credit spread environment
is very important as we move forward. Widening spreads mean a much greater
potential for broad based deleveraging by what really is the larger than ever
leveraged investment community. And any acceleration in the process of deleveraging
by those exposed to these markets will act to reinforce this very process itself.
Where would it all end? When the last hedge fund capitulated. Of course in
today's world, when there's blood in the water, you can bet your last dollar
it will quickly attract sharks intended to further punish the already wounded.
Conceptually, the reinforcement of short term price trends in both directions
has probably never been stronger. Thank you "miracle" of leverage.
Second simple watch point item of the moment are what have been the global
equity market beneficiaries of leveraged investment. Pretty easy to watch.
We'll move through this very quickly. The EEM - the iShare for the MSCI emerging
markets index - is the poster child for emerging market equities in aggregate.
From the beginning of the US equity rally in early 2003, the EEM is up fourfold.
Have emerging market equities been the beneficiary of levered global investment?
C'mon, are you kidding us? They have been ground zero.

From a very short term standpoint, watch the recent lows on the EEM. If we
break the low $100's to the downside, selling will accelerate. We expect the
EEM to be a very important tell ahead.
When we really think about the long term, we're pretty darn convinced that
the Asian community will play a very powerful role in both driving the global
economic landscape as well as the global financial markets. As we've said for
years now, all investment decisions need to be made within the context of thinking
globally. Having said that, we also all know that over the short term, financial
markets can be notoriously volatile beasts, regardless of long term fundamentals.
So although we're long term believers in the all too popular China/India/etc.
stories, we need to remember that equity markets in these countries have been
the direct beneficiary of meaningful investment popularity, especially over
the past few years. You'll remember that we've chronicled to you many a time
in recent years that equity mutual fund inflows in the US have overwhelmingly
been directed to foreign exposed funds. Same deal goes for the levered institutional
global investment community. Again, no one is taking on investment leverage
to buy the GE's of the world, but it's an entirely different story when it
comes to China, India, Brazil, Russia, etc.
We never plunk down hard earned capital on speculations driven by charts that
appear to rhyme in terms of historical versus current behavior, but the following
says something about the potential downside for leveraged speculation. As you
know, the poster child of the moment for global equity speculation has to be
the Shanghai index. Below is simply a look at the Shangai index since the start
of 2006 and the comparable NASDAQ of 1999 to March of 2000. Okay, here's the
deal. From August of 1999 to March of 2000, the NASDAQ doubled, as you remember
all too well. As is also clear, we saw exactly the same pattern in the Shanghai
index From August of last year to present. There is absolutely no question
in our minds that leverage played a role in the SSEC index doubling over this
very short space of time. Hence, we would sure as heck expect to see any effect
of potential macro investment community deleveraging in the Shanghai index
ahead. A key tell? One of many, but a clear poster child.

Again, hopefully without sounding overly simplistic, we believe watching equity
markets such as Russia, India, Brazil, and even a Mexico (as an example) will
be very important in the weeks and months ahead. If these very popular markets
do not recover to their most recent highs and push ever northward, then it's
a very good bet that the process of macro deleveraging in the levered global
investment community to at least some degree or magnitude has begun and will
continue for a period. It is absolutely clear in the chart below that key turning
points in these markets over the last few years have been completely coincidental.
They trade as one. They are, for lack of a better characterization, the emerging
markets equity trade, not individual country specific driven trades.
Notice that each of these markets had gains in excess of 50% from the lows
during the summer of 2006 to their most recent peaks. The minor exception was
Brazil, which was not that far off the 50% up mark. Of course the Shanghai
Index makes these returns over the same period look conservative. And this
wasn't done at least in part with speculative levered money? C'mon. Levered
hedge money is a heat seeking missile. And these markets where throwing the
heat. Of course to be fair, downside breaks in animals such as these can be
quite the religious conversion experience.




Again, in very simplistic characterization, we believe the impact of leverage
is a key focal point for the here and now. In our minds, the process of acceleration
of leverage among the global investment community has been a huge positive
for both real world economic outcomes as well as financial market outcomes
in recent times. So too will an ultimate, and even temporary, process of deleveraging
be a big negative. A very big negative. We've never before lived in a global
environment, let alone the US specifically, characterized by so much in play
leverage, both in real economies and financial markets. So although we won't
be able to keep ourselves from watching the day to day market character of
volume, moving averages, new highs and lows, put/call averages, etc., we suggest
it is vitally important to both recognize and monitor the manifestations of
leverage in the global investment community. Leverage that has already turned
against its practitioners and former benefactors in the land of US sub prime
mortgage paper. From a macro overview standpoint, we can't overemphasize how
important it will be to keep an eye on fixed income credit spreads as well
as emerging market debt and equities. These have been the primary areas most
heavily influenced by macro leveraged investment/speculation over the last
three to four years. So too should they be the areas to "tell" us change, in
terms of potential deleveraging, has arrived.
One last comment for clarification. When we speak of deleveraging, we're not
talking about every hedge fund and their brother swearing off the use of leverage
on a dime. We're not talking about the derivatives markets being frozen in
time. Rather, we're talking about rate of change and the potential for some
nominal cutting back on margin/leverage in the investment process. It's clear
to us that market participants of today are wildly complacent about, or simply
do not understand, the potential for risk in structured finance vehicles and
the layering of levered investment, especially in the hedge community. The
fact that a number of hedge funds were "surprised" to find they had sub prime
exposure in their CDO investments simply tells us that even the masters of
the universe, if you will, do not have all of their hands around the question
of investment risk. In straight up markets, there are few questions. But in
the current environment, we have the distinct feeling there will also be very
few questions asked if meaningful downside is to unfold. Rather, those being
hurt by leverage in what could become a punishing market environment will shoot
first and save the questions for later. The double edge sword of leverage tends
to evoke those types of responses. Little time for philosophical debate when
one is losing money. Funny how that works. We'll be referring back to this
issue of deleveraging ahead as these asset classes we have referred to in this
discussion show us where their next ports of call lie.
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