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Mr. Greenspan has been hailing the wonderment of the U.S. economy's new resilience, both to the bursting of the stock market bubble and to the
various shocks from terrorists and the Iraq war.
But the cause is obvious. What, for the time being, has prevented a deeper
and longer recession in the United States is more and more of the very same
consumer-borrowing-and-spending bubble, which has been propelling U.S. economic
growth over the past several years.
Yet two things have changed. The first one is the collateral behind the consumer
borrowing and spending binge. Rising stock prices have been replaced by rising
house prices. The second is that it needs more and more rampant credit and
debt creation to master just marginal GDP growth.
Our highly critical assessment of the U.S. economy's performance during the
past two to three years, in fact, finds its major justification in the atrocious
discrepancy that has developed between extremely promiscuous monetary and fiscal
stimuli and their extremely poor economic effects.
Between 2000 and 2002, the federal budget has swung from a surplus of $295
billion into a deficit of $257 billion, heading for a $400-500 billion deficit
in 2003. During the same two years, total nonfinancial credit zoomed $2,520
billion and financial credit by another $1,879 billion, both adding up to $4.4
trillion.
What was the effect of this credit and debt deluge on the economy? GDP during
these two years grew in real terms by $248 billion and in nominal terms by
$621 billion. To us, this is an outright policy disaster.
Yet, American consensus economists are definitely consistent in their approach.
Undeterred by data that overwhelmingly point to the enduring weakness of the
economy, they stick to the same forecast of the U.S. economy's imminent, strong
recovery. Though there is no trace of the generally predicted postwar snapback,
optimism about the U.S. economy and its imminent, strong recovery remain the
order of the day.
Betting on the government's third tax cut, further Federal Reserve easing,
a weaker currency, and still more mortgage refinancing, the consensus expects
economic growth to accelerate to 3-4% in the second half of this year, compared
to the dismal sub-2% in the first half.
In striking contrast, Mr. Greenspan and the Fed have become distinctly more
cautious in their utterances about the economy's prospects. The Fed's latest
Beige Book admits that economic activity remains sluggish. Although "the unwinding
of war-related concerns appears to have provided some lift to business and
consumer confidence," the report said, "the effect has not been dramatic."
Consumer spending was said to have "remained lackluster." Labor markets were
described as "weak" and manufacturing activity as "mixed." In particular, one
remark concerning consumer spending shocked us: "Overall consumer spending
was soft in April and May. Retail sales picked up some after subdued sales
in March, but most reports indicated that sales remained below the level of
a year ago."
This weakness in consumer spending is ominous, considering that new borrowing
and mortgage refinancing are setting ever-new records. Both new and existing
home sales rose to record highs last year, with mortgage origination totaling
$2.5 trillion. According to estimates by the Mortgage Bankers Association,
mortgage origination this year is set to reach even $3 trillion, with over
$1.7 trillion of refinancings.
This mortgage-refinancing binge has had two effects. One is the change in
net new borrowing by the consumer, which rose by a record amount of $768 billion
during 2002. The other effect is the amount 'saved' by private households through
the refinancing of existing mortgages on their interest payments. Considering
that 30-year fixed rates for mortgages have plunged by more than two percentage
points over the past 12 months, from well over 7% to almost 5%, these savings
have played an important role in bolstering disposable consumer incomes.
Pondering where all this money went, we took a look at the pattern of consumer
spending from 2002's first quarter to 2003's first quarter. What we found greatly
surprised us.
Apart from a temporary, minor surge in the sale of motor vehicles, expenditures
on consumer durables were flat over the year. Among nondurable goods, the major
increases in spending were on food, gasoline and fuel. Actually, 63% of the
higher consumer spending was on services, and mainly on housing and medical
care.
It was a discovery that has shocked us - because we learned that the American
consumer's heavy borrowing is largely financing expenditures on essentials.
The other, equally important conclusion to be drawn from these facts is that
consumer spending, despite ever-new records in borrowing, is not able to lead
a sustained recovery. So far, it has prevented a deepening recession, but it
is much too weak for more than that. The obvious indispensable further condition
for sustained, stronger economic growth is higher business fixed investment.
Mr. Greenspan has certainly realized this, having said in a recent speech, "the
central question about the outlook remains whether business firms will quicken
the pace of investment."
Scrutinizing the GDP numbers and also the necessary conditions for a broad
recovery in business fixed investment, we see no chance for it to happen. But
first a clarification of facts:
Over the 12 months to the first quarter of 2003, nonresidential fixed investment
has declined in nominal terms by $21.7 billion and in real terms by $17.6 billion.
The decline occurred across the board, but it was centered in structures, that
is, in nonresidential buildings.
Business investment on equipment and software, measured in current dollars,
increased slightly, by $10 billion, or 1.2%, implying virtual stagnation. Measured
in real terms, however, one item - computers and peripheral equipment - showed
a sharp increase by $56 billion, or 21%. For many bulls, this is one ray of
hope in the economy's overall dismal picture. But we see nothing but hedonic
pricing. In current dollars, business spending on computers rose by just $4.4
billion.
Pondering the possibility of a broad recovery in business capital investment,
we can only repeat what we have stressed many times before. Profit prospects
are the key question in this respect. But scrutinizing the various macroeconomic
components that ultimately determine aggregate profits, we note a preponderance
of negative influences. The greatest potential threat to profits is a return
of private households to higher savings, which is sure to happen when the mortgage
refinancing frenzy abates and long-term interest rates stop falling.
Positive influences from the macro perspective during 2002 were the sharply
widening federal budget deficit and rising residential building. Major negative
influences were the continuous rise in the trade deficit and declining net
investment, mainly due to the continuous rise in depreciations.
The fact is, there are no reasonable signs of an imminent pickup in U.S. economic
growth in general and of business fixed investment in particular. In the last
analysis, all the prevailing optimistic forecasts are based on the conviction
that the Fed and government have the infallible means to generate a recovery
under any circumstances. The chorus calling for the Fed to open its money spigots
further has become deafening.
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