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The first crash in subprime mortgage bonds wasn't noticed until the price
had plunged to 73 in late February. When it was discovered by Wall Street strategists
it was quickly judged to be an isolated event. Then, with the rebound to 84.60
in late May it lost its focus even as an event, let alone a contagious one.
Then the price of the mortgage bond again turned down to take out the February
low in late June, when a number of Fed spokesmen argued that "the pain
from the subprime mess will be contained."
The breakdown was at 73 and the plunge took it to yesterday's 51.62, which
decline seemed to prompt yet more observations that the distress could be isolated.
History provides reliable instruction on credit expansions and credit contractions.
One causes the other and the corruption of central banking from the duty of
providing a sound currency to being the bender of last resort has exacerbated
the booms, which in turn will exacerbate the inevitable contraction.
Those armed with interventionist theories rather than with the evidence of
financial history seem compelled to deny a natural turn towards a credit contraction,
when its time has come.
This occurred with the culmination of the tech-mania in 1Q 2000. Pundits stayed
with the theme that you had to buy the stock market because "there was
no inflation". One of the features of that boom was that it did not
include commodity price inflation - mainly inflation of stock prices.
Today's story has been remarkably different as "you have to buy equities
because there is inflation in commodity prices." However, although
the pitch is opposite to that of 1Q 2000, a boom is a boom and the actual
stories, while interesting, have been controlled by the credit markets.
Typically near the culmination of huge speculative action the yield curve
will turn from inversion to steepening, at which time usually the wheels
begin to fall off the most egregious speculations.
Recent examples would include nickel's 40% plunge and the subprime "mess" becoming
more acute as it afflicts the traditional corporate bond market.
Describing the problem as a "mess" implies that it is isolated and eligible
for fixing.
This was the case with the "Asian Crisis" that started with the Thai baht
on July 1, 1997. The problem followed excessive local speculation blowing out
and on the usual liquidity crisis the central bank suffered a shocking loss
of reserves. The financial media overlooked the real problem and described
it as "currency turmoil", with the implication that it could
be fixed by wise policy. The other reporting blunder was the insistence that
credit distress would be isolated to Thailand.
Then when it afflicted the Philippines, media still insisted that it could
be contained. Well, as the world discovered, the distress couldn't be contained
and despite the affliction spreading U.S. corporate spreads did not adjust
for risk until it was too late and in October suffered the worst hit in a decade.
All the way down the slide the establishment insisted that it was currency
turmoil and that it could be contained.
The current subprime "mess" turned acute earlier in the year, and traditional
corporate spreads remained immune until mid June. After basking in splendid
isolation at record narrow spreads, widening has taken junk from 418 bps over
treasuries to 595 bps. With this the yield has jumped from 9.50% to almost
11%, which would knock some 13 points off a representative junk-bond.
Usually junk-bonds and the stock market go up and down together. Given the
nature of credit the stock market will get in line with the building liquidity
crisis.
As with the end of previous credit inflations, the contraction is progressing
from sector to sector. This time around it started with subprime mortgage bonds
and has now taken out junk which most of the time acts like a stock.
This is likely the biggest train wreck in financial history and until today,
in looking at the senior stock indexes the bulls are getting aboard the last
train into Dodge City.
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