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A chimerical force has been rampaging through global markets in recent months,
wreaking widespread havoc. Cobbled together from myriad agreements, assumptions,
and transactions by academics, financiers, and marketers, this labyrinthine
creation was once seen as an unmitigated success of new age financial alchemy.
But now, with changing economic and financial conditions exposing the derivatives-securitization
monster to the harsh light of day, the nightmare of Frankenstein finance is
coming home to roost.
For years, industry insiders and so-called experts have proclaimed the virtues
of slicing, dicing, and repackaging risk. They waxed on about how borrowers
and savers, and society as a whole, could only benefit from such machinations.
They suggested any sort of exposure could be disbursed and dissipated to the
point where it essentially disappeared. Some even claimed that the crises of
the past would no longer exist.
Yet amid the hype and assurances, few supporters spoke of the dark side of
wanton and widespread risk-shifting. They didn't seem -- or want -- to acknowledge
that by combining complicated risks in unfamiliar and unnatural ways, the end
result could be an uncontrollable monstrosity -- one that eventually turned
on its masters.
Nor did they heed the notion that by scattering risk into every nook and cranny
of the global financial system, the vast web of overlapping linkages virtually
guaranteed that serious problems in one sector, market, or country would trigger
far-reaching shockwaves. Much like, for instance, the allegedly "contained" meltdown
in the subprime sector has done.
Proponents also discounted the fact that peaks and troughs would be amplified
to stomach-churning extremes by technology and networks that ensure the smooth
functioning of such complex systems. In the new age, point-and-click computing
power and fiber-optic networks are a substitute for physical proximity when
it comes to promulgating an old-fashioned rush for the exits.
Another problem with this synthesized latticework is that it enables toxic
fallout to flow unimpeded and puddle in places with widely varying rules, regulatory
standards, political regimes, and moral codes. This all but ensures that when
defensive measures have to be taken, solutions are not only hard to find, but
impossible to implement.
What's more, with loans and other easy-to-understand financial products squeezed
through the sausage-grinder of structured finance into cash-flows, tranches,
and other nebulous constructs, few regulators, politicians, or industry leaders
will be able to ring-fence, let alone identify, the source of any systemic
toxicity.
The transformation of illiquid obligations into tradable securities and the
emergence of markets for all sorts of exotic derivatives have created a dangerous
illusion of rampant liquidity. In truth, with energy and resources drawn away
from public exchanges and plain-vanilla products into a splintering array of
pseudo-markets, the stage is set for these phantom trading venues to disappear
-- suddenly, and all at once.
Unintended consequences have also stemmed from the popular belief that the "system" is
a lot safer than it used to be. Many new age operators have been motivated,
even compelled, to take on far more risk than they might have when unlimited
cheap finance, safety nets, and instant-exit strategies were lacking.
And even with the added exposure, Wall Streeters have been much less worried
about circumstances going awry than in the past -- until recently, at least.
That is because they believed they had passed the risk along. No point in paying
too much attention to what they were dumping into the global financial system
- it was somebody else's problem now.
Of course, the innovations and efficiencies of modern finance enabled all
comers, regardless of acumen or resources, to grab their share of the pie,
no matter how overpriced, dangerous, or misrepresented the stuff that Wall
Street was churning out happened to be. There's nothing like having plenty
of weak hands in the game when the going gets tough.
Not surprisingly, though, now that the losses are starting to pile up and
everyone seems to be up to their ears in all sorts of toxic financial waste,
it seems that a growing number of these naïve bagholders are mad as hell
and gearing up for a fight - as well as putting their lawyers on retainer.
Even the notion of splitting risks into simple parts proved fallacious. While
those who traded mortgage-backed securities, for example, thought they were
mainly dabbling in credit risk, the reality now seems altogether different.
Aside from liquidity, correlation, counterparty, and other risks, many have,
like Bear Stearns, been confronted with another form of exposure -- reputational
risk. They have been forced to backstop legally separate operations or face
having their own viability threatened.
Over-reliance on technology and overconfidence in the prowess of academics
helped foster a near blind dependence on dubious data and inadequate models.
These were, in turn, transformed into the seemingly unshakeable foundations
of multi-billion dollar investment decisions. Greed, complacency, and fraud
followed, and as the flow of money circled around, many of the original assumptions
are turning out to be dicier still.
In the real estate, for example, what many once believed was the gold standard
of collateral has lost its luster. For strapped commuters living in an age
of digital money, it seems that automobile loan and credit card payments now
have greater priority than the monthly mortgage bill. With the lax standards
of recent years leaving many borrowers with little skin in game, is it really
all that surprising?
Regardless, now that the man-made monstrosity has emerged from dormancy with
a destructive, self-perpetuating momentum, it's too late, of course, to go
back and try to repair the mistakes of the past. All we can do now is batten
down the hatches and steel ourselves for a powerful and rapidly expanding global
threat: the revenge of Frankenstein finance.
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