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"...All financial bubbles need the rabble to pile in before the bubble
goes bang. But something's amiss this time round..."
DAY TRADERS in spring 2000, shoe-shine boys in 1929, the "meaner rabble" in
1720's London...
Glancing at the history of speculative bubbles, as we do all too often here
at BullionVault, we find the ordinary
sort in fact acts as the very pin itself.
The one thing needful at the top of each bubble, the rabble also take on the
role of greatest sucker, too. Piling in as the smart money runs for the exits,
the common-or-garden investor pays top price. He or she is then left holding
the "asset" as its price collapses...and by that time, the Lear Jets have long
since cleared the tarmac...taking the money with them.
Think of it as the classic "life cycle" pitch from your financial advisor,
only with a side-splitting twist. There, you'll find a retirement wannabee
moving from "accumulation" to "distribution" and then "legacy". In a market-wide
bubble, by contrast, the smart money first accumulates an asset, before distributing
it to the dumb money, which is then left holding a legacy of wipe-out losses
and debt.
Ha! It's a laugh-a-minute when the poor schmucks find the "wealth" they've
gathered is evaporating in the sell-off.
But something's amiss with the pattern of the latest financial bubble to burst
- the bubble inflated by cheap home loans worldwide. Yes, "Every fool aspired
to be a knave," as a broadside noted of the South Sea Bubble nearly 300 years
earlier. No-doc and low-doc aren't known as "liar's loans" for nothing.
But rather than the fools merely failing to turn knave now they're losing
their homes, they have also succeeded in pushing the foolishness far higher
up the food chain. The greatest excesses have come at the top, up in the marble-topped
kitchen of haute finance - where the MBS, CDS and CDOs still can't be
served, mercifully, to ordinary investors calling their broker direct.
Driven by the "liar's loans" of 2003-2006, in fact, this last gasp of air
into the US housing boom saw the mortgage lenders and their creditors - the
investment banks - playing the fools at every chance they got.
Outstanding US mortgage-backed sceurities ($bn)

Mortgage lenders happily played the fool, apparently safe in the knowledge
that the magic of securitization - of packaging home-loan assets for sale to
other financial institutions - would get them "off risk" quick smart. Why worry
about risk when appraising a new loan? The chance of default by the wannabee
home-owner was set to become somebody else's concern.
Nor was the chance of default a concern for the investment banks, either.
In running the sale of the home-loan backed bonds, they simply passed on the
risk...letting it trickle through their fingers in return for a fat fee. Bundling
higher-risk securities into a collateralized debt obligation (CDO) with enough
boxes ticked to qualify for a triple-A rating, managers could earn up to 0.75%
of the sum total. One asset manager says he'd expect a pay-out of $2.5 million
each and every year until maturity on a $500 million CDO.
With the money men playing the fools so gladly, therefore, it's no surprise
to find mortgage underwriting changed beyond recognition between 1998 and 2006,
as First American Financial recently reported:
- Adjustable rate mortgages as a percentage of new mortgages rose from 0.7%
to 69.5%;
- Negative Amortization loans - where the principal owed actually increases
over time - rose from 0% to 42.2% of the market;
- Interest Only home loans - where the borrower only has to cover the interest
due, leaving the principal for repayment sometime in the far future - rose
from 0.1% to 35.6%;
- Silent Seconds, issued on the back of outstanding loans to the most vaguely-related
people, rose from 0.1% to 38.7%;
- Low Documentation - where the greater the lie, the greater the loan - rose
from 57% to 79.8%.
In short, the US mortgage market switched from cautious Fixed-Rate borrowing
to head-in-the-sand ARMs...while the underlying debt was left untouched or
actually grew larger...as borrowers struggled to meet just the interest alone
after fudging the numbers to bag a loan they could never repay.
Most shocking of all, as Robert Rodriguez of First Pacific Advisors has noted, "is
that the origination volumes for the last two years, when the most egregious
deterioration in underwriting standards occurred, total more than the previous
seven years of originations combined."
New US mortgage-backed securities ($bn)

The Fed's data only runs back to 2001, but it clearly shows that - just as
in every bubble before it - the value of cash taken out by the smart money
at the top of the US home-loans scandal was greater than the entire accumulation
preceding it.
Quite who this smart money was, however, remains a real mystery. For the dumb
money pumped in at the top actually came from hedge funds and
Wall Street insiders, rather than flowing to them! This time around, it was
the smartest guys in the room who played sucker - lending money to home-buyers
with no thought for risk and no hope of repayment.
A victory for us poor fools at the bottom, perhaps? Trouble is for the "meaner
rabble", of course, the knaves and the fools at Bear Stearns, Queen's Walk,
Basis Capital, IKB, BNP Paribas, Barclays Capital and everywhere else were
using our retirement savings to inflate that last gasp. Put mortgage-backed
tomfoolery aside, in fact, and you'll find the same problem - of professional
investors neglecting the concept of risk in search of easy returns - right
across the developed world's pension portfolio right now.
"24% of all the hyper-leveraged assets managed by large hedge funds ($1 billion
or more) internationally, belong to pension funds and endowments," says a June
18 report from Greenwich Associates, as quoted by Paul Gallagher in the Executive
Intelligence Review. "This average is just below the 25% limit at which an
individual hedge fund, under the [US] Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA) as modified in 2006, becomes an investment advisor with fiduciary responsibility
for the pension fund doing the investing - something hedge funds obviously
do not want to do."
More than that, pension funds have also stumped up one-fifth of the money
held in 'hedge funds of funds', the aggregating super-funds run by many large
banks. In first-half 2007, around 40% of current flows into the hedge fund
industry has come from pension funds. And "as pension fund money is coming
in," says Gallagher, "it's allowing 'smart' money to get out."
Or rather, the flood of pension fund money was allowing the
smarties to get out before the start of August. Now even the dimmest pension
fund trustee...sat on even the farthest flung beach for his vacation...will
know just how foolish buying mortgage-backed bonds and derivatives would make
him today. Quite how the so-called smart money now plans to exit the high-leverage
debt markets is anyone's guess.
"The overall flow of capital into hedge funds has dropped dramatically - from
$40 billion each quarter over January-September 2006," Gallagher goes on, "to
just $12 billion in fourth quarter 2006, and $20.7 billion in first quarter
2007. Numerous reports, including a new one from Chicago-based Hedge Fund Research,
Inc., have shown 'high net-worth individuals' reducing their net hedge fund
investments by half, between 2006 and 2007 - investing instead into real property
and stocks. They now account for only about 20% of the assets of hedge funds,
which were supposedly made for them."
Instead of high-net worth billionaires, it's now Joe Public left holding this
junk, thanks of course to his well-paid retirement fund managers. As late as
May of this year, Jean Fleischhacker - a senior managing director at Bear Stearns
- was telling fund managers gathered in a Vegas ballroom that they could generate
20% annual returns from un-rated mortgage-backed credit derivatives. The Dallas
Police and Fire Pension Fund bought its first collateralized debt obligation
(CDO) in early 2005. "We were beefing up our risk and we were hoping for a
greater return," said Richard Tettament, head of the $3.2 billion fund, to
Bloomberg in March. He couldn't say what kind of collateral was actually backing
the CDO, but he reckoned the returns were above 20% in 2006. The largest bank
in the United States, Citigroup, recently sold $140 million in just this kind
of un-rated junk to the California Public Employees' Retirement System, too.
Members of the Calpers scheme have just got to wonder, along with the rest
of us: How much is that $140 million worth today? Because the "meaner rabble" really
did climb on board this mega-geared bubble in liars' loans.
It's just that in this money bubble, most people had no idea they were even
involved - let alone put at risk. It should offer small comfort, however. Giving
control of your money to a financial "expert" might indeed prove the most foolish
decision of all.
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