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Fund managers and investors have been puzzled why prices across a wide spectrum
of assets moved together last week - namely, down. I think it has everything
to do with delevering. What is bringing about delevering? When a fund owns
assets that are going down in value for some fundamental reason, say mortgage-backed
securities whose underlying collateral are defaulting subprime mortgages, and
the fund is levered, its creditors start to make margin calls. The fund, then,
has to sell assets to raise cash. The fund might end up selling relatively
high-quality and liquid assets in order to raise the maximum amount of cash
quickly to meet its margin call. This puts downward pressure on the prices
of assets not tainted by credit risk.
Now price volatility increases in asset classes unrelated to the originally
troubled asset class. Many hedge funds engage in seemingly low-risk strategies
that have commensurately low returns. In order to boost investor returns, these
low-risk funds incur leverage. Many of these funds measure risk by the price
volatility of their asset holdings. When there has been an extended period
of low price volatility, risk is considered to be low. Therefore, more leverage
can be incurred. But when asset-price volatility starts to increase due to
the sale of assets to meet margin calls by funds with tainted assets, funds
with seemingly "good" assets are forced to delever because of the
increased risk these hitherto low-risk funds now face. So, the low-risk funds
end up selling "safe" assets in the process of delevering, thereby
putting downward pressure on the prices of these "safe" assets.
Leverage is wonderful when asset prices are rising. It is a bear when asset
prices start to retreat. It creates a vicious cycle. Both the sinners and the
sacred get got in the undertow.
Derivatives and Risk: When the Cost Goes Down, More Gets "Produced"
In recent years there has been exponential growth in the financial derivatives
markets. Financial engineers have been hard at work designing and introducing
derivatives that will shift the risk of almost anything you can think of. Today
(or perhaps more accurately, a couple of weeks ago) the cost of shifting risk
through the use of derivatives is (was) considerably less expensive than it
was twenty years ago. Econ 101 says that when the cost of production of something
goes down, the quantity demanded of that something goes up and more of that
something gets produced. So, if the cost of risk-shifting goes down,
more overall risk gets created in the global financial system. So, yes,
the growth in financial derivatives has enabled investors (?) to shift risk.
It also has encouraged an increase in overall risk to be taken in the financial
system.
Can the PBOC Wait Until August 25, 2008 to Rein In Inflation?
The Chinese government reported today that Chinese consumer inflation in
July reached 5.6% on a year-over-year basis - its highest rate since
February 1997. As the chart below shows, Chinese consumer inflation has been
trending higher throughout 2007. The People's Bank of China (PBOC) and
the Chinese central government has implemented a series of measures this year
in an attempt to rein in consumer price as well as asset price inflation. As
I argued in the July 20th commentary (How
Do You Say "Rube Goldberg" in Chinese?), these acts will prove
to be futile until the Chinese decide to stop supporting a fundamentally weak
currency - the U.S. dollar. The PBOC supports the U.S. dollar by purchasing
dollars in the foreign exchange market. It pays for these dollars with Chinese
yuan, which it creates, figuratively, out of thin air - the way all central
banks create their respective currencies under this global anchorless fiat
money system that we have had since 1971. The yuan the PBOC creates as a consequence
of its U.S. dollar support operations is causing Chinese consumer and asset
prices to rise at faster rates. The Chinese central government may be loathe
to stop supporting the U.S. dollar until after the upcoming summer Olympics,
which are to be held in Beijing on August 8 through August 24, 2008, for fear
of creating an economically-destabilizing financial market reaction. But if
the U.S. dollar remains under downward pressure and the PBOC continues to support
it through August 24, 2008, Chinese consumer and asset prices are likely to
continue rising at undesirable rates, which, themselves, may be economically
destabilizing. The volatility the global financial markets have experienced
in the past week is nothing compared to what they will experience when the
PBOC stops supporting the U.S. dollar.
Chart 1

Japanese Q2 Real GDP Growth Downshifts Sharply as Export Growth
Slows
After growing at an annualized rate of 3.2% in the first quarter,
Japanese real GDP growth slowed to only 0.5% in the second quarter. To be sure,
domestic demand growth slowed - from 1.5% to 0.4%. But, as the first
chart below shows, a rising percentage of Japanese real GDP is accounted for
by its exports. For example, in Q2:2003, real exports accounted for 11.5% of
Japanese real GDP. By Q2:2007, this ratio had risen to 15.3%.
Chart 2

In the second quarter, annualized Japanese real export growth
slowed to 3.5% from 14.3% in the first quarter. Hmm. U.S. real imports contracted at
an annual rate of 2.6% in the second quarter after growing 3.9% in the first.
As the chart below shows, there is relatively high positive correlation between
U.S. real import growth and Japanese real export growth. So, if U.S. domestic
demand is slowing, this will retard U.S. import growth. Simultaneously, this
will retard export growth in the world's second largest economy - Japan.
All of which goes to show that the consensus talk about how the global economic
fundamentals are in great shape even if the U.S. economy is going through a
bit of a "soft patch" (Alan, how we miss your phrase-making) is
just another example of partial-equilibrium analysis. We live in a general
equilibrium world. Everything affects everything else. And one important reason
non-U.S. real GDP growth has been so strong in recent years is that the U.S.
has been a huge importer of the rest of the world's production. Now that
U.S. domestic demand is giving up the ghost, the rest of the world will begin
to see its export growth slow. On top of that, because many foreign central
banks have been tightening their monetary policies, the rest of the world's domestic demand
will be slowing as well.
Chart 3

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